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First-Year Writing
Conference Award Winners

First-Year Writing "equips students to grow as writers in the Wheaton College classroom and beyond. The course is designed to prepare students to write effectively in a variety of social contexts and to improve student learning and performance in many other facets of their undergraduate education." At the end of the course, students present their research papers to one another at a student conference, and instructors award prizes for the best papers. The winners are chosen through a two-step process: instructors nominate students' papers from their classes and then a panel of judges selects the best papers from the nominations. The following research papers received FYW awards in 2015-2016.

Salvaging Slacktivism: Why Awareness Counts in Social Media Activism

Sarah Holcomb

The emergence of slacktivism, or easy online activism through social media, has been critiqued by some scholars who claim it fails to mobilize or effectively create change, while others contend it promotes awareness. In this essay, Holcomb assesses the claims of both groups, and while she agrees that social media activism is a problem when seen as an end result that prevents people from further meaningful support, it can function as a source of "value alignment." Because social media activism creates awareness, it can allow people to come into contact with a cause and to decide whether or not that cause is one that is in line with their values—thus getting more people involved in a more meaningful way.

On November 13, 2015, three terrorists bombed Paris, France, killing 130 people, injuring hundreds more, and creating international outrage in an organized attack by the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL). Another explosion followed: that of millions of social media users spreading Twitter hashtags and modifying Facebook profile pictures with a temporary France flag filter created and promoted by Facebook. Blue, red, and white stripes blanketed Facebook feeds as thousands joined the movement within mere minutes. The effort, intended to exhibit "solidarity," became the subject of a recurring debate within popular media and academia alike: does social media activism actually create change?

Many, like one blogger for USA Today, criticized participants in the movement, claiming that making a difference "doesn't start with a Twitter rant or a Facebook photo" (Petrow). Some labeled participants as "slacktivists," who desire to "feel good without having to do anything substantive" (Skoric). This stance echoes Malcolm Gladwell's famous critique of social media in 2010 claiming that physical effort, not distant support, creates change (Gladwell). Proponents of the slacktivism critique, however, dismiss the value of social media activism too quickly, without acknowledging its ability to create awareness and foster advocacy, especially within the millennial generation. Social media activism may serve as a powerful and positive tool for promoting important issues, especially concerning marginalized groups; it only becomes harmful when participants view it as a substitute for further action, treating it as an end in itself.

In order to understand social media activism and the slacktivism critique, we must first distinguish between the primary categories of online activism and their corresponding goals. Martha McCaughey and Michael Ayers identify three types of Internet activism: "awareness/advocacy," which focuses on sharing information and creating a support base, "organization/mobilization," which seeks to organize

physical demonstrations, and "action/reaction," which concentrates on direct internet action like hacking (McCaughey and Ayers 72-75). For the scope of this paper, I will examine the ability of social media (focusing on Facebook and Twitter) to create awareness and facilitate advocacy through forms of online affirmation, such as the altercation of a profile picture for a specific campaign, "liking" an organization's Facebook page, or "retweeting" a hashtag.

Every day, Facebook adds a half a million new users, or six profiles every second (Regan). Given that social media sites boast more than 2.2 billion active users, which is over 30% of the world's population, these platforms play a pivotal role in informing people around the world and influencing public thought (Regan). Out of the 90% of millennials (ages 18-29) who use social media, 36% say that they are online "almost constantly," making social media one of the most influential ways in which young adults in particular connect and communicate (Perrin). The Pew Research Center discovered that during January 16-20 of 2014, when piracy legislation threatening online freedom provoked social media backlash, almost a quarter of millennials "followed the SOPA battle more closely than any other topic [that week], making it a bigger story among that youthful demographic than the presidential race" (Hitlin and Tan). This massive display of online interest and support demonstrated the power of social media to advocate causes as millions expressed their disapproval online and successfully "derailed" the bill (Hitlin and Tan). Social media clearly possesses a remarkable capacity for sparking public interest and conversation.

Many critics, however, dismiss social media activism too quickly due to flawed assessments. The first attack often brought against social media activism, as articulated in Malcolm Gladwell's article "Small Change," published in the New York Times, claims that because social media activism requires little effort, it is illegitimate (Gladwell). Gladwell contrasts a civil rights sit-in, which he terms "strong tie activism," to loosely organized online platforms, which he labels "weak tie connections." While the former relies on a network of dedicated individuals, the latter, "slacktivist," group is unlikely to be united by the same level of conviction (Gladwell).

Gladwell's case, however, fails to make an important distinction between the different varieties of social media activism, namely awareness and advocacy-oriented activism and mobilization-focused activism. His argument presumes that legitimate activism must result in physical demonstration; he endeavors to show social media's ineffectiveness regarding protest organization in order to disprove its ability to create any kind of meaningful change. While Gladwell may be correct pertaining to mobilization-oriented activism, he misrepresents the value of awareness and advocacy-based activism by presuming a narrow definition.

Unlike mobilization-focused activism, the goal of awareness-oriented activism is not to organize a team or demonstration, but rather to promote a particular issue in order to shift public opinion or increase general awareness. We should not dismiss such activity as meaningless simply because its impact appears less overt; evidence shows social media activism to be a tool of empowerment. A study by Johnson and Kaye discovered "internet activity to have positive effects on political attitudes and suggests that the Internet may help diminish political detachment since it empowers those otherwise feeling marginalized" (Johnson and Kaye). This finding illustrates how social media campaigns can not only impact viewers through their messages, but also give a voice to those under-represented in policy-making or mass media.

Stephanie Vie's research examining the Human Rights Campaign (HRC) logo corroborates this argument. The HRC logo was viewed more than 50 million times on Facebook, creating record-breaking traffic for the campaign's website, as participants used it to modify their profile pictures in support of marriage equality. Vie answers the question "what kind of lasting effects can be felt from seeing someone change their Facebook profile picture to a particular image for a short time?" by arguing for the power of online support to combat microaggressions, or ongoing discriminatory encounters, which produce a host of negative effects like poor self-image, lower health, and inferior access to opportunities (Vie). Ultimately, she concludes that the value of participating in a profile-changing

campaign "lies in [its] ability to draw attention to issues and causes worth our interest" (Vie). Her study illustrates that even small actions such as changing one's profile picture, when visible on a powerfully popular platform such as Facebook, can inform a large audience, garner advocates, and demonstrate support and/or sympathy.

Recent social media campaigns have followed a similar pattern of calling attention to those who are marginalized by race, gender, or sexuality as evidenced by campaigns like #BlackLivesMatter, #HeForShe and #LoveWins. Furthermore, the Georgetown Center for Research shows that ethnic minority groups, as well as women, place greater value on social media within activism, which emphasizes the importance of social media activism to marginalized or underrepresented groups (Georgetown 20, 23). Gladwell's restrictive idea of legitimate activism excludes the individual, low-cost actions that still possess the ability to make a difference in the lives of others, whether to a single victim or an audience of millions.

The other main critique of social media activism, as voiced by Evgeny Morozov, targets the motivations of so-called slacktivists, claiming that they participate selfishly, for the sake of popularity, laziness, or constructing a personal online identity, with little to no actual political interest (Morozov 186). Morozov particularly associates millennials, which he terms "the lazy generation," with the slacktivist profile (186). This seems logical since millennials are digital natives who, according to Lance Bennet, professor of Communications at Washington University, "prefer participating in looser and less hierarchical networks" (Bennet). Morozov uses this concept of misguided motivation to argue that social media activism's power has been vastly-over estimated.

While the need for online support to translate into tangible, meaningful action is clear, Morozov's analysis overlooks important distinctions between traditional activism and the activist efforts of the younger generation. While Morozov criticizes online identity-making as selfish, studies show millennials often pursue social change through "building common identities" (Teruelle 203). By constructing an image of what he or she stands for as an individual through publically supporting causes of personal interest, a millennial may seek to establish his or her own platform for advocacy. Coffé and Chapman write in their study "Changing Facebook Profile Pictures as Part of a Campaign: Who Does it and Why?" that the most commonly cited motivation of young adults participating in social media activism is to "spread awareness" (Coffé and Chapman 18). They note that "the ability to change one's Facebook profile picture can thus be seen as a prime opportunity to create a (political) identity. It allows Facebook users to show their friends political issues they care about and in that process construct an identity which corresponds with how they wish to be perceived" (9-10). This finding reveals that identity construction may not be a narcissistic distraction, but instead a customary component of activism for younger generations. In addition, the study revealed that those who were already "politically engaged offline," participating in events or protests, were significantly more likely to change their profile picture as part of a campaign, demonstrating that many social media activists already care about the causes which they support (17). Therefore, Morozov's critique fails to validate millennial patterns and preferences in activism engagement and creates an inaccurately narrow profile of the typical participant.

In addition, this argument fails to discredit social media activism because it places too much emphasis on the role of the individual participant, analyzing personal motivations and contributions while the power of awareness and advocacy-based activism primarily lies in the convergence of mass messages, such as the 18 million Facebook users who changed their profile pictures to support the Human Rights Campaign (Vie). While small exhibits of individual support such as changing one's Facebook profile picture may sometimes be misplaced, they nevertheless serve as visual symbols that may yield productive results (Vie). For instance, applying a pink breast cancer awareness profile filter on Facebook may not raise more money for research, yet it can still serve as a reminder to women to schedule a mammogram or to investigate her cancer risk (Skoric). Regardless of the user's intentions, the message can still create a positive effect.

Awareness and advocacy therefore serve as powerful tools that should not be overlooked by

proponents of the slacktivism critique. Nevertheless, this observation does not mean that the quality of "slacktivist" support is equal to that of volunteering for an organization or offering financial support. We must distinguish "token support," or affiliation with little to no effort, from "meaningful support," or significant effort (Kristofferson, White, and Peloza). Wearing a pink shirt to raise awareness for breast cancer or reposting an article online are both examples of public token support, while donating time or money and physically reaching out to those affected creates more meaningful support. A study conducted by Kristofferson, White and Peloza found that participants who offered public support (such as sharing a Facebook post publically) were less likely to contribute subsequent meaningful support than participants who offered private support (such joining a private online group). These results illustrate that some who offer public token support, including through social media activism, deem the act of affiliating himself or herself with the cause in public to be an end in itself, and this problem must be addressed. While this finding does not discredit social media's ability to promote advocacy, it highlights the need for strategic engagement that drives further involvement.

Many organizations heavily rely on public token support, which achieves a positive outcome in awareness, but fails to significantly raise donations of time or money. In 2013, the United Nations International Children's Emergency Fund (UNICEF) launched a campaign titled "Likes don't save lives," followed by a campaign by Crisis Relief Singapore called "Liking isn't helping" to demonstrate the need for real volunteers and donations, not merely social media supporters (Miller 13-14). While we cannot disregard the positive ability of social media to campaign for important issues and to educate millions through awareness campaigns, social media activism should not be a substitute for other forms of activism. Unlike Morozov and Gladsow, however, I do not believe that social media activism must be rendered useless to create offline supporters, but rather that in order to contribute meaningfully, organizations and users alike must be intentional in how they engage with social media activism.

How, then, can organizations better harness social media's platform to attract meaningful support? The study conducted by Kristofferson, White and Peloza sheds light on a potential strategy. When participants who offered public token support were required to reflect and evaluate the alignment of their own values with that of the cause through written questions, the amount of subsequent meaningful support they willingly extended increased. The researchers identify "value alignment between self and cause" as "a tool that charitable organizations can use to combat slacktivism and garner meaningful support from public token support campaigns" (Kristofferson, White and Peloza). These results suggest that by tailoring their marketing differently in order to match the values of various target groups, organizations may be able to increase meaningful support. Strategies such as creating an interactive ad or a banner containing a relevant, thought-provoking question might increase success for organizations. These steps may help to grow a potential supporter's involvement, establishing the connection between the viewer's own priorities and the mission of the organization more quickly.

The question of how to engage social media effectively for activism should also be of particular importance to millennials, as the largest and most online-active demographic in social media. While during the late twentieth century college campuses often served as the breeding grounds for young activists' efforts, the modern college campus has expanded into online territory; garnering support typically includes a digital component, such as a hashtag, link, or user handle, pointing offline viewers towards a website, Facebook page, online petition, or social media account. Here, value alignment may also prove helpful as a tool for the viewer, who must decide which causes are worth supporting, and what kind of support they will offer.

I suggest that when a student (or any online user) encounters a campaign on social media, he or she should first ask "to what extent do I care about this issue or do I want to learn more about this issue?" If the student already feels passionate about the topic, he or she should take steps to be well informed about the cause, and pass on the message via social media, perhaps noting why he or she believes the issue is important and why it should matter to others. This

initial effort should be thought of as a first step that should lead towards further tangible support, demonstrated through practices such as reaching out to those affected and/or marginalized, volunteering for an organization, starting local initiatives, or contributing financial or other assistance. If the student does not care about the cause, he or she should further consider why this may be the case, and ask whether becoming more informed about the campaign might be worthwhile. By self-reflecting and researching, he or she might either become engaged with the issue, or remain indifferent or opposed, which should dictate whether or not she or she should follow the previous guidelines. Value alignment provides a way to increase authentic support and avoid becoming the lazy and indifferent stereotypes mentioned earlier.

It is important to note that engaging in low-risk, easy ways to raise awareness for a cause, such as sharing a post on Facebook, or retweeting hashtags, still plays a vital role in the process of showing support. If a user had not originally been exposed to the campaign through the online activity of his or her contacts, he or she may have never become aware of the issue. By circulating the message, one continues to create an impact on the awareness front, even though it is not the most meaningful form of support. Marko Skoric suggests in his article "What is Slack About Slacktivism?" that "slacktivist activities should be developed as integral parts of the activism repertoire, and not simply seen as another, easier way to achieve political and social change. Slacktivists should not be scorned, but instead cultivated to take their actions beyond the social media sphere and into the real world" (Skoric). While it may be tempting to disqualify all low-risk efforts, as Gladwell and Morozov advocate, doing so would fail to utilize a valuable tool.

In summary, social media activism provides an important platform for awareness. While critics claim that it does not mobilize change and results from faulty motivations, these critiques ultimately fall short of discrediting its legitimacy. Online support should create further offline support, however, in order to lead to tangible change. Users and organizations alike can benefit from using value alignment to establish connections between the cause and the viewer and to increase sincere support. As social media platforms continually evolve and expand, users, especially millennials, should seek to engage in social media campaigns intentionally, and organizations should work to create innovative and specially-tailored campaigns that not only grab the viewer's attention, but keep it.

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Not Made in the USA: A Proposal for Sweatshop Reform

Sarah McDevitt

Sweatshop conditions have been widely criticized by scholars because workers are required to work long and hard for very low pay in uncomfortable and unsafe environments; however, many economic scholars recognize that sweatshops play a significant role in the economic advancement of Third World countries and the wellbeing of people in these regions. Therefore, although it is true that many practices implemented by sweatshops are unethical and must be addressed, sweatshops are an economically important part of society that should not be eliminated but reformed. As one's everyday purchases contribute to the economic effects caused by sweatshops and resultantly affect the wellbeing of factory workers, it is crucial for people to become aware and educated about the purchasing decisions they make every day so that they are not ignorant of the effects that their choices can result in.

In today's Western world, it is typical to purchase an item made and imported from some Third-World country overseas. This normalcy is due to the hard work of many unskilled, low-waged, harshly treated workers employed in factory sweatshops all over the world. Sweatshops are factories typically located in underdeveloped countries and pay low wages for employees who work long hours while facing unsafe and severe working conditions. They have been employed in the world's economic system for almost two hundred years, ever since the start of the Industrial Revolution in the early 1800's. Even America's industrial stage, where conditions were even worse than those in many modern day Third World sweatshops we see today, lasted nearly 100 years (Powell, 2014a). Today, sweatshops abound in many countries around the world, and more developed countries, such as the United States, often outsource their products from these poorer countries due to the low prices of the goods they produce.

The issue of sweatshop endorsement has been widely criticized since its inception. Many scholars condemn it due to the "morally wrong" practices they use to exploit their workers (Meyers, 2007, p. 620). Aspects such as "coercion, unsafe working conditions, deception, paying workers less than promised, etc." are all fundamental characteristics of sweatshops that workers must endure to make ends meet. Chris Meyers, professor at University of Southern Mississippi, uses the term "beneficent exploitation" to describe the exploitation of workers who make fully informed decisions to work at factories despite the poor conditions they must endure (Meyers, 2004, p. 320). This term was coined because "the exploiter benefits from his use of the exploited in a way that is unfair, for example, by benefiting disproportionately

to the contribution of the exploited" (Meyers, 2004, p. 320). To many, including Meyers, this is morally unacceptable since the worker is still exploited and victimized although he or she gave consent. Therefore, a "collective responsibility" to end the practice of using sweatshops has been deemed necessary by many anti-sweatshop advocates (Meyers, 2007, p. 622). More conservatively, instead of terminating sweatshops entirely, many suggestions have been made by academics such as Arthur Herman to improve the standards factories exhibit, such as creating labor codes of conduct in order to improve working conditions or setting an optimal hourly wage in order to improve the workers' pay (Herman, 2012).

However, many anti-sweatshop activists tend to dismiss the complexity of the nature of sweatshops and the role it plays in individual lives in addition to the general population. Despite the immoral stigma associated with sweatshops, many economic scholars recognize that sweatshops play a significant role in the economic advancement of underdeveloped countries as well as in the wellbeing of people in these regions. Economist Benjamin Powell argues that the study of economics allows scholars to examine how "actions taken by activists, nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), governments, consumers, and others will impact the incentives of businesses that employ sweatshop workers. Unfortunately, many actions for which the anti-sweatshop movement has agitated adversely impact incentives and harm worker welfare" (Powell 2014b). While it feels wrong to many Western consumers to allow poor treatment and exploitation of workers to take place, Powell suggests that the solution is not found in merely eliminating the immediate source of harm. In doing so, the workers may be placed in even more detrimental circumstances such as unemployment they were never intended for. Therefore, although I believe many practices implemented by sweatshops are morally wrong and must be addressed, sweatshops are an economically important part of society that should be reformed, not abolished. In this paper, I will analyze the economic significance of sweatshops in developing regions by investigating how sweatshops induce economic and industrial growth for Third World countries, by comparing the quality of sweatshop jobs with that of available alternatives, by weighing factory wages against the wages of other industries in their regions, and by evaluating the effects of a typical anti-sweatshop advocate's demands. Finally, I will propose a promising solution to maintain adequate pay and good working conditions for sweatshop workers in underdeveloped countries.

To begin making the case for outsourcing from sweatshops, it is vital to understand that sweatshops are highly influential in advancing the economic and industrial development of Third World countries. One of the main reasons established First World companies decide to take advantage of outsourcing from sweatshops is because of the inexpensive labor Third World factories offer. This is explained by an economic principle called "comparative advantage." Harvard University professor of economics N. Gregory Mankiw describes comparative advantage as possessing an opportunity cost (what one gives up in order to gain something else) in producing a specific good that is lower than another producer's opportunity cost. Because no single producer can have a comparative advantage in producing everything, this principle illustrates that trade has the ability to make both parties involved in an exchange better off. Therefore, when dealing with international trade, as Mankiw explains, "trade allows all countries to achieve greater prosperity" (Mankiw, 2012, p. 58). When developing countries specialize in sweatshop industries like garments or toys, the low cost of employment gives them a comparative advantage in the markets, and it provides already developed industries an incentive to trade with them. Paul Krugman, a New York Times journalist as well as a Nobel Prize winning economist, wrote an article entitled "In Praise of Cheap Labor: Bad Jobs at Bad Wages Are Better Than No Jobs at All." In it he argues that "the only reason developing countries have been able to compete with those [First World] industries is their ability to offer employers cheap labor. Deny them that ability, and you might well deny them the prospect of continuing industrial growth" (Krugman, 1997). This form of development is crucial for these regions because, as economist Pierre Lemieux states, "in today's poorer countries, only economic growth can solve the sweatshop problem" (Lemieux, 2015,

p. 67). Thus, sweatshops give developing countries an advantage in the markets and, as a result, provide them with opportunities to grow both economically and industrially.

The economic and industrial advancement of developing countries that sweatshops stimulate can ultimately lead to their own demise. Economist Joan Robinson notes that "as we see nowadays in South-East Asia or the Caribbean, the misery of being exploited by capitalists is nothing compared to the misery of not being exploited at all" (Robinson, 1962). In this statement Robinson argues that the conditions of people who live in poor countries are actually considered to be better off if companies outsource from these countries than if they do not. This is a popular stance many economists agree with and support. Another economic scholar states that "wherever the new export industries have grown, there has been measurable improvement in the lives of ordinary people" (Krugman). If a country's revenue and industrial development generated by sweatshops are able to progress substantially, the country will no longer need to rely on sweatshops to sustain its economy. Because of this, scholars attest that "sweatshops themselves are part of the very process of development that will lead to their own elimination" (Sachs). Therefore, exploitation, it seems, is not an antagonist, but a slow yet necessary means to someday achieve prosperity.

Despite the arguments of many economists, people often find themselves still in support of the anti-sweatshop movement. After all, some of the factory owners and managers subject their workers to brutal or unsafe conditions, require laborers to work long overtime hours, refuse breaks during the job, or even demand engagement in inappropriate sexual conduct (Kristoff and WuDunn, 2000). Once becoming aware of this knowledge, contributing to sweatshops through common purchases often instills a sense of guilt within many buyers. This understandably gives reason for buyers to boycott purchasing from companies who sell sweatshop-produced goods in order to detach themselves from condoning immoral practices and to run these unethical factories out of business. However, even though these immoral practices appear shocking and disgraceful, the reaction of these anti-sweatshop activists disregard the effects sweatshops have in improving the opportunity presented to people in underdeveloped countries. It is crucial to realize that while a virtuous treatment of workers seems desirable, shutting down sweatshops entirely ultimately leads to workers losing their jobs and entering into worsened situations (Powell, 2006). If sweatshops close, workers will lose their jobs, and in many of these Third World countries the alternatives to factory employment are grim in comparison. When a sweatshop worker in an underdeveloped country becomes unemployed, his or her other options are extremely limited. These few alternatives could be working an even lower paying agricultural job, practicing prostitution, rummaging through garbage for food, or even facing starvation (Lemieux, 2015). It is important to keep in mind that "these are still extremely poor countries, where living on a garbage heap is attractive compared with alternatives" (Krugman, 1997) and, in doing so, recognize the comparative enhancement in the opportunity commonly offered by sweatshop jobs.

Not to be misunderstood, I am not endorsing the principles sweatshops maintain. I fully recognize the immorality and exploitation infused in many factory practices. Instead, I wish to bring attention to the significance of sweatshops in the lives of factory workers compared with alternatives. It is common for Westerners to realize how poorly sweatshop workers are paid and to be appalled at the average earnings of only a few dollars per day. This is likely because people in developed countries compare the low wages in developing regions with typical wages seen in the West, causing the poor pay to seem outrageous. However, when looked upon more closely, economic analysis can bring forth a different perspective. Benjamin Powell, the Free Market Institute director at Texas Tech University who has both his MA and Ph.D. in economics, wrote a book entitled Out of Poverty. In it, he analyzes the economics behind sweatshops, and one chapter focuses on how the wages of sweatshops compare to the alternatives. After examining eighty-five different sweatshops scattered throughout a total of eighteen countries, Powell found that the hourly factory wages ranged from only 6 cents per hour in a Bangladeshi sweatshop all the way to $1.12 per hour in a Costa

Rican sweatshop. At a quick external glance, these wages appear horrendous; however, Powell then compares them to the average wages made by workers in other industries of each country. In the end, he found that in Third World countries the average worker in an alternative industry must often live on less that $2 per day, while almost all sweatshop workers typically earn $2 per day in wages and occasionally much more. His data show that in every country he examined, sweatshop wages were at least fifty percent of the average national income, and in some countries the factory workers earned over two times the average national income. Powell says that "sweatshop jobs pay wages that are not just superior to earnings from begging or prostitution. They pay better and make them better off than many of their fellow countrymen," (2014b, p. 62) indicating that comparatively, poor wages are not as poor as many assume.

Now that the economic importance of sweatshops and the benefits they offer have been explained, methods of improving sweatshops will now be examined. As discussed previously, the wages earned by sweatshop workers are sufficient when compared to alternatives, so our focus will shift towards the poor conditions workers endure. Anti-sweatshop advocates often demand stricter safety and labor standards within factories. However, contrary to popular belief, the improvements demanded by activists will ultimately make workers worse off. Many advocate for labor codes to be mandated in factories, but when enforced only in particular regions, manufacturers will relocate to a country with less strict standards and abandon its original location. Therefore, the only effective way to enact labor and safety codes on sweatshops is to do so universally and globally. Unfortunately, this is both difficult to implement and subject to "perverse effects" of which workers must bear the burden (Prasad et al., 2004, p. 64). The nature of profit-maximizing firms indicates that they are unconcerned with the methods in which they pay their workers, whether it is in monetary pay or benefits such as safety, medical care, fewer hours, and comfort. As a result, firms offer workers a desirable combination of the two payment types (where if one goes up, the other goes down) in order to attract workers who will be the most beneficial to the firm. This indicates that the combination is determined mostly by the desires of the workers instead of the corporations (Powell 2006). In a study conducted in two Guatemalan sweatshops where complaints about working conditions were made by employees, economists Benjamin Powell and J.R. Clark surveyed workers asking them if they would accept lower wages if certain conditions were improved. Table 1[1] shows that when averaged together, the response most workers gave was a resounding "no" as at least ninety percent of employees determined they would not want to receive less pay if their conditions were improved for eight out of the ten improvements (2014b). It can be seen by this data that workers value maintaining their wages far more than they desire any other work benefits.

Powell explains that "if activists push only to improve safety in factories, they are implicitly pushing for a reduction in monetary wages that workers have already demonstrated they prefer more than safety," or if the firm decides not to lower the wage, the activist push could lead to worker unemployment instead (2006, p. 1034). Therefore, in both cases, a call for improved conditions made by activists will consequentially impede in pleasing the desires and wellbeing of sweatshop workers.

Although many of these well-intentioned means of improvement seem to end in unfavorable outcomes, there are still ways to positively impact the working conditions in sweatshops. The method I propose is a market-based strategy that relies upon ethically conscious consumers who are willing to pay extra in order to purchase a product that does not endorse the immoral and harsh practices workers are forced to deal with. If buyers purchase more ethically produced items from factories at a higher cost, firms earn a higher total revenue. As a result, the compensation firms receive allows them to begin "raising wages, avoiding abuses, and protecting worker rights—all without the risk of falling profits and resulting job losses" (Prasad et al., 2004, p. 58). Similar to how people pay higher prices for goods like organic food, this phenomenon is possible because buyers who want to see working conditions enhanced

[1] Table 1 refers to a table in *Out of Poverty: Sweatshops in the Global Economy,* p. 74, by Powell, B., 2014.

will continue to purchase the same quantity of items as they typically buy, but the price will be high enough to vindicate improvement. When the same quantity is purchased, but a higher price is paid, it is not necessary for firms to fire any of their employees, and firms are given the incentive to treat their workers more uprightly. Therefore, buyers promote the sweatshops offering better conditions and give other sweatshops incentive to improve their workers' conditions as well. One study completed in 2004 and entered into the Labor Studies Journal tested consumers to see if people will actually pay higher prices for ethically produced products. The results showed that one out of four consumers consciously purchased ethically made products at a higher price than the original, and one out of three were willing to pay ten percent more for those products. The writers of the study suggest that "price increases of a few cents at the point of consumption could thus generate the added revenues needed to enable low-wage employers to absorb the higher costs of transforming their sweatshops into better paying, safer, and more productive workplaces" (Prasad et al., 2004, p. 72). Powell proposes that "this is one area in which activists and non-profits could play a valuable role by certifying particular goods as 'ethically produced'" for products made in Third World sweatshops (Powell, 2006, p. 1036). If activists push to create a label for "ethically produced" Third World products, marketing and advertising could appeal to consumers and incentivize them to purchase from certified companies. Thus, the solution to creating a better work environment is not in eliminating sweatshops or forcing higher wages and stricter standards, but in promoting sweatshops that offer their workers good conditions and paying the costs of improvement.

Understanding the topic of sweatshops holds much significance because a vast majority of Western society members are influenced by sweatshops in some way. How often do the tags on clothing state that a garment was made outside of the US? More often than not, one's clothing was not produced or manufactured in America, but rather somewhere overseas in a factory or sweatshop. People are frequently and unknowingly involved in promoting the use of sweatshops by simply buying a new top or purchasing a new pair of shoes. Therefore, one's everyday purchases contribute to the economic effects caused by sweatshops which resultantly effect the wellbeing of factory workers. Furthermore, when one is aware only of the immoral practices sweatshops implement, ill-informed decisions like boycotting sweatshop products can cause more harm than good. Because of this it is beneficial to buy products from Third World countries and to encourage others to do so as well. In order to enhance the quality of sweatshop workers' conditions, it would be effective to intentionally purchase products from and advocate for sweatshops in Third World countries that maintain good working conditions. Therefore, if activists become involved in certifying ethically produced products, consumers will be more informed about the products they buy and be more inclined to purchase goods produced morally. These are all ways to prevent causing unintentionally poor results when dealing with the sweatshop industry, for it is crucial for people to become aware and educated about the purchasing decisions they make every day to avoid ignorance of effects caused by their choices.

The ethics of sweatshops are not easy concepts to deal with, for what seems evil may surprisingly be helpful, but what seems righteous, may actually be harmful. Despite the moral complications, many scholars recognize the economic significance sweatshops possess. Sweatshops cause industrial and economic growth in underdeveloped countries because of their comparative advantage when they specialize in industries that utilize their cheap labor. In addition, the work offered by sweatshops is more desirable than many of its alternatives. In fact, even the wages are comparatively better than most industries in their respective regions. Unfortunately, many activists have the wrong idea when advocating for workers' rights. The wage, labor, and safety improvements they demand will ultimately worsen the workers' situations. As a result, eliminating sweatshops or enforcing higher wages and stricter standards is not the solution to creating a better work environment, but a solution can be found in paying the costs of improvement by promoting sweatshops that provide their workers with good conditions. Therefore, even though many practices used by sweatshops are unethical, due to their critical role in society and the economy, they should not be

eliminated but reformed.

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Did Fukuyama Get the Biggest Piece Right? The Effect of Ideology in the USSR and Russian Federation

Robert Jones

Francis Fukuyama's theory that ideology is the locus of social evolvement and conflict was attacked by Fouad Ajami, who focused on the importance of material goods to the state, as opposed to immaterial goods like culture, religion, and ideology. Jones aims to prove that Russia has on several occasions upheld its ideology—even when doing so would not provide material benefit. In doing so, Jones backs up Fukuyama's claims.

In his paper *The End of History*, written in the midst of the collapse of the Soviet Union, Francis Fukuyama made the argument that history, or the social evolvement of peoples around the globe, had effectively ended due to ideologies ceasing to competitively evolve. Fukuyama based this argument on the premise that political and economic liberalism had definitively shown itself to be the superior social ideology (Fukuyama). Samuel Huntington attacked this position in his book *The Clash of Civilizations*, claiming that Fukuyama had overstated the impact of the collapse of the Soviet Union. Huntington then made the opposing claim that history would continue to evolve through clashes between meta-civilizations (Huntington 22). Fouad Ajami then attacked Huntington's argument in his article *The Summoning*, claiming that he had overstated the importance of immaterial forces within nations: religion, ideology, and culture. In that essay, Ajami claimed that smaller groups of peoples would engage in conflict, since the accounts of empirical secularism and modernism would overpower the immaterial forces that Huntington described (Ajami 2). While one might be able to correctly argue against Huntington's civilizational thesis, Ajami erred by disputing the importance of immaterial forces over material ones. In doing so, Ajami effectively attempted to redact Fukuyama's central premise from the conversation. Despite Fukuyama himself saying that he overstated the magnitude of the end of the Cold War, Ajami's contribution removed the most importance piece of the puzzle of globalization: that *ideology* is what drives social evolvement and conflict between peoples, per the thought of G.W.F. Hegel.

This paper seeks to demonstrate that the locus of social evolvement and conflict is ideology, in defense of Fukuyama's major premise from Ajami's incidental attack. It will do so by utilizing the case of Russia to illustrate how ideological evolvement in Russia after the end of the Cold War did not follow a trajectory set by interactions aimed at material benefit, as Ajami predicted, but a trajectory set by the dominant ideology of the state. In order to provide proper depth, this paper will limit itself to three points of discussion concerning the Russian state. First, the changes in the behavior and policy of the

Russian state during the transition from the Soviet Union. Second, how twenty-first century Russian statecraft is based on ideology, not on what might bring the greatest material good of its people or the state. Finally, this paper will discuss recent Russian involvement in Syria.

Through the 1990s, the ideologies of the USSR and Russian Federation were more similar than one might expect. In 1990, after many reforms had been set into motion by Mikhail Gorbachev, law school students still preferred the shreds of the old way of doing things, and teachers who presented older ideas over professors who challenged the old guard of Soviet ideology (Lempert 641). Indeed, it would have been surprising if the Russian academic world changed radically after the fall of the Soviet Union, as non-Soviet ideas were considered taboo and were more or less non-existent (Fishman 194). Thus, the ideology of the Communist Party persisted in various political hold-outs well after 1991 (Fishman 201), and remnants of Communist thought, including anti-Western rhetoric and the importance of social controls, even persist to the present day (Fishman 202-203). This persistent immaterial ideology may help to explain why many Russian people look upon the state favorably, even though the state does not focus itself on pragmatic economic policy.

Likewise, the eventual changes that brought about the death of the USSR were ultimately instigated by changes in ideology which preceded changes in the market forces of the Russian state. Mikhail Gorbachev, in instituting the new policies of the USSR after his election in 1985, was in large part following his personal "new view of the world" (Brutents 79). In doing so, Gorbachev pursued radical, and even risky, change in foreign policy which was primarily focused on de-escalation and embracing the world community (Brutents 80). These changes were unexpected precisely because they were not necessarily forced by market forces or the foreign policy of other states: at the time, the Russian economy was growing and the US was not an overwhelming threat (Leon 64-70). Therefore, the facts run counter to a possible Marxist hypothesis that Gorbachev's hand was forced by the market, and Ajami's hypothesis of the pragmatic state. If Gorbachev were to act according to Ajami's thesis, then from the view of 1980s Soviet wisdom he should have maintained the status quo by attempting to increase the influence of Russia around the globe and within its sphere of influence. Yet he did not. The changes that brought about the death of the USSR were instigated by changes in the aims of Soviet ideology by Gorbachev and others. Thus, the facts demonstrate that the changes that catalyzed the fall of the USSR were made, to some extent, for the sake of ideology itself.

After the fall of the USSR, the Russian state has followed a path blazed by the ideology of the party in power. Changes that occurred were primarily a function of the state actively choosing to change its ideology, but this was usually driven with the ideology of the Russian elite. As the Russian state evolved, and continued to modify its economic systems, the ideology of the party in power was always the catalyst (Lempert 641).

But is the assertion that the transition from communism was driven by ideology slighting the slyness of state? In the 21st century has not Russia moved in some respects towards strengthening itself on the global stage for national benefit? To answer this question we will move into a discussion of Vladimir Putin's statecraft in the instances of the 2014 Olympics and Russia's annexation of Crimea, which may help us to diagnose what is happening with Russian military involvement in Syria.

Make no mistake: for Vladimir Putin the 2014 Sochi Olympics were about projecting soft-power—on a massive scale. More countries and athletes participated than in any previous Winter Olympics (Müller 628). And, on the face of things, hosting the Sochi Games was a materially pragmatic move. Putin recognized that Sochi was Russia's chance to pursue two goals: showcasing a region as an extravagant getaway for tourists from within Russian and from other nations, and showing Russia's muscle in the fields of "technology, infrastructure, leisure, and quality of life" (Müller 629). Indeed, it makes sense that Russia would want to broadcast a new, soft-power image to overshadow the preconceptions that have haunted it since the end of the Cold War. The Olympics were a perfect opportunity to showcase this soft-power, and to take advantage of the material benefits afforded by this soft-power projection

through tourism and trade.

Yet, the cost of the Sochi Games was so large that it outweighed any material benefit that has come to the state. With a bill of $55 billion, Sochi was, by far, the most expensive Olympics ever, and it was funded almost entirely using public funds (Müller 629). In addition to this, the people in the area surrounding Sochi have seen little to no benefit from the Games. Most of the benefits promised to the residents of Sochi and the surrounding area have not manifested themselves (Müller 631). The Games did not live up to the hype that they would reinvigorate Sochi and put Russia back on the map as a tourist destination (Müller 654). Instead they were extremely costly, and at the expense of the Russian people. Yet even in the face of the extreme cost of the Games, and with the knowledge of the likely failure of the Games to provide material benefit to the Russian population, the Russian state depended on ideological rhetoric to justify celebrating the Games (Müller 652). At the point where Russia did not hold back in tempering the cost or the graft of the Games to pacify the population, there seems to be a preference for the symbolism of the Games internationally over any pragmatic benefit for Russia. Putin may have sold the Games to individuals within Russia as a material benefit, and even intended international soft power to bring trade and goods, but the vehicle necessarily had to be positive, international, immaterial perception.

Days after the end of Sochi Olympics, Russia made another major statecraft maneuver: aggression against Ukraine. Some may point to this examples and say, does not the annexation of Crimea and invasion into Eastern Ukraine demonstrate the slyness of the state? Russian president Vladimir Putin skillfully positioned Russia so that it could claim that Crimea had chosen to be a part of the Russian Federation (BBC News), correctly predicting that NATO would view an incursion to defend a small piece of the umbrella of its protection as too costly. Crimea was much more important to Russia than to the nations of NATO, and Putin almost certainly utilized this knowledge to inform his decision. In doing so, Putin contradicted much of the espoused ideology of peace and non-aggression of the 1990s, and made a pragmatic gambit that produced checkmate for the nations of NATO.

But what this narrative overlooks is that the move against Ukraine was actually extremely costly for Russia, and thus it was likely a symbolic move (and in turn, an ideological one) more than a pragmatic one. The West's eventual sanctions devastatingly rebutted an attempt to project geopolitical or economic power, if that was what Putin was aiming for. The ruble lost half of its value; Russian banks lost much of their liquidity; the Russian government's financial reserves decreased to the point where China offered to help (Kramer 9). Thus, painting Putin's Ukrainian gambit as geopolitical or economic does not attribute slyness to Putin at all. Instead, Putin's gambit makes much more sense if it is depicted as an ideological one.

Current Russian ideology centers on a deep sense of nationalism and shifting the power dynamic away from the US and the West, explicitly at the cost of the good of the Russian people. Scholars state that "Putin supporters, ...fed by and contribute to the Kremlin propaganda regarding Ukraine, have advocated employing similar economic weapons against the United States, even if the Russian people have to sacrifice material comforts" (Finch 190). This sort of polarized rhetoric and movements have become, to many, so out of touch with reality as to bring the state-of-mind of Vladimir Putin into question (Braun 34-42). But if Putin is of sound mind, scholars have hypothesized that Putin may be worrying about losing his grip on the Russian Federation, and thus is using nationalism and aggressive foreign policy as an effort to galvanize domestic support. Populations often feel it is their duty to support their political leaders if they believe their nation is at war. Thus, Russian are more likely to support Putin if Russia is "defending other peoples" in order to "restore peace." Putin has capitalized on this mindset by mass media and state television to espouse nationalistic ideology, to great effect. Putin is, and has always been, extremely popular within Russia, in large part because he has successfully used mass media to broadcast ideology. In sum, Putin has indicated that the immaterial ideology of nationalism may be at the core of his policy and possibly of his survival strategy (Kramer 12-13).

If this is true, then Ukraine is merely a pawn in Putin's ideological game—the fuel that Putin needs to consolidate support—rather than the ultimate power

play for expanding Russia's sphere of influence. While Putin may be acting pragmatically, ideology is the engine that makes his plan go. Thus Putin has chosen to control the immaterial, even at the cost of material benefit to his state. But above all, it is important to realize Putin's use of ideology has worked. Putin's political survival and continued support is a direct refutation of the pragmatic state thesis of Ajami's world. In addition, the fact that Putin's adoring "proletariat" cares not for the goods it has lost under Putin not only refutes the Marxist thesis, but refutes Ajami a second time: the people of Russia are answering the summoning of an immaterial ideology of nationalism.

The goals of the Sochi Olympics and aggression against Ukraine may actually help to predict what might happen in the most current manifestation of Russian ideology: military involvement in Syria. The Olympics informed us that Vladimir Putin is seeking to project power, particularly outside of Russia, but that he is not concerned with domestic financial cost. Instead, Putin may be attempting to consolidate domestic support by engaging in international conflict to encourage groupthink, again while throwing financial cost to the wind, as Russian aggression in Ukraine appears to indicate.

Does this preference for the immaterial over the material match up with the facts so far of Russian engagement in Syria? Yes. This is apparent when one considers that the material factors that might spur Russia onto involvement in Syria are largely absent. Unlike the US, which must maintain the ability to extract oil and do trade in the Middle East, Russia has vast resources of oil and has debatably the most access to natural resources in the world. While Syria is mildly close to Russia, and so it may be fairly high on Russia's priority list to have a government that is favorable towards Russia in Syria, this would seem to be outweighed by the sheer difficulty of waging "a land war in Asia," or anywhere. And, as is warranted through terrorist attacks against the US after the Gulf Wars, destabilizing a group that is hostile to one's nation does not necessarily guarantee national security. All of this seems to indicate that there is no direct material benefit for Russia to involvement in Syria. So what is Putin's game here?

The answer, again, may be found in ideology. It is possible that Putin is trying to heighten nationalism further by engaging in another foreign conflict. But any impact this might have is likely non-unique if the Russian people recognized that Russia was already involved in a foreign conflict in Ukraine, or foreign conflict doesn't have any effect on domestic nationalism in the first place. Instead, Russia's involvement in Syria seems to reveal something very different about current Russian statecraft: Putin is trying to challenge US hegemony.

Putin is challenging US hegemony by projecting another locus of international military might, headquartered in Moscow. In the status quo, the US possesses hegemony over most of the face of the earth: the US spends a significant amount on defense, and utilizes it to project power over the entire globe through rhetoric and ideology that supports the US' allies (Telatar 41). At the point where few nations directly challenge US power (excluding China, Russia, and a few others) most countries are effectively under US hegemony, including Syria. In Syria, the US has used its power to complete air strikes against Bashar Al-Assad and DAESH[1] without any challenge; until now. For the first time since the beginning of the Iraq War, the US military is engaged militarily in the same area as another nation who is also attempting to project power outside of that nation's borders. And this fact is likely not lost on Russia. By creating an effective proxy war between the US and Russia, Russia is directly challenging US hegemony. Russia has made a deliberate choice to change the status quo.

Perhaps the aim for Russia in challenging the status quo is not to push the US out of Syria or an area directly, but to challenge the rhetoric and ideology that the US is the world hegemon. To do so would be extremely advantageous for Russia, as it might lead to more weapons deals with nations, more trade, and fewer serious threats to the Russian homeland as nations turn to Moscow as a center of power to the same degree as Washington. And if Russia can demonstrate that it is willing to follow through on its commitments to prop up Bashar Al-Assad, but the US reneges on its commitment to

[1] The term DAESH is used in order to not afford the "Islamic State" the legitimacy it might gain from such a title, or a similar one. Instead, DAESH is an Arabic acronym for the group, and is the common usage term in the Middle East.

protect the Syrian people from chemical weapons attacks or to contribute to the toppling of DAESH, then Russia will have effectively projected superior power in Syria, and succeeded in breaking US hegemony in Syria at the very least.

The narrative of challenging US hegemony, at least tangentially, seems to be born out in the status quo. While the US' policies of training fighters in Syria flounders, Russia bombs the very groups that the US supports (Reuters). Russia is supporting the very individual whom the US has said must be eliminated for there to be a real stabilization in Syria (Reuters). Russians know Turkey and the US are marginal allies, yet Russian planes infringed—likely deliberately—upon Turkish airspace during bombing raids this past week, even though the two nations are friendly with one another (Al Jazeera). All of these instances seems indicate that Russia's goal is primarily to fracture US hegemony in the region by demonstrating Russia's commitment to stand by its allies, which forces the US to do the same in order to maintain its hegemony. In doing so, Russia is using ideology to control the material; hegemonic gambits are inherently ideological. Syria is an ideological chessboard for two powers attempting to consolidate power. But their tools of choice are immaterial, not material.

Thus, the hypothesis of Putin using ideology to consolidate international and domestic support seems to be born out in Syria as well. In contrast to sly state or Marxist hypotheses, which would predict that Russia would pursue controlling the material factors in the conflict, or seek to bring material benefit to Russia, Putin is playing an ideological game with the US, which he hopes will break US hegemony in the process.

In conclusion, while the USSR and Russia have demonstrated an inclination to pragmatic decisions and the material benefit of the state, these decisions were primarily driven by a desire to uphold the ideology of the state or the government in power. Changes in governmental ideology preceded many of the major material moves, today nationalist ideology sets the tone for statecraft. Indeed, ideology is the central point of Russia's strategy in Syria. Thus, Ajami's thesis seems to misdiagnose the phenomena of the Russian state because it focuses too much on the importance of material things to states and peoples, while Fukuyama's Hegelian diagnosis appears more fitting by the day.

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An Evaluation of Traditional Threshold Theories: Failure to Adequately Protect Human Populations from Pesticide Exposure

Kelly Baglia

The scientific discipline of toxicology is based heavily on the theory of thresholds, or that toxic chemicals can be regulated to specific levels in order to prevent human populations from experiencing adverse effects. However, I contend that, in light of recent research, this threshold concept is inadequate for pesticide regulation and thus new tools and models are needed to determine safe exposure levels. For the sake of industrial economics and politics, human health is being knowingly compromised—with the grave potential to impact generations and perpetuate injustice.

In the realm of Environmental and Occupational Safety, a crucial concept for toxicology is that of thresholds. In essence, the theory is that certain toxic chemicals are needed in society but should be regulated to a specific level of exposure at which the most sensitive humans show no significant adverse effects. Thus, through experimentation with rats, this threshold, known as the No Observable Adverse Effect Level (NOAEL), is traditionally determined for each individual chemical. Public health policies are dependent upon these levels in order to ideally regulate the concentration, dosage, and exposure of all toxic chemicals in use (SC). Until very recently, the threshold theory went nearly unchallenged as it was developed and used by the Environmental Protection Agency, the Food & Drug Administration, and the U.S. Department of Agriculture, along with many other authoritative toxicology regulators around the world (SQ). However, new scientific studies on endocrine disrupting chemicals (EDCs) used in pesticides have begun a debate over the legitimacy of this theory. EDCs were found to be able to mimic hormones in the body, and any presence of these chemicals, even at extremely low concentrations, exceeds the threshold of the natural endogenous hormones (Crews and Gore 2014). In other words, any exposure to EDCs, regardless of the amount, can interfere with biological developmental changes in humans and wildlife, suggesting that a safe threshold for these chemicals does not exist (Bergman et al. 2013). Further studies on EDCs have also suggested there are many additional factors that can influence the degree of adversity to exposure, which cannot be accurately accounted for when calculating thresholds (Grandjean and Ozonoff 2013) (DC).

This is particularly concerning because the majority of humans are exposed to pesticides regularly, but arguably even more so because it calls into question the reliability of the threshold concept as a whole. If the idea of setting a safe threshold is erroneous for any chemical and there can be significant adverse effects to individuals caused by very minimal exposure below the set "safe levels", this necessitates new tools, theories, and regulations to determine safe amounts, as well as serious reconsideration of the use of these chemicals (Olden

et al. 2014) (C/B). NOAEL and all affiliate threshold concepts need to be immediately reevaluated in light of the following concerns that make the theory unsafe and inadequate for pesticide regulation (C): 1. Thresholds are unable to account for the complex mechanisms by which pesticide exposure can cause diverse biochemical effects; 2. The mixture of many chemicals in pesticides can react with each other, making it impossible to calculate a safe threshold for the whole; 3. Toxicology threshold assessments only test exposure as a single event and are unable to account for chemical pesticide body burden across an entire lifetime or even generations; and 4. Individual differences between people, especially levels of stress, make the concept of one threshold across an entire population invalid.

First, the mechanisms by which pesticide exposure causes diverse biochemical effects are not well understood as they interact with a plethora of biological functions, even at doses well below recommendations, and thus threshold values are unable to account for all such pathways and risks. Depending on the chemical, new studies are finding that the processes by which exposure damages the body are extremely elaborate and can have both short-term and long-term effects. Currently, disruption of the endocrine system, metabolic system alternation through oxidative stress, and epigenetic changes to gene expression are recognized as poorly understood mechanisms by which very low exposure to pesticides can cause significant health problems. Still, research is undergoing as many more pathways remain unidentified (Mrema et al. 2013, Mesenage et al. 2015). Over 105 separate chemicals used in pesticides are acknowledged as disrupters of biological functions at low doses and are correlated in numerous studies with hormone-dependent cancer risks, most significantly breast and prostate cancers, as well as being linked to endometriosis, infertility, neurodegenerative disorders, and immunotoxicity (Mnif et al. 2011, Multigner et al. 2010, Parron et al. 2011, Mrema et al. 2013). However, despite such strong correlations, the data is still considered largely inconclusive because of a lack of understanding of exactly *how* these changes are occurring. And without a comprehensive understanding of these pathways, it is impossible to accurately identify and predict values at which chemicals can be considered safe (WARRANT).

In a recent study done by Somayyeh Karami-Mohajeri and Mohammad Abdollahi, various pesticides were biochemically examined and tested for their direct influence on bodily processes and functions. Organochlorines (OC), organophosphates (OP), and carbamates (CB), three common chemicals used to make pesticides, were demonstrated to each use various intricate mechanisms, some the same and some different, through which they cause adverse effects. Karami-Mohajeri and Abdollahi indicated that "OP and CB show this effect through inhibition of AChE or affecting target organs directly. OC mostly affect lipid metabolism in the adipose tissues and change glucose pathway in other cells… all OP, CB and OC induce cellular oxidative stress via affecting mitochondrial function and therefore disrupt neuronal and hormonal status of the body" (Karami-Mohajeri and Abdollahi 2011). They conclude that much more work is needed in this area in order to reduce the toxic effects of these three chemicals on humans, as the effects are clearly more complicated than accounted for in threshold regulations. As a follow up, another study was done by University of Crete scientists on health effects associated with low levels of OPs and OCs. They discovered yet another pathway, the non-cholinergic mechanism, which links long-term exposure to minimal doses of chemicals to neurodegeneration (Androutsopolous et al. 2013, Flaskos 2012). And this year, studies moved outside of the realm of organo-pesticides, to test the most commonly used type of pesticide around the world, Glyphosate-based herbicides (GlyBH) such as RoundUp, for possible adverse effects caused by below regulatory level exposure. Although similar mechanisms, as found in the previous studies, were detected, including endocrine disruption and oxidative stress, these pathways interacted with different biological functions leading to altogether different health risks, including teratogenic and hepatorenal effects. Mesnage et al. also concluded that there was uncertainty in how pesticide exposure could cause different health problems using the same mechanisms that have been linked to other health risks (Mesnage et al. 2015). Thresholds are based on the theory that

the lowest level of exposure causing harm can be calculated through assessment; however, these studies all point to a reliable calculation being practically impossible. Because the mechanisms and resulting effects of pesticide exposure, both short-term and long-term, are still being understood and remain largely unknown, it cannot be accurately determined with thresholds at what specific levels various pesticides will cause harm (WARRANT).

Second, pesticides almost always contain a mixture of numerous chemicals, which can exhibit synergy or new toxic effects together, thus negating the known threshold of each chemical tested separately. To add to the inconclusive data on the mechanisms and risks of each individual chemical, the changes that occur when two or more of these chemicals are mixed together is also severely under researched. In the last few years, toxicologists have finally begun to test a mixture of chemicals and measure the effects of one added to another. Yet, this has been done with less than 100 chemicals out of an estimated 70,000 that have been produced and are used around the world, with no more than two tested together at one time (Hernandez et al. 2013, Keil 2014).

Currently, a calculated threshold for individual chemicals does not change when mixed together with other chemicals because the level is supposedly set low enough to offset any additive effects. Therefore, when the chemicals come into contact with each other, as long as they individually remain below their respective set limits, the mixture as a whole can also be theoretically considered safe. Many studies have supported this theory, mixing two chemicals at a time and determining that the overall toxicity of the mixture was as predicted. In 2011, two such studies by Koster et al. and Rennen et al. independently supported that the threshold for chemical mixtures should be set at 540 micrograms per person, about the same as the limit for the same class of individual chemicals by themselves (Koster et al. 2011, Rennen et al. 2011, Leeman et al. 2013). They predicted that this would hold true for all other classes and types of chemicals as well, and that the threshold theory was reliable even for the mix of chemicals found in pesticides.

However, other studies have been published which challenge this assumption. In 2008, Boobis et al. carried out one of the first assessments which directly analyzed various pesticide residues containing a mixture of chemicals and their subsequent toxic risk. The results showed that the toxicity levels in the residues did not always match what they expected, having assumed that the effects of the various chemicals would be additive. They suggested the need to pursue the possibility of chemical synergy, a process that occurs when two chemicals interact to become more toxic than they would if their effects were simply added together (Boobis 2008). Hernandez et al. also supported this concept in their recent article covering the toxic effects of pesticide mixtures, focused on the molecular level of chemicals. Concluding that not all mixtures only produce additive effects, they state, "if [the molecules] act on multiple sites they can elicit different toxic effects, with some mixtures having the potential of producing greater toxicity than would be predicted based on the potencies of the individual compounds." Further, Hernandez et al. also poses that the molecules of pesticide chemicals interact on an "agent-to-agent" level, meaning that they can change the expected relationship between the dose and the amount of the chemical that reaches the target biological function, thus changing the threshold level necessary to cause adverse effects (Hernandez et al. 2013). These studies are significant because they demonstrate that the chemical reactivity of pesticides is not as simple as the threshold theory accounts for. In many of the studies which support the threshold theory, two chemicals are singled out and tested, and the possibility of synergy was never considered. However, as numerous studies support that synergy can occur between toxic chemicals, it is important to recognize that the current threshold theory cannot account for these effects. There is no way, using the traditional threshold concept, to predict what mixture of chemicals will be toxic at lower doses without testing every combination of the 70,000 possible chemicals.[1]

One recent, potential solution that was proposed to this problem was the Mixture Risk Assessment (MRA), an additional threshold test

[1] Testing every possible combination of 70,000 chemicals would require approximately 1040000 separate toxicological assessments.

that can theoretically be used with the traditional threshold approach in order to quickly account for these mixture variances. In an evaluation of this assessment, 67 different pesticide chemicals were tested together in various combinations, and the data were used to identify whether a standard could be statistically determined, so that every possible combination of mixtures would not need to be tested. However, researchers encountered significant problems; they simply could not get enough data to make reliable determinations. It would have taken entirely too long to evaluate just 67 chemicals, making it inefficient and impossible to use for the rest of the 70,000. As well, they concluded that there were too many variables, which they could not account for using the MRA and the threshold theory alone (Evans et al. 2015). This study, in combination with the previous, raises the question of whether the threshold theory's framework is inherently flawed, as it cannot accommodate new and necessary aspects of pesticide risk. When chemicals are mixed together to make pesticides, potential increases in toxicity are unpredictable, making certain combinations dangerous despite the threshold limits which say they are safe. And if all aspects of pesticide risk and thus possibilities of adverse effects in human populations cannot be modeled, the threshold theory must be regarded as ineffective (WARRANT).

A third problem with the threshold concept is that rather than a single event of exposure as assessed in toxicology safety assessments, body burden is a combination of personal exposure to toxic chemicals accumulated throughout an entire lifetime as well as the chemically-induced epigenetic changes in our DNA that are inherited across generations. In calculating all chemical thresholds, exposure is assumed to be a single event. Or conversely, extended periods of exposure to a chemical are not considered or accounted for in the toxicological tests. As argued by many in favor of traditional threshold assessments, this is an unnecessary component because all experimental values are reduced by two orders of magnitude to determine the set limits. By erring on the side of caution, the variable of duration could not be enough to cause harm, so it does not need to be considered. In a study done this year by the European Food Safety Authority using the Threshold of Toxicological Concern (TTC) test, results supported that the threshold theory is conservative for 96.2% of chronic exposure to pesticide chemicals. Chronic exposure to 311 out of 328 chemicals at levels below traditional thresholds did not cause adverse health effects. However, they include in their conclusion that for 17 of the 328 pesticides they tested, the levels recommended for NOAEL were too high, implying that chronic exposure to these pesticides at doses lower than the threshold were still linked with significant health effects (Feigenbaum et al. 2015). Although the results were written to emphasize the chemicals for which the threshold theory proved reliable, it is significant that several of the pesticide chemicals did not confirm this theory. If toxicologists are relying on erring on the side of caution, yet 17 separate chemicals were still shown to be dangerous at the recommended dose with chronic exposure—considering that these levels were already reduced to be extremely cautious—it seems that these levels are not always exceedingly safe. Further, the researchers were not able to distinguish why these 17 chemicals did not follow the threshold concept. Thus, out of the 70,000 man-made toxic chemicals, we have no way of determining which 5% (assuming no other factors increase this number) are currently causing significant health problems around the world.

Other studies have also shown that chronic exposure to pesticides at levels below the NOAEL can lead to negative health effects, including Pohl et al. who completed a chemical risk assessment in their 2010 study on the effects of duration on priority toxic substances. Although the threshold theory held for volatile organic compounds (VOCs), their data for Organophosphate and Organochlorine pesticides supported that doses well below NOAEL limits can be safe for acute exposure, but chronic exposure may cause neurodevelopmental complications (Pohl et al. 2010). This further supports that the threshold theory is insufficient for chronic exposure to all pesticides, and therefore new models and theories are needed which can accurately limit every pesticide chemical to safe levels.

Additionally, an extremely new field of study in pesticide exposure is transgenerational environmental epigenetics. This is the theory that "chronic" exposure to chemicals is not limited to a single lifetime, but

rather, through DNA changes, chemical exposure is "passed down" through generations with heritable genes (Thayer and Kudzawa 2011). By inducing changes in phenotypes through hormones, DNA methylation, and histone modification, exposure to chemicals can "build up" in our bodies for generations, making us infinitely more susceptible to personal chemical exposure in our lifetime (Hou et al. 2012). Recently, the Center of Molecular and Genetic Epidemiology in Italy published a study on pesticide exposure and mechanisms of epigenetic-induced adverse health effects in various populations. Supporting research done by Chiu and Blair in 2009, they concluded that the strongest link between pesticide exposure and epigenetics is through DNA methylation directly leading to blood cancers. These epigenetic changes may also be passed down through generations, making agricultural workers and their families extremely vulnerable (Collotta et al. 2013, Chiu and Blair 2009). If pesticides can induce changes to DNA, which are different for every person, as well as if these changes can be passed down through generations which are unique to every family, it would be impossible to measure at what level pesticide exposure is harmful for each individual. The model of measuring a threshold and then reducing it to be cautious could no longer be considered safe for entire populations with the possibility of agricultural families whose tolerance for pesticides is so low that any exposure might cause significant health effects. The threshold theory cannot account for either chronic exposure across a single lifetime, or for exposure passed down through generations, severely limiting the protection that it claims to provide (WARRANT).

And finally, fourth, a complex set of psychosocial differences in individuals, particularly allostatic load, have the ability to modify vulnerability to chemical exposure, implying that a single threshold for an entire population is useless. Disease susceptibility is commonly quantified by the total amount of stressors placed on the body. Thus, the accumulation of all types of stress over a lifetime, termed allostatic load, is often used when calculating individual or population sensitivity to certain risks. The more stress the body endures, the more vulnerable it is to adverse health effects. However, when calculating thresholds for pesticide exposure, the only stress that is considered is chemical stress, or the direct influence of the chemicals on the body. The theory neglects all other types of stress that are experienced or have been experienced, such as psychosocial and physical stress (Olden et al. 2014).

In 2012, a study by Crews et al. analyzed the relationship between stress response and exposure to a chemical commonly found in fungicides and pesticides. They found that when rats were exposed to the pesticide chemical, the concurrent three generations responded to stressful situations differently than the control group of rats which was not exposed to the pesticide (Crews et al. 2012). These results support that there is a link between the stress placed on the body by chemical exposure and the psychosocial stress from seemingly unrelated events. Two further studies done by toxicologists on stress and chemical exposure have also concluded that psychosocial stress "[has] the potential to modify the response to environmental exposures", and combinations of stress "…coordinately increase toxicological assaults on health". They further conclude that, "In addition to concomitant chemical exposures having agonistic and/or antagonistic interactions, the physical and psychological status of the individual can influence exposure outcomes" (Schwartz et al. 2011, Friedman and Lawrence 2002). In other words, the effect of chemicals on the body is influenced by many other physiological and psychological states and thus cannot be adequately predicted unless all stressors are considered. Yet, the cumulative impact of all of the interacting stressors has received little to no attention from toxicologists despite recent technological tools made available to measure allostatic load (Olden et al. 2014). They prefer instead to hold to the threshold theory and its inability to measure stressors beyond chemical exposure.

A common counterargument to this debate over the threshold concept is that the level of exposure to pesticides can still be limited to the most vulnerable in society. Therefore, it doesn't matter how complicated and diverse an entire population's response to chemical exposure would be, as it only needs to be concerned with those who will react first and the worst. Safe and effective thresholds are those

which intend to protect the infants and the sick, and by doing so, protect the rest of the population as well (Munro et al. 2008). Yet, as the previous studies have demonstrated, the threshold for chemical stressors is also dependent upon the body's allostatic load, making the threshold for each individual extremely variable. Psychosocial stressors and other physical stressors, such as past traumatic events, chronic stress due to poverty, or stress to the body caused by a lack of nutrients could interact with chemical exposure stress, making particular adults more vulnerable to pesticides than even infants. Because there are many other variables involved in calculating risk to chemical exposure beyond just the chemical itself, the 'threshold' will be constantly, incalculably changing as people change, depending on their respective stress levels. And as the threshold theory is a constant limit set for an entire population based on the vulnerability of infants, it is unable to predict or protect those who are even more susceptible to chemical exposure due to stress (WARRANT).

In conclusion, though at one point in history the threshold theory was a sufficient concept, it needs to be reconsidered given what we now know and what we realize that we don't fully understand about chemical exposure to pesticides. Thresholds are unable to predict and account for the chemically-induced mechanisms leading to adverse biological effects. And because these mechanisms are not well understood, it is impossible to assume the ability to predict safe levels. As well, thresholds do not consider the possible synergistic effects of mixing two or more toxic pesticide chemicals, and currently we have no way of determining what mixture of chemicals will exhibit synergy and thus could be hazardous at levels lower than the NOAEL threshold. Further, most threshold assessments only test acute exposure, and even tests done to attempt to determine chronic exposure thresholds cannot predict or measure epigenetic changes across generations affecting chemical exposure vulnerability. And finally, due to the varying influences of psychosocial and physical types of stress on the potency of chemical exposure to the body, the threshold theory is incomplete as it does not allow for combinations of multiple stressors. Thresholds are too simple of a concept bidding to model a tremendously complicated process. In an attempt to force an outdated theory into practice for the sake of industrial economics and politics, human health is being knowingly compromised. And the vast majority of the public is unaware of the risk they are taking, and the precautions they are forsaking, because of the trust they place in political regulation of toxicology. It remains unknown whether an effective theory for pesticide exposure regulation can be modeled, and if so, what models will amply serve to protect populations from toxic chemicals. Therefore, much research is needed in this area, taking into consideration all of the concerns raised in this paper. Still, it must be said that it may never be possible to accurately predict and prevent all adverse effects caused by chemical exposure. Do we then choose to reduce our usage and production of these chemicals, or are there human lives that we are willing to sacrifice for economic prosperity and the increase of benefits somewhere else? Perhaps it is time to begin thinking about the true costs of pesticide usage without the justifications that thresholds provide.

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Jameson Award Winners

The Jameson Critical Essay Contest awards prizes for academic essays that engage their subjects from a distinctly Christian perspective. Judges pick winners from each of the three academic divisions: Arts, Media, and Communications; Humanities and Theological Studies; and Natural and Social Sciences. The following essays received Jameson awards in 2015-2016.

The Grimké Sisters: Providing a Voice for Female Abolitionists

Lauren Hawthorne

This paper explores the remarkable careers of nineteenth-century abolitionists Angelina and Sarah Grimké. Born into a slave-owning South Carolina family, the Grimké sisters became staunch abolitionists, gaining national attention through their speaking and writing. This story alone would make for compelling reading, but the paper offers more, explaining how the sisters used the public platform they gained as abolitionists to advocate for women's rights. Drawing on a variety of primary sources, the paper shows how the Grimké's Quaker spirituality and Bible reading shaped their abolitionist and feminist convictions. Where another paper might have been content to treat the links connecting nineteenth-century religion, slavery, and gender in the abstract, this paper explores those connections in all their rich historical particularity.

Women have historically been a crucial part of reform movements in the United States. In the nineteenth century, the majority of social activist group members were women, and the abolitionist movement was no exception.[1] However, although women made up the largest component of the abolition movement, it was the voice of male leaders that consistently carried the most weight, and the expectation for females to participate behind the scenes, mainly unheard. Angelina and Sarah Grimké, two Christian sisters from South Carolina, defied these stereotypes. Beginning in the 1830s, these sisters courageously launched a public campaign in which they openly spoke in opposition to slavery in front of sizeable crowds comprised of both men and women, something unheard of for women at the time. Through their persistent efforts in the anti-slavery movement, the Grimké sisters revolutionized women's role in the abolition movement in the United States first, because of the impact of their status as former slave owners on the movement, second, because of their faith in the way God could work through women, and third, because of the connections they made between the abolition movement and the women's rights movement.[2]

FORMER SLAVE OWNERS

On the surface, the Grimké sisters seem unlikely characters to be leaders in the antislavery movement. Sarah and Angelina were born in 1792 and 1805, respectively, to John and Mary Grimké, wealthy southern plantation owners who lived in Charleston, South Carolina. The Grimkés were highly influential leaders in South Carolina, as the girls' father, John Grimké, was the Chief Justice of the South Carolina Supreme Court and much of his wife's family was politically involved as well. The girls' mother, Mary

[1] Pamela R. Durso, *The Power of Woman: The Life and Writing of Sarah Moore Grimké*, 1st ed. (Macon, Georfia: Mercer University Press, 2003), 1–3.

[2] Biographical information about the Grimké sisters can be found in *The Power of Woman: The Life and Writing of Sarah Moore Grimké*, by Pamela R. Durso. Some sources also include primary source documents, such as *The Public Years of Sarah and Angelina Grimke* by Larry Ceplair. For the Grimkés and abolition, see Mark Perry, *Lift Up Thy Voice* and *Women and Sisters: Antislavery Feminists in American Culture* by Jean Fagan Yellin. For their role in nineteenth century women's rights, see *The Power of Woman: The Life and Writing of Sarah Moore Grimké* and as well as Katharine DuPre Lumpkin, *The Emancipation of Angelina Grimké*.

Grimké, was a devout and active Episcopalian and a leader of the Charleston Ladies Benevolent Society. Sarah was 12 years Angelina's senior, and served as a mother figure to her. Mrs. Mary Grimké was very busy, and did not have significant amounts of free time to spend with Angelina, so Sarah begged her mother to let her be Angelina's godmother. Her mom conceded, and Angelina and Sarah's close relationship was maintained throughout the sisters' lives, with Angelina sometimes still addressing her sister as "mother," in their correspondences as adults. Growing up in this family, Sarah and Angelina lived a rather opulent life: horseback riding, picnicking, and attending extravagant balls and dinner parties held by some of the finest families in South Carolina. As plantation owners, the Grimké family owned numerous slaves, and each of the twelve Grimké children were even given their own personal slave to attend to them.[3]

This pampered lifestyle was all that the Grimké daughters knew. As children, Sarah, Angelina, and all of the Grimké children attended school, but while the boys studied arithmetic and Latin, the girls were required to learn gentility and the proper behavior and etiquette for a woman with their social status. Despite this, Judge Grimké still valued the virtue of hard work for his children, so even his daughters were encouraged to pursue, albeit limited, physical labor and educational activities. Sarah loved participating in elementary legal training and practiced debating with her brothers, and it was her dream to go to law school. However, she was crushed when she was not allowed to follow her brothers to law school or study the law beyond elementary academia.[4] "If only Sarah had been a boy," her father often said, "she would have been the best jurist in the land."[5]

This was a turning point in Sarah's general acceptance of the values her family tried to instill in her since childhood. Sarah felt trapped by the pressure from her family and society to remain in her traditional sphere expected as a woman. She looked at the slaves on the plantation, and felt sympathy for their feelings of captivity. She took pity on her personal slave, who was also denied what Sarah deemed basic rights, and secretly taught her how to read and write, something forbidden at the time for fear that slaves would read revolutionary ideas in the Bible.[6] Her sister Angelina, too, found fault in the society in which she lived. She objected to the forced systematic separation of slave families and the lack of basic comforts such as a bed, lights, and blankets that she observed at her own plantation. Angelina was also disturbed by the harsh violence that was too readily shown to the slaves owned by her family and family friends.[7] Eventually, both sisters left South Carolina in opposition to the corrupt system of slavery in the south, and moved to Philadelphia to become abolitionists in the North, first Sarah in 1821, and then Angelina a few years later.[8]

Coming into the abolitionist movement with this background made the Grimké sisters unique, and their story captivated Northerners. Angelina and Sarah were the first women from a Southern, slave-owning family to attack slavery publicly, which made an unparalleled impact on the abolitionist movement.[9]The sisters' personal anecdotes of the violence that they witnessed as slave owners made a powerful case against slavery for many Northerners. Not only that, but Sarah and Angelina relayed their personal conversations with well-treated slaves who still yearned for freedom, something that contradicted many pro-slavery activists' argument that only poorly treated slaves wanted to be free.

The sisters were the first women invited to publicly speak out against slavery in "mixed" crowds, or audiences composed of both men and women.[10] The sisters met many prominent abolitionists such as William Lloyd Garrison, who was so impressed with their compelling speech and knowledge in respect to slavery that he invited the women to speak at his

[3] Ibid., 12–18.
[4] Ibid., 14–20.
[5] Ibid., 15.
[6] Ibid., 21–22.
[7] Katharine DuPre Lumpkin, *The Emancipation of Angelina Grimké* (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 1974), 4–18.
[8] Mark Perry, *Lift Up Thy Voice* (New York: Penguin Books, 2001), xii.
[9] Durso, *The Power of Woman: The Life and Writing of Sarah Moore Grimké*, 3.
[10] Ibid., 3–5.

abolitionist convention about their observations of slavery "whenever they think proper."[11] Sarah took advantage of this invitation to explain to Garrison's convention why she left South Carolina on account of slavery, and to boldly describe the beatings and torture that she knew rebellious slaves had to endure on a plantation.[12]

The Grimké women became so popular within the abolitionist circle that they were eventually encouraged to begin leading "parlor talks," small speeches given in order to mobilize more women behind the abolition movement. Held every Friday in New York for several months in 1836 and 1837, these meetings became so well attended that the Grimkés eventually needed to leave the convention session room and move to a church sanctuary in order to accommodate the over 300 women who regularly listened. So popular were the meetings among women that eventually even men began to listen and attend the meetings. The Grimké's status of former slaveholders-turned-abolitionists won over many men and women in attendance, and the women told a compelling story of firsthand accounts so detailed it seemed they could only really be surpassed by the testimony of former slaves. The Grimké's leadership in an environment of mixed company was unprecedented, and established credibility for the female voices of the abolition movement. For the first time, it was acceptable for abolitionists to gather large numbers of men and women together to listen to a woman speak. This gave room for female abolitionists of the future to speak publically in front of men.[13]

HOW GOD COULD WORK THROUGH WOMEN

Not only did the Grimkés' atypical background help to develop the role of women in the abolition movement, but so too did their faith. Religion had always been a part of Sarah and Angelina's lives. Growing up with a devout Episcopal mother, the entire Grimké family and their slaves went to their local Episcopal church every single Sunday.[14] But Sarah soon left the Episcopal Church and embraced the Quaker Society of Friends, with Angelina later following her there. As the sisters grew deeper in their faith, they followed the Quaker practices that were unique compared to many sects of Christianity, such as women participating in worship and women permitted to serve the congregation as ministers. Besides the Society of Friends, no other major Christian denominations allowed women to represent the congregation in forms of leadership.[15] But George Fox, the founder of Quakerism, believed that since all people could receive the "Inner Light," or, the divine revelation of God, then therefore all people were equal. This included people of all races, genders, nationalities, and any other qualities in this same vein. Therefore, Fox encouraged the participation of women in the Quaker church, and soon the Quaker membership became predominantly female. The Quakers supported the sisters´ belief that God could work through their leadership. Sarah and Angelina were given the opportunity to hone their public speaking skills as well as practice teaching through their time at the Quaker church and were empowered by the Quaker philosophies of the significance and potential of women. Since under Quakerism all races were considered equal, the Society of Friends was also one of the only leading religious communities to condemn slavery and the slave trade.[16]

The Grimké sisters believed that if God could use women in positions of leadership in the Church, he could certainly use them in the abolition movement. In their activism, Sarah and Angelina stressed the importance of women in the effort to eliminate slavery, and how women could serve in positions different than the ones they were typically restricted to within the movement. Most abolitionists of

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[11] Walter M. Merrill and Louis Ruchames, eds., "William Lloyd Garrison to Helen E. Garrison, 22 November 1836," in *The Letters of William Lloyd Garrison: A House Divided Against Itself*, vol. 2 (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1971), 185.

[12] Durso, *The Power of Woman: The Life and Writing of Sarah Moore Grimké*, 94.

[13] Ibid., 93–99.

[14] Ibid., 23.

[15] Jean Fagan Yellin, "Angelina Grimké," in *Women and Sisters: Antislavery Feminists in American Culture* (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1989), 2.

[16] Durso, *The Power of Woman: The Life and Writing of Sarah Moore Grimké*, 75.

prominence were men, who got to speak, write, and publish their thoughts and work. Women were usually restricted to aiding in the movement in behind the scenes work, such as administration. Both genders often cited religious reasons for women's subordination in the movement. However, the Grimké sisters believed that gender should not be a barrier to being a leader for a cause, and argued that in fact, that Christianity advocated for the opposite. Angelina used her own faith and her Episcopalian background to find common ground on which to appeal to the Christian women in the South.[17] She wrote an *Appeal to the Christian Women of the South* in order to persuade women of their God-given importance as women, and convince them of their potential impact on the abolition movement. Angelina called white southern women to action by using biblical examples of women leaders with whom she knew they would be familiar. For example, Angelina related the duty of women to stand up against slavery, even if it meant breaking the law, to the duty of the biblical character of Esther, who had to disobey authority in order to plead for the salvation of her people. Angelina entreated Southern Christian women, "Is there no Esther who among you who will plead for the poor devoted slave?" begging the women to follow God on behalf of slaves by joining the movement.[18]

Also in this letter, Angelina implored the Christian women of the south to do four things: the first, read on the subject of slavery, and examine the testimony of the Bible to examine whether God "sanctioned such a system of oppression and crime."[19] It is clear that Angelina believed that upon a careful examination of the scriptures, women would realize that God does not condone slavery. Second, Angelina told women to pray that God would open their eyes to see slavery with a clear vision, as well as pray for the slaves themselves. Thirdly, Angelina urged women to speak out on the subject to relatives, friends, husbands, and sons and explain that slavery is a crime against God and humankind. Lastly, Angelina argues that it was critical that women themselves act on the subject. Angelina called on women to do what was right: to set their slaves free in obedience to God, and convince others to do the same despite the consequences impending.[20]

Accustomed to the Quaker practice of women having equal rights before God and the Church in the Society of Friends, the Grimkés felt entitled to the right to address any audience, no matter the respondents' gender. Angelina was not the only Grimké sister writing appeals to the Christian south. Sarah also wrote an appeal, but to the church clergy in the South, addressing the moral failure of the Church to address the institution of slavery. Sarah's letter was very controversial at the time, both because many abolitionists who spoke out against slavery were being banished from the southern churches, but also because Sarah was a woman, addressing men in positions of church leadership as "fellow professors." By this, she meant that she and the clergy were fellow professors of the faith, a radical assertion for the time.[21] Many Christians at the time would have considered this grossly improper. Despite this, Sarah used scripture to urge the clergy to see the sinfulness of slavery, and employed strong language her letter to convict her audience of their wrongdoing. Sarah condemns the clergy, saying "in regard to slavery, Satan has transformed himself into an angel of light, and under the false pretense of consulting the good of the slaves, pleads for retaining them in bondage."[22] Sarah believed that slavery was the work of the devil. A church preaching a message of love on Sundays only for members return home, where men, women, and children were kept in bondage and forced to serve them was a church furthering the labor of the devil, not the work of the Lord.[23]

Converting to Quakerism helped make the fight for abolition even more important to Sarah and

[17] Yellin, "Angelina Grimké," 33.
[18] Larry Ceplair, ed., "Sarah M. Grimké, An Epistle to the Clergy of the Southern States," in *The Public Years of Sarah and Angelina Grimke* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1989), 60.
[19] Ibid., 55.
[20] Ibid., 55–59.
[21] Ibid., 90.
[22] Ibid., 109.
[23] Ibid., 90–115.

Angelina, as it gave religious justification to their cause. "I would not give up my abolition feelings for anything I know," Sarah said in a letter to her friend Jane Smith, "They are intertwined with my Christianity."[24]

It must be acknowledged that the relationship between the Grimkés and the Society of Friends did not end amiably. The sisters frequently had problems with the Quakers and some of their ideas, and several times thought they were on the verge being asked to leave. The breaking point was when Angelina disregarded the Quaker tenet of Quakers only marrying other Quakers by marrying Theodore Weld, a non-Quaker. When Sarah attended her sister's wedding, both she and Angelina were officially removed from the church. Notwithstanding their expulsion, Angelina and Sarah's experience in the Society of Friends empowered them, allowed them the practice that would make them compelling orators, and provided them religious support for women to be in leadership positions. The sisters' faith allowed them to expand their role as women in the abolitionist movement because of their firm belief that God equipped them as females to compel Christians of any gender to speak out against slavery. Even apart from the Quakers, the Grimké sisters' enduring love of God and study of the Bible allowed them to continue to appeal to Christians about the sinfulness of slavery.

Sarah and Angelina revolutionized the role of women within the abolitionist movement internally, because of their unique background as slave owners and their religious faith and experience as Quakers, but they also significantly impacted the role of women in the antislavery movement by making the connection and forging the path from abolition to women's rights.

CONNECTION BETWEEN ABOLITION AND WOMEN'S RIGHTS

The Grimké sisters not only spoke out to raise awareness of the misery of those literally enslaved. Sarah and Angelina also saw that they themselves had been stuck in figurative chains since childhood. The fact that women were confined in their designated sphere of the home made the Grimké sisters, and many women, feel imprisoned. Because of their gender, there were always limits to what they could do in society, for a career, in the church, and even within the abolitionist movement for which they so passionately advocated. At this time, women could not vote, run for office, or attend any kind of institute of higher learning. Married women had no property rights, no guardianship rights over their children, and no right to sue. Any job a woman was able to receive often paid her half what a man in her position would earn.[25] A Philadelphia newspaper *The Public Ledger* wrote in 1848, "Who ever heard of a Philadelphia lady setting up for a reformer, or standing out for woman's rights, or assisting to *man* the election grounds, raise a regiment, command a legion, or address a jury?" The paper continued, "A woman is a nobody. A wife is everything. A pretty girl is equal to 10,000 men and a mother is, next to God, all powerful." Clearly, the potential of women outside of the home was not recognized. The writer concluded that the women of Philadelphia ought to maintain their rights as wives and mothers, but certainly not their rights as women.[26]

The Grimké sisters knew that this way of thinking was unjust. To prove it, Angelina Grimké made the comparison between women's societal limitations in the United States to the restrictions of slaves. Because of the rights denied them, women were, Angelina Grimké argued, slaves as well. She was an advocate of freedom for slaves, yet also a woman who had not fully attained her own freedom. Angelina believed that although there were many abolitionists who claimed to be supporters of freedom for all; they were not including women in this "all." Women were pushed aside and discriminated against, even within the abolition movement, in favor of men. In Angelina's view, anyone who supported the freedom of slaves but not the women's liberation movement was a hypocrite. She insisted that she, her sister,

[24] Catherine H. Birney, "Sarah Grimké to Jane Smith," in *The Grimké Sisters* (Westport, Connecticut: Greenwood Press Publishers, 1969).
[25] Yellin, "Angelina Grimké," 2–3.
[26] *Public Ledger and Daily Transcript*, ca. 1848 [Reprinted in Elizabeth Cady Stanton, Susan B. Anthony, and Matilda Joslyn Gage, editors. *History of Woman Suffrage*. Volume 1. New York: Fowler & Wells, 1881. 804]

and all women should have equal opportunity for leadership and influence within the movement.[27]

But abolitionist leaders feared the type of reaction Angelina and Sarah's leadership would have on the antislavery movement. Many Americans already viewed the abolition movement as radical, and there was a fear that the feminists might further repel those the movement was trying to attract.[28] Before Angelina and Sarah Grimké, women had made attempts to break through the glass ceiling of the nineteenth century, but had for the most part failed. A Scottish-born woman named Frances Wright lectured on equal rights for women throughout cities of the United States but had been labeled by most as a foreign freak. An African-American woman, Maria Stewart attempted to lead a lecture series on education for women in Boston, and failed miserably to garner support. But the Grimkés were different. The abolition events at which they spoke grew larger and larger, until they were eventually leading successful conventions in sizeable venues. Interesting to the masses because of their wealthy, slave-owning, and southern Episcopalian background and their well established reputation from their antislavery advocacy campaign, the Grimkés were eventually asked to speak before men and women all over the United States. Most notably, they were invited to present an anti-slavery petition to the Legislature of the State of Massachusetts. Angelina and Sarah prepared a speech, and on February 21, 1838, people all over Boston gathered to the state house to watch, for the first time in United States history, a woman address a legislative body.[29]

Although Sarah came down with a violent cold and ended up being unable to speak before the legislature, Angelina Grimké represented both of the sisters, and all women, when she stood before this body of male legislators and female audience members and delivered a bold speech on an antislavery petition, and indirectly, on behalf of feminism. Although she was only asked to speak on the merits of the petition, Angelina made a nod to the women's liberation movement at the start of her oration. Like she had in appealing to the Christian women of the South, Angelina told the biblical story of Queen Esther, who approached the King of Persia and asked for mercy on her people. Before the body of representatives, Angelina proclaimed that today, she was Queen Esther, begging for her dignity and that of all humanity before the ruling authorities. Angelina ended her introduction by declaring that she, as a moral being "feel that I owe it to the suffering slave, and to the deluded master, to my country and the world, to do all I can to overturn a system of complicated crimes…cemented by the blood and sweat and tears of my sisters in bond."[30] Angelina, and her sister Sarah, believed that all of humanity deserved equal rights and standing before the law, and Angelina's earnestness captivated her audience in Boston. Many had advised Angelina to avoid the distasteful topic of women's place in a society when trying to get the legislators to consider the antislavery petition, especially when it was controversial enough that she as a female was addressing a group of influential male leaders. But she proceeded anyway. Her audience was enthralled, with many legislators convinced of the advantages of the petition, male audience members in admiration of her boldness, and women in the audience shocked to hear a woman courageously proclaim what many had believed in secret.[31] Angelina's speech was so well attended that the Boston officials feared the enormous crowds would cause the galleries where Angelina was speaking to collapse.[32] In the days following, Angelina's speech was published in *The Liberator*, an abolitionist paper, as well as in several Boston papers. Some papers praised her speech, her boldness, and her mission, while some ridiculed her and her impassioned advocacy of the notion of the equality of women before the law. Nonetheless, the words of the press could not change the fact that the Grimké sisters, the first abolitionists to defend the right of

[27] Yellin, "Angelina Grimké," 30–32.
[28] Perry, *Lift Up Thy Voice*, 147.
[29] Gerda Lerner, *The Grimké Sisters from South Carolina* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1967), 4.
[30] Larry Ceplair, ed., "Angelina E. Grimké, Speech to a Committee of the Massachusetts House of Representatives, February 21, 1938," in *The Public Years of Sarah and Angelina Grimke* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1989), 312.
[31] Lerner, *The Grimké Sisters from South Carolina*, 8.
[32] Ibid., 3–12.

women not to be confined to a sphere of domesticity and the first women to stand and speak before a body of legislatures, were changing the course of history.[33]

Biographer Jean Fagan Yellin describes the journey of the Grimké sisters as one that "blazed a trail from abolitionism to feminism along which other women could proceed."[34] The Grimkés' persistence in their abolition campaigns, despite objection, helped give women a voice in society. Throughout their campaigns, the Grimkés transitioned from being solely activists in the abolition movement to feminist leaders. They inspired women to do what society had always said that they could not. In this way, the Grimké sisters were role models for women who would come after them to be leaders of the abolition movement and the later women's suffrage movement.

Of course, Sarah and Angelina were not the only feminists in the United States and not necessarily the most well known today. Countless other men and women advocated for the rights of women. For example, the Seneca Falls Convention in 1848 was led by another feminist Elizabeth Cady Stanton and another Philadelphia Quaker, Lucretia Mott, and is widely revered as a pivotal moment of the first wave of the Women's Emancipation. The convention was the first of its kind to gather women from all walks of life behind the cause of women's rights.[35] While the significance of this convention should not be undermined (the Grimké sisters were invited and, although they could not attend, were enthusiastically in support of the mission of the conference), it is important to note that the efforts of the Grimké sisters are so extraordinary because theirs were the first of these successful efforts. It was ten years before the Seneca Falls Convention, in 1838, when Sarah published her first feminist writing, *Letters of the Equality of the Sexes*. This book was published before the first wave of the Women's Rights Movement had even begun. It was years before the Convention that Angelina and Sarah began their speaking tours, and months before when they made history as the first women to be heard before a body of the legislature in the United States. In this way, Angelina and Sarah's work for the feminist movement helped pave a path for other feminists to step up as leaders, and their beliefs and writing helped shape the feminist movement that eventually grew out of the convention at Seneca Falls.[36]

Additionally, it must be acknowledged that the Grimké sisters were not the only abolitionists to make the connection between the antislavery movement and the women's rights movement. But they were the first to explicitly make this connection in their writing and oratory. Angelina and Sarah were the first women to publicly declare that they were in chains like the slaves were.[37] Not only that, but they were also two of the first abolitionists in the United States to address the role of women in society using an antislavery platform.[38]

Angelina and Sarah had a unique story. They went from being slave owners to leaders in the abolition movement, from wealthy and subordinated Southern Episcopalian women to bold and unflinching feminists. The Grimké sisters revolutionized women's role in the abolition movement in the United States because of their unique background as slave owners, their religious training and faith in God that women could be leaders in the church, and the connections they made between the emancipation of slaves and the emancipation of women. The Grimké sisters gave women a means to step up into leadership in the abolition movement, but they also forged a path for the women who would follow through the way they transformed female activism and feminism in the United States.

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[33] Durso, *The Power of Woman: The Life and Writing of Sarah Moore Grimké*, 3.
[34] Yellin, "Angelina Grimké," 1.
[35] Greene, Dana. "Quaker Feminism: The Case Of Lucretia Mott". *Pennsylvania History: A Journal of Mid-atlantic Studies* 48, no. 2 (1981): 143–54.
[36] Perry, *Lift Up Thy Voice*, 202–203.
[37] Yellin, "Angelina Grimké," 30.
[38] Kotef, Hagar. "On Abstractness: First Wave Liberal Feminism and the Construction of the Abstract Woman". *Feminist Studies* 35, no. 3 (2009): 495–522.

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Bulgakov's Sophiology as a Faithful Expression of Byzantine Tradition

Christopher Iacovetti

This paper carefully unpacks Orthodox theologian Sergei Bulgakov's conception of Sophia and contends by way of conclusion that Bulgakov's writings about the figure of divine Wisdom are consistent with the ideas and practices of Byzantine theology. The paper's description of Bulgakov's Sophia is productively situated in relation to several theological traditions and draws on an impressive array of texts, which include (but are not limited to) Proverbs, the Wisdom of Solomon, Clement of Alexandria's Exhortation to the Greeks, and the "Novgorod icon" of St. Sophia. Ultimately, the paper presents a lucid and well-contextualized synopsis of Bulgakov's arguments about Sophia, and the paper's conclusion—which claims that "Bulgakov's thought effectively overcomes the perennial dualisms and disciplinary divisions of the post-Kantian West"—leaves readers eager for more.

Anglican theologian John Milbank suggests, in a recent essay, that "perhaps the most significant theology of the two preceding centuries has been that of the Russian sophiological tradition."[1] This claim is remarkable, as it bears powerful witness to the rapid growth of interest sophiology—the theological study of divine Wisdom—has garnered in recent decades. Despite this growth, however, the question of sophiology's legitimacy remains a profoundly vexed one, particularly in Eastern Orthodox circles. Given the increasing relevance of and controversy surrounding sophiology, this paper will be mainly devoted to introducing the oft-misunderstood sophiology of Orthodox theologian Sergei Bulgakov (d. 1944), with a special focus on the ways it interprets and relates to earlier Jewish, Byzantine, and Slavonic tradition. Of the Russian sophiologists, Bulgakov is both the most theologically precise and the most verifiably orthodox; indeed, in many ways, his project can be understood as an attempt to give conclusive theological structure to the more ecstatic intuitions one finds in the writings of earlier Orthodox sophiologists (chiefly Vladimir Solovyov and Pavel Florensky). After offering a cursory introduction to Bulgakov's thought, I will close by suggesting that his sophiology represents—in much of its theological content and, more broadly, in the approach of its theologizing—an authentic expression of Byzantine theology in the modern era.

[1] John Milbank, "Sophiology and Theurgy: The New Theological Horizon," in *Encounter Between Eastern Orthodoxy and Radical Orthodoxy: Transfiguring the World Through the Word*, ed. Adrian Pabst and Christoph Schneider (Burlington, VT: Ashgate Publishing Company, 2009), 45.

DIVINE SOPHIA IN JEWISH, BYZANTINE, AND RUSSIAN TRADITION

Sophiology begins, for Bulgakov, with the wisdom literature of the Old Testament. The books of Proverbs, Baruch, Wisdom, and Sirach all speak of and describe the feminine figure of Sophia, the wisdom of God. For the most part, this Sophia is portrayed in general, qualitative terms, as something like a virtue or key to human happiness (e.g., Prov. 3:18). Curiously, though, in several significant instances she is depicted instead as "a mysterious being in God, created before all time, who works together in the creation and counsels God."[2] The Lord is said, in Proverbs 8, to have "created [Sophia] as the beginning of his ways" and "founded [her] in the beginning," delighting in her as she aided him in "fitting together" created reality (8:22-23, 8:29-30).[3] "Before all things," writes Jesus ben Sirach, the Lord "created [Sophia], and he saw and enumerated her and poured her out upon all his works" (1:4, 1:9). This biblical personification of Sophia reaches its apogee in the Wisdom of Solomon, wherein Sophia is "presented in Her relationship to creation and the cosmos" in striking lucidity, as that "spiritual power which creates, permeates, enlivens, and renews all things."[4] She is a "clear effluence from the glory of the Almighty" who, issuing forth from God, "pervades and permeates all things" (7:24-26); "Herself unchanging, she makes all things new" (7:27).[5]

Who, precisely, is this quasi-personal, quasi-divine Sophia of the Old Testament? This question surfaced only briefly in the thought of the patristic period. Irenaeus of Lyons and Theophilus of Antioch had both, in the 2nd century, identified the Sophia of Proverbs 8 with the Holy Spirit. Theirs quickly became a minority opinion, however, as the vast majority of Christian writers from the 3rd century forward (especially amid the Arian controversy), opted for a strict equation of Sophia with the divine Logos.[6] This christological equation resulted, for better or worse, in a gradual forgetting of the question of Sophia within Byzantine theology: the Old Testament's depiction of Sophia was generally remembered only as a distant site of a long-settled christological dispute.

And yet, if the question of Sophia was forgotten within Eastern theology, it nevertheless remained alive within what Bulgakov calls the "liturgical consciousness"[7] of the Byzantine world. The 6th century dedication of the Hagia Sophia to divine Wisdom, in particular, marks a "definite landmark in the creative activity of the epoch,"[8] as the first of many Eastern churches to creatively grapple with the mystery of Sophia. "For from that time," writes Bulgakov, "churches dedicated to Sophia began to be built both in Byzantium and in Slavonic countries, with a wealth of mysterious symbolism."[9] There can be no doubt that the design of Hagia Sophia implicitly equates Sophia with the person of Christ, who is depicted in a 9th century mosaic over the church's main entrance; as Judith Kornblatt notes,

[2] Thomas Schipflinger, *Sophia-Maria: A Holistic Vision of Creation*, trans. James Morgante (York Beach, ME: Samuel Weiser, Inc., 1998), 12.

[3] Unless otherwise noted, all biblical quotations in this paper are taken from the New English Translation of the Septuagint. Following Orthodox tradition, Bulgakov placed a high value on both the Masoretic and the LXX renderings of Proverbs. Although he did not consider 'apocryphal' books like Sirach and Wisdom officially canonical, Bulgakov repeatedly stressed that these books, by virtue of their historical reception into the church, held an authority in Christian theology second only to that of inspired scripture.

[4] Schipflinger, *Sophia-Maria*, 12.

[5] Bulgakov was fond of referring to the Wisdom of Solomon as a 'metaphysical commentary' on and 'ontological interpretation' of the book of Proverbs. And quite rightly so; Wisdom 7:24-27a is probably the most metaphysically profound and daring sophiological text of the entire Septuagint: πάσης γὰρ κινήσεως κινητικώτερον σοφία, διήκει δὲ καὶ χωρεῖ διὰ πάντων διὰ τὴν καθαρότητα· ἀτμὶς γάρ ἐστι τῆς τοῦ Θεοῦ δυνάμεως καὶ ἀπόρροια τῆς τοῦ Παντοκράτορος δόξης εἰλικρινής· διὰ τοῦτο οὐδὲν μεμιαμμένον εἰς αὐτὴν παρεμπίπτει. ἀπαύγασμα γάρ ἐστι φωτὸς ἀϊδίου καὶ ἔσοπτρον ἀκηλίδωτον τῆς τοῦ Θεοῦ ἐνεργείας καὶ εἰκὼν τῆς ἀγαθότητος αὐτοῦ. μία δὲ οὖσα πάντα δύναται καὶ μένουσα ἐν αὐτῇ τὰ πάντα καινίζει.

[6] It is worth noting that both parties involved in the Arian controversy accepted this equation. The exegetical disputes between Athanasius and his opponents, for example, centered around how—and not *whether*—Proverbs 8 suitably speaks of the Logos.

[7] Sergei Bulgakov, *Sophia, The Wisdom of God: An Outline of Sophiology*, trans. Patrick Thompson, O. Fielding Clarke, and Xenia Braikevitc (Hudson, NY: Lindisfarne Press, 1993), 26.

[8] Ibid., 2.

[9] Ibid.

"The location of the mosaic over the main entrance suggests it is a depiction of the church's patron saint, in this case St. Sophia. He/She/It is Christ enthroned."[10] And yet, this identification of Christ with Sophia need not be understood in reductive or simplistic terms: as Bulgakov puts it, Hagia Sophia is not dedicated *merely* to Christ, but more precisely to "Christ in the aspect of *Sophia*—to Christ-*Sophia*."[11]

The dedication of Hagia Sophia to divine Wisdom inspired the construction of numerous sophianic churches in early centuries of Slavonic Christianity, the most notable of which are the 11th century cathedrals of Kiev and Novgorod. Both of these cathedrals differ markedly from Hagia Sophia, however, by commemorating their foundings on feast days associated with the Virgin Mary rather than with Christ. This development clearly suggests, if not an identification, some sort of intimate connection between divine Wisdom and the Virgin.[12] Thus, early in the history of Russian sophiology, "along with the christological emphasis … another, mariological, emphasis emerges."[13] Far from resolving the ambiguity of Old Testament sophiology, these Byzantine and Russian churches add to it further layers of christological and mariological depth.

The collective ambiguity of biblical, architectural, and liturgical sophiology takes on visual form in the famous 'Novgorod icon' of St Sophia, located in the Novgorod cathedral and praised by Florensky as "the most ancient and remarkable"[14] depiction of Sophia in Orthodox tradition (Fig. 1). According to at least one venerable account, this icon is a replica of an earlier Byzantine image in a Constantinopolitan church.[15] Whatever its provenance, there can be no doubt that the Novgorod icon masterfully recapitulates, in visual form, the collective multivalence of early Byzantine and Slavonic sophiology.[16] When Paul Evdokimov observes (correctly) that "There are no absolutely convincing explanations about the meaning of [the Novgorod icon's] enigmatic figure,"[17] he effectively expresses the historical consensus of Jewish, Byzantine, and early Slavonic tradition regarding divine Wisdom.

BULGAKOV'S SOPHIOLOGICAL VISION

It is from within this foggy tradition of "hieroglyphic sophiology"[18] that Bulgakov develops his theology. Bulgakov sees, in the elusive figure of divine Sophia, tremendous potential: both to work out various problematic tensions latent within Christian dogma and to respond to certain modern challenges posed by Darwinism and German Idealism.[19] Solovyov and Florensky had already begun this twofold project, but it remained for Bulgakov to articulate their sophiological insights in a sufficiently systematic and orthodox manner.

Bulgakov begins his interpretation of Sophia with a constructive critique of traditional trinitarian dogma. The received dogmatic formula consists in

[10] Judith Deutsch Kornblatt, *Divine Sophia: The Wisdom Writings of Vladimir Solovyov* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2009), 49.
[11] Bulgakov, *Sophia, The Wisdom of God*, 2.
[12] For a brief but rich account of the historical relationship between Mariology and the pre-existing pantheistic religion of the Russian world (which may well have been responsible for the mariological emphases of Russian sophiology) see Kornblatt, *Divine Sophia*, 51-55. For a broad, encyclopedic study of the relationship between the Virgin Mary and Sophia in both Eastern and Western thought, see Schipflinger, *Sophia-Maria*. For a developed presentation of Bulgakov's own Mariology (which deals minorly with the relationship between Sophia and the Virgin), see Sergei Bulgakov, *The Burning Bush: On the Orthodox Veneration of the Mother of God*, trans. Thomas Allan Smith (Grand Rapids, MI: Wm. B. Eerdmans Publishing Co., 2009).
[13] Bulgakov, *Sophia, The Wisdom of God*, 4.
[14] Pavel Florensky, *The Pillar and Ground of the Truth: An Essay in Orthodox Theodicy in Twelve Letters*, trans. Boris Jakim (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1997), 268.
[15] Ibid., 268-269. Following this account, Florensky considers the icon "probably contemporary with the construction of the cathedral" and therefore, "at least in content if not in execution, one of the oldest Russian icons."
[16] For detailed Orthodox interpretations of the Novgorod icon, see Florensky, *The Pillar and Ground of the Truth*, 267-272 and Paul Evdokimov, *The Art of the Icon: A Theology of Beauty*, trans. Fr. Steven Bigham (Redondo Beach, CA: Oakwood Publications, 1990), 345-353.
[17] Evdokimov, *The Art of the Icon*, 345.
[18] Bulgakov, *Sophia, The Wisdom of God*, 2.
[19] For an account of the ways Bulgakov's sophiology interacts with, is influenced by, and responds to these challenges posed by the German Idealist tradition (especially by the thought of Schelling) and Darwinism, see Milbank, "Sophiology and Theurgy."

two basic postulates: the tri-unity of Father, Son, and Spirit, on the one hand, and the consubstantiality, or common *ousia*, of these hypostases, on the other. While much attention has been devoted, throughout the church's history, to speaking properly about the tri-unity of God—about the relations between Father, Son, and Spirit— almost none has been devoted to understanding the way in which the three divine hypostases are identical in *ousia*. Instead, and much to Bulgakov's dismay, the term *ousia* has unfortunately tended to function purely as a kind of "philosophical abstraction"[20] or verbal placeholder, altogether bereft of theological content. This tendency to speak of *ousia* in abstraction has resulted in an impoverished and incomplete trinitarianism, one which dangerously verges on tritheism by failing to uphold or emphasize the *essential* identity of Father, Son, and Spirit.

But precisely how should we speak of or understand the divine *ousia*, then? Bulgakov insists that the divine *ousia* is not something in any way separable or really distinct from the divine life of the Trinity, such that we could conceive of it 'on its own,' abstracted from what has been revealed of God's economic trinitarian activity. Rather, when we affirm that the Father, Son, and Spirit exist together, from all eternity, in a common *ousia*, what we affirm is that the three trinitarian hypostases eternally share and live a *single common life* with one another.

Bulgakov is convinced, moreover, that scripture offers us a "revealed teaching on [this] life of the triune God."[21] The triune "life of God in his divinity," he asserts, "*is precisely what Scripture calls Sophia*, or the Wisdom of God."[22] Bulgakov thus identifies the inadequate *ousia* of trinitarian dogma with the ambiguous Sophia of biblical and Orthodox tradition; the figure of Sophia, he argues, is nothing other than a personification of God's triune life. In the language of the Wisdom of Solomon, Sophia is a perfect effluence of trinitarian light, arising eternally as a "fine mist" from the *perichoresis* of Father, Son, and Spirit. She is, in Bulgakov's expression, the very 'divine world' in which the divine hypostases, attributes, and creative ideas cohere in perfect unity.

It is crucial to note here, however, that Bulgakov does not attribute *personhood* to Sophia; on the contrary, he repeatedly insists that one not conceive of Sophia as a 'fourth hypostasis' alongside the Father, Son, and Spirit. And yet, at the same time, Bulgakov affirms that Sophia is eternally *personified* by God, as that *tripersonal* divinity which unites Father, Son, and Spirit as one God. In their love for one another, one might dare to say, the trinitarian Persons eternally 'bring Sophia to life' and personify her (even as, paradoxically, she is the very 'world' *in which* their interpersonal love occurs in the first place). "Both affirmations are true," writes Bulgakov: "Sophia is the non-hypostatic essence, which yet can exist *only in connection with* the tri-hypostatic person of God."[23]

Thus, Sophia is 'possessed' by the Father, Son, and Spirit as that which eternally unites them, the 'world' of their interpersonal love and creative activity. At the same time, the trinitarian hypostases are truly distinct from one another, and therefore possess Sophia in truly distinct ways. "We should learn," for precisely this reason, "to think of the divine Sophia as at the same time threefold and one."[24] The Father possesses Sophia as his eternal "self-revelation" in the Son and Spirit; the Son possesses her as the eternal 'content' of the Father's self-revelation; and the Spirit possesses her as the vitalizing *manifestation* of this eternal content. In sum, therefore, we can say that Sophia is simply "the Father manifesting himself through the Son and the Holy Spirit."[25]

But if Sophia refers to the Father's self-manifestation in the Son and Spirit, what exactly is the 'content' of this paternal self-manifestation? Phrased otherwise, *what* is contained from all eternity

[20] Ibid., 25.

[21] Ibid. Bulgakov repeatedly stresses that all trinitarian speculation is rendered possible solely by the self-revelation of God, apart from which we are utterly unable to "penetrate into the inner life of the Deity itself."

[22] Sergius Bulgakov, *The Lamb of God*, trans. Boris Jakim (Grand Rapids, MI: Wm. B. Eerdmans Publishing Co., 2008), 107; emphasis added.

[23] Bulgakov, *Sophia, The Wisdom of God*, 56; emphasis added.

[24] Ibid., 37.

[25] Ibid., 51. For a helpful account of the ways Sophia is respectively possessed by each of the trinitarian hypostases in Bulgakov's theology, see Aidan Nichols, *Wisdom from Above: A Primer in the Theology of Father Sergei Bulgakov* (Leominster: Gracewing, 2005), 19-32.

in the divine Sophia? Is the content of Sophia limited to the trinitarian relations, or does it somehow extend 'outwardly' beyond them? Here, again, Bulgakov finds his answer in the Old Testament. The wisdom passages quoted above describe Sophia with constant reference to the created order, as that "intelligent purpose" by which God thinks, considers, plans, and *creates* all things (Sir. 1:4). This intimate connection between Sophia and creation suggests, on Bulgakov's take, that Sophia somehow 'contains' not only the essential relations of Father, Son, and Spirit, but also the pre-existent plans of all *created* beings. As Aidan Nichols puts it, Sophia is "the divine nature as containing … the content of the life of God. And this means not just all the properties of the divine nature but the archetypes of all created things as well."[26]

Bulgakov is deriving this interpretation, in large part, from patristic and medieval tradition. Many of the fathers, both Eastern and Western, spoke of the 'divine ideas,' the creative thoughts by which God designs creatures and calls them into being. Clement of Alexandria, for instance, wrote in the 3rd century that "We already existed before this world, because our creation was decided by God long before our actual creation. … Thanks to Him, we are very ancient in origin, because 'in the beginning was the Word.'"[27] The logic behind this doctrine is fairly straightforward (and incontrovertible): if the 'ideas' of all created entities were not in some sense contained eternally within God's own life, the divine act of creation would problematically involve what Bulgakov calls "ontological novelty for God";[28] in the moment of God's creative act, that is, something 'new' would be entering the God's consciousness, something of which God had been formerly unaware.

To avoid this obviously unacceptable conclusion, Bulgakov follows the fathers in affirming the doctrine of divine ideas. He adds new sophiological depth to this doctrine, however, by asserting that these creative ideas "make up the ideal content of the Divine Sophia, the life of God."[29] Sophia is not only unity of the relations between Father, Son, and Spirit; she is also the "*all-embracing unity* … of the world of ideas."[30] Like Florensky before him,[31] Bulgakov thus finds the doctrine of Sophia nascently present within (and therefore justified by!) patristic tradition: "Although the Fathers themselves do not describe [the divine ideas] by the name of the divine Sophia, nevertheless in essence we have here, quite undoubtedly, the divine world considered as the prototype of the creaturely. Thus the doctrine of Sophia as the prototype of creation finds ample support in the tradition of the Church."[32]

If Sophia eternally contains the ideas of creation within herself, what does God's *act* of creating the world involve? This question had been posed with particular acuity by the German Idealism of the 19th century (especially in the thought of Schelling[33]), and Bulgakov answers it sophiologically: God creates the world by "submerging" Sophia in nothingness.[34] That is, God sends forth and, in a real sense, 'repeats' his own divine world of ideas in the

[26] Nichols, *Wisdom from Above*, 24.

[27] Clement of Alexandria, *Exhortation to the Greeks*, 1. For an extensive discussion of the relationship between the Russian Sophia and the patristic doctrine of the divine ideas, see Florensky, *The Pillar and Ground of the Truth*, 237-253. Florensky argues brilliantly, in this discussion, that the Gnostic doctrine of pre-existence is to be condemned not because it asserts that we 'existed before this world,' but because it understands this pre-existence in *too weak* a fashion. Gnostic pre-existence merely extends our chronological history backwards by some lengthy but nevertheless quantifiable amount of time; authentically Christian pre-existence, by contrast, far more daringly locates us in *God's own timeless eternity*. Thus, the Gnostic doctrine of pre-existence fails to sufficiently dignify us as eternal beings: as Florensky quips, "do years make the holy holy?"

[28] Sergius Bulgakov, *The Bride of the Lamb*, trans. Boris Jakim (Grand Rapids, MI: Wm. B. Eerdmans Publishing Co., 2002), 50.

[29] Ibid.

[30] Bulgakov, *Sophia, The Wisdom of God*, 69.

[31] As Florensky writes (in *The Pillar and Ground of the Truth*, 237), "Sophia is the Great Root of the whole creation. … That is, Sophia is all-integral creation and not merely *all* creation. Sophia is the Great Root by which creation goes into the intra-Trinitarian life and through which it receives Life Eternal from the One Source of Life. Sophia is the original nature of creation … The shaping reason with regard to creation, Sophia is the shaped content of God-Reason, His 'psychic content,' eternally created by the Father through the Son and completed in the Holy Spirit: God thinks *by things*."

[32] Bulgakov, *Sophia, The Wisdom of God*, 65.

[33] See note 19 above.

[34] For a more in-depth discussion of Bulgakov's understanding of *creatio ex nihilo*, see Sergius Bulgakov, *Unfading Light: Contemplations*

realm of nonbeing. This does not mean, however, that creation is simply an imperfect replica of God's life; rather, by a mysterious power, God confers *real distinctness* and *individuality* upon his creation—the "capacity to maintain its own distinct existence."[35] God creates out of himself, out of his divine Sophia, but nevertheless bestows upon this creation an irrevocable individuality.[36] As the divine Sophia is refracted into the realm of nothingness, moreover, the divine ideas contained unitedly within her are separated and diversified into distinct beings, each of which are granted individual identity by God; in Florensky's words, "One in God, [Sophia] is multiple in creation."[37]

"By one and the same eternal divine act," therefore, "God is both God and the Creator."[38] Creation is "an act that belongs to God's eternity."[39] As Bulgakov memorably puts it, "The fact of God's creation of the world certifies that there is a *place for the world* in the divine life."[40] In a sense, sophiology bestows the highest dignity possible upon creation: it locates our world, and even our own selves, within the trinitarian life of God himself. "The creaturely world is united with the divine world in divine Sophia. Heaven stoops toward earth; the world is not only a world in itself, it is also the world in God, and God abides not only in heaven but also on earth with human beings."[41] There is hence no *natura pura*—no created space in any way devoid or independent of divine presence.[42] Rather, all things are created, permeated, pervaded, and made new by God *in Sophia* (Wis. 7:27, Ps. 104:24). Through Sophia, God both creates *ex nihilo* a world distinct from himself and call this world eternally back *into* himself. Sophia, in the vision of Bulgakov, is therefore both the presence of the world in God and the presence of God in the world; she is both heavenly and earthly, both uncreated and created, both divine and human. In Florensky's memorable phrase, she is simply that which "unites all."

CONCLUSION: BULGAKOV'S RELATION TO EARLIER BYZANTINE TRADITION

How should this ambitious sophiological system of Bulgakov's be understood in relation to Byzantine tradition as a whole? It is worth noting, first, that Bulgakov's sophiology derives a substantial amount of its content directly from Byzantine tradition: from the Septuagint, from Orthodox cathedrals and liturgical practices, from the trinitarian and christological formulae of the Councils, from the fathers' writings, etc. Unsurprisingly, then, his theological vision, for all its sophiological novelty, bears substantial resemblance to that of Byzantine Christianity. Bulgakov—no less than Dionysius and Maximus and Palamas before him—understands creation as a theophany, called into being *ex nihilo*, imbued with divine energy, sustained by divine ideas, and eschatologically oriented toward deifying union with its Creator. Granted, Bulgakov incorporates into this theological vision several distinctively sophiological

and Speculations, trans. Thomas Allan Smith (Grand Rapids, MI: Wm. B. Eerdmans Publishing Co., 2012), 186-192. On Bulgakov's take, the doctrine of *creatio ex nihilo* expresses negatively what the corresponding doctrine of *creatio ex Deo* expresses affirmatively.

[35] Bulgakov, Sophia, *The Wisdom of God*, 70.

[36] The "world rests in the bosom of God like a child in the mother's womb. It lives its own life, its own particular processes run in it which belong to it and not to the mother, but at the same time it exists in the mother and only by the mother." Bulgakov, *Unfading Light*, 183.

[37] Florensky, *The Pillar and Ground of the Truth*, 239.

[38] Bulgakov, *The Bride of the Lamb*, 51. This claim is precisely what leads Bulgakov to insist upon the 'necessity' of God's creative act (and, on a related note, what leads him to deny that divine freedom and divine necessity are distinct in any real sense at all). The necessity of creation arises, however, not because God is subject to any external constraints or demands, but because his own, entirely 'free' love requires it of him. See Bulgakov, *The Lamb of God*, 120.

[39] Ibid.

[40] Ibid., 47-48; emphasis added.

[41] Bulgakov, *Sophia, The Wisdom of God*, 17.

[42] For a recent discussion of some of the aesthetic and ecological implications of this sophiological understanding of creation, see Michael Martin, *The Submerged Reality: Sophiology and the Turn to a Poetic Metaphysics* (Kettering, OH: Angelico Press, 2015). Martin argues that sophiology is first and foremost a kind of 'poetic intuition' of the presence of divinity in creation, and that its traces can be found turning up at various points within the histories of not only Eastern but also Western Christianity (e.g., in the theology of Bonaventure and the poetry of Hopkins).

claims. But even these claims are not simply 'novel': as Bulgakov never tires of insisting, sophiology is little more than an attempt to understand and draw out neglected elements of the Byzantine vision that have, in a real sense, been there all along.

And if Bulgakov's thought hearkens back to that of the Byzantine world in its content, it does so to an even greater degree in its theological *approach*. In characteristically pre-modern fashion, for instance, Bulgakov submits to ecclesial dogma as a real, binding intellectual authority. This acceptance of authority requires, for Bulgakov, that the best of modernity's 'pagan' wisdom—the wisdom of Boehme, Kant, Fichte, Schelling, Hegel, and Darwin (*et cetera*)—be understood *in terms of* Orthodox theology. Bulgakov thus re-elevates theology to its medieval status as 'queen of the sciences,' and, by doing so, is able to incorporate into his thought the wisdom of his own day's philosophy and biology in a spiritually constructive way. More than this, Bulgakov's theocentric approach is uniquely capable of incorporating insights from oft-neglected, more obscure and 'non-scientific' sources (e.g., the iconography and religious experience of Byzantium). Thus, by embracing and operating within the structure of ecclesiastical dogma, Bulgakov's thought effectively overcomes the perennial dualisms and disciplinary divisions of the post-Kantian West (between cognition and aesthetic judgment, faith and reason, phenomena and noumena, and so on). Bulgakov is an heir, instead, to the unabashedly holistic and all-integrative vision of Eastern Christianity, a vision for which truth, goodness, and beauty are ultimately convertible with one another, and for which all truth finds its perfect fulfillment in trinitarian love. Whether Bulgakov's sophiology ultimately veracious or not, then, it is certainly—in both content and approach—a faithful expression of Byzantine tradition in the modern era.

Fig. 1: 'Novgorod' icon of St Sophia, 16th-century rendition (St George Church in Vologda)

Click here to see the image.

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God in Our Own Image: Demythologizing Protestant Christianity's Relationship with Nazi Germany

Rebecca Ito

This paper brilliantly integrates faith and learning. It tells the story of the "German Christians," a movement of Protestant pastors, theologians, and laypersons who worked in the 1930s to accommodate Church doctrine to Nazi ideology. Hoping to "dejudaize" Christianity, the movement published nationalistic and racist material for use in pulpits, Sunday School classes, and theological seminaries. As the paper explains, the Nazi regime eventually tired of the German Christians, but not before the movement had sown confusion in Germany about Christian doctrine and the relationship between church and state. Engaging with an impressive body of scholarly literature, the paper shows how many Protestants came to believe that there was little contradiction in following both "the cross and the swastika." A concluding theological meditation reminds readers to follow "the One who does not permit himself to be made a means to merely human ends."

What would the Bible look like without the Old Testament? What would the New Testament look like without the Epistles? And what would the Gospels look like without a single mention of sin or grace?

Add to these the omission of any reference to Christ's Resurrection, the substitution of *heil* ("hail") for *hosanna* ("save us"), and refusal to acknowledge Jesus as a Jew or as the long-awaited *Messiah*, and one begins to get a picture of the *Deutsch Christen* ("German Christian Faith") Movement. German Protestant pastors began this undertaking in the late 1920s, aiming to endear themselves and their religion to the Nazi regime. The strongest intellectual arm, *Institut zur Erforschung und Beseitigung des jüdischen Einfl usses auf das deutsche kirchliche Leben* ("Institute for the Study and Eradication of Jewish Influence on German Church Life"), was officially disbanded with the conclusion of World War Two.[1]

Today, much speculation and projection surrounds the nature of this church-funded movement, its influence on German society, the Nazi political response and the theological backlash from Catholic and Protestant Christians. In popular discourse, Hitler and his regime are commonly viewed as the embodiment of evil; to associate or analogize anything to Nazism is to unequivocally

[1] Susannah Heschel, The Aryan Jesus: Christian Theologians and the Bible in Nazi Germany, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2008), 1.

condemn it as defective at best and diabolical at worst.

And yet, despite popular, contradictory statements like "Hitler supported Christianity," or "Hitler was the Antichrist," the historical relationship between church and state, as well as Christian attitudes toward Hitler and the Nazi regime, were more complex. This paper employs German Christian declarations, state-sponsored propaganda, and scholarly works like Susannah Heschel's *The Aryan Jesus* and Doris Bergen's *Twisted Cross: The German Christian Movement in the Third Reich* to argue that the short-lived, early twentieth century alliance that the German Christian Faith Movement made with political Nazism was tenuous and mutually opportunistic. Thus, as the Nazi vision for Germany never included an organized, supranational religion, and certainly not one whose holy book commanded submission, meekness, and love for one's enemy, the state supported the institutionalized religion insofar as it was useful in rallying religious Germans to their nationalistic, anti-Semitic cause. This, I contend, explains why the German Christian movement ultimately failed to gain ideological dominance over the nation.

This study begins with an investigation of the movement's grassroots beginnings, its deepest anti-Semitic theology, its goals for creating the Institute, and the Institute's projects. It then moves to an examination of how the Nazi regime encouraged and exploited this new theology of a manly, Aryan, Jew-fighting Jesus to further unify the German *Volk* ("people") and fuel radical anti-Semitism. I subsequently trace the trajectory of the Nazi party's vague support for the German Christian Movement in the 1930s to a complete disavowal of the organization in the early 1940s. I finish with a meditation on political idolatry and the folly of designing God into our own image for the sake of furthering any human-conceived agenda.

THE GERMAN CHRISTIAN MOVEMENT

Its Origins and Vision

In her book *Twisted Cross*, Bergen describes the ideological currents that eventually gave rise to the popularity of the German Christian movement. The most general of such currents was comprised of those within the established Protestant church who, having beheld the economic stagnation and wounded national pride that Germany had been subjected to at the disgraceful end of the First World War, were set on "reviving church life through increased emphasis on German culture and ethnicity."[2]

A more specific example can be found in teachings of Siegfried Leffler and Julius Leutheuser, two pastors from the state Thuringia in east-central Germany. In the 1920s, they "had been preaching religious renewal along nationalist, *völkisch* lines."[3] Seeing hope in the Nazi party, which at that time was only one party in a sea of competition for control over the otherwise ineffective Weimar Republic, they dubbed their teaching and followers German Christians.[4] By 1932, observing the rising popularity of Nazi party, some laity and other political and religious leaders met in Berlin to discuss how to integrate Christian theology with National Socialist ideology.[5] Nazi flags draping the altar and sermons declaring Jesus' antagonistic attitude towards the Jews only began the long list of modifications pastors made to their individual parishes as a result of this ongoing discussion.

One specific example of this new ideological rhetoric was expressed in Hanover German Christian leader Gerhard Hahn's 1934 pamphlet piece, entitled "*Christuskreuz und Hakenkreuz*" ("The Cross of Christ and the Swastika").[6] Found in a journal sponsored by the movement, the article outlined the basic tenets and rationales of this new order in lay terms.[7]

> The cross of Christ and the swastika do not need to oppose each other, and must not do so,

[2] Doris Bergen, *Twisted Cross: The German Christian Movement in the Third Reich* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1996), 5.
[3] Ibid.
[4] Ibid.
[5] Ibid.
[6] See Appendix: Image 2.
[7] Susannah Heschel, *The Aryan Jesus*, 67.

> but rather they can and should stand together. One should not dominate the other, but rather each should maintain its own meaning and significance.
>
> The cross of Christ points toward heaven and admonishes us: remember that you are Christian people, carried by the eternal love of the heavenly father, free through faith in the Lord Jesus Christ, sanctified by the power of God's spirit.
>
> The swastika, however, points to the world as a divine creation and admonishes us: remember that you are German, born in German territory to parents of German blood, filled with the German spirit and essence, formed according to German nature.
>
> Both together, however, the cross of Christ and the swastika, admonish us: remember that you are German Christian people and should become ever more whole German Christian people, and remain so![8]

The preponderance of the adjective "German" makes this pamphlet the epitome of interpreting the Gospel as a means to nationalistic ends. Also, despite the orthodox theology Hahn employs in the second paragraph, the rest of it could be categorized as fallacious *non sequiturs*, where the conclusions do not logically follow from the arguments. The same could be said of the vast majority of known *Deutsch Christen* writings, in which misapplications of Scripture, proof-texting, and logical fallacies abound.[9]

Later on in the same article, Hahn recalled another German Christian pastor justifying the movement's vision to embody the merging of the two symbols:

> The church stands here under the cross of Jesus Christ; the German people stands there, which under the symbol of the swastika has awakened.
>
> In past decades, the subversive powers of liberalism, materialism, and Bolshevism alienated millions of German people's comrades from the German nation. It is doubtless God's grace that our Führer Adolf Hitler has once again won back to the nation the German people's comrade and the German worker. Hitler could and had to achieve his goal, because he broke totally from the past and followed the entirely different, yet ancient, path of National Socialism.
>
> In past decades, these satanic powers alienated millions of our German people's comrades from the Evangelical Church. It is the holy duty and solemn goal of our movement of faith, the "German Christians," to win back the German people's comrade and the German worker, with God's help, to the Evangelical Church. To do that, we want to, and must, follow a different, yet ancient path in the church, namely the path of Martin Luther that leads to a deep connection of church and people, of Christianity and German nature.[10]

Rife in this excerpt are allusions to a tumultuous battle between a holy, pro-German God and a Satan incarnate in divergent political ideologies. The triumph of National Socialism over the power of communism affirmed God's providential hand in all the events leading to Hitler's success and the nation's subsequent success. Dean Stroud, historian and complier of subversive sermons preached in Nazi Germany, comments: "Hitler was the German savior and Jews were the devil incarnate. Both Christianity and Nazism spoke of a Reich ("empire" or "kingdom"), but they had vastly different understandings about its meaning."[11] To label communists and Jews "satanic" and parasitically

[8] Gerhard Hahn and Randall Bytwerk, trans.,"The Cross of Christ and the Swastika," German Propaganda Archive, accessed March 19, 2015, http://research.calvin.edu/germanpropaganda-archive/christuskreuz.htm.
[9] Mary M. Solberg, ed., *A Church Undone: Documents from the German Christian Faith Movement*, 1932-1940 (Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 2015).
[10] Gerhard Hahn, "The Cross of Christ and the Swastika."
[11] Dean Garrett Stroud, editor, Preaching in Hitler's Shadow: Sermons of Resistance in the Third Reich (Grand Rapids, MI: William B. Eerdmans Publishing Company, 2013), 9.

entrenched in German culture was to further impress upon readers that God was on the side of Germany, the Nazis, and everyone in the church who decided to align themselves with National Socialism. Consequently, in the eyes of the German Christian leaders, resistance to the Nazis was paramount to rejecting almighty God.

Here one can already see that though the movement might have benefited from Nazi rhetorical support, it began as a grassroots undertaking by Protestant clergy. It cannot be claimed that the Church bears no responsibility for the creation of a nationalistic theology that supported Hitler. Though the published writings and speeches of German Christian leaders make it difficult to determine whether they were cynical opportunists or fawning devotees, scholar Mary Solberg notes their motivations ranged widely: from currying personal favor with the new regime to climbing the German political power ladder, and from acting out of fear of being seen as unpatriotic to redeeming the disgrace that Germany suffered at the end of World War I.[12]

Anti-Semitism as Common Ground

It is important to realize that the racial anti-Semitism which characterized Nazi Germany was not an invention of the National Socialists, but rather a radicalization of many social and religious factors which predated Hitler's rise to power. One only has to think of the French Dreyfus Affair forty years earlier to realize that anti-Semitism was not even unique to Nazi Germany.[13] Anti-Semitism was born out of long-standing cultural stigmas reaching back to the economic and societal make-up of the Middle Ages; Medieval Europeans also perpetuated the Biblical misinterpretation that blamed Jews for the ultimate, unforgivable sin of killing Christ. Christians, both Catholic and Protestant, bear the historical guilt of perpetuating this story into the nineteenth and twentieth centuries.[14]

For Germany, this religious justification for anti-Semitism manifested itself in the church long before Hitler came to power or the German Christian movement was conceived.[15] But in 1937, as the German Christian movement continued gaining popular momentum, they came out with an official statement that reinforced the pre-existing Christian anti-Semitism:

> The National Church Movement German Christian stands for an overcoming and eradication of all Jewish and foreign völkisch spirit in church teaching and ways of life and confesses German Christianity to be the racially appropriate religion of the German Volk. Christ is not the scion and fulfiller of Judaism but rather its deadly enemy and conqueror.[16]

Even Martin Luther's anti-Semitic writings were invoked as validation for the ideological marginalization and physical dehumanization of Jews. Nazi Christians claimed that: "In the Nazi treatment of Jews and its ideological stance, Luther's intentions, after centuries, are being fulfilled."[17] Anti-Semitism was the single factor that both the National Socialists and the German Christian movement could whole-heartedly agree upon, and both saw this commonality as an opportunity to gain an upper hand on the other.

For indeed, beyond this noxiously celebrated similarity, they were engaged in a power struggle for popular German loyalty. In the words of Heschel,

> Nazism did not present racial anti-Semitism as antithetical to Christian theological anti-Judaism; rather, Nazi ideology was a form of supersession, a usurpation and colonization of Christian theology, especially its anti-Semitism, for its own purposes. The theology of the Institute was a similar effort at supersessionism in reverse, taking over elements of Nazi racial ideology to bolster and redefine the Christian message. The result was an uneasy competition between two sides seeking popular support and institution

[12] Solberg, A Church Undone, 23.
[13] Ruth Harris, Dreyfus: Politics, Emotion, and the Scandal of the Century (New York: Metropolitan Books, 2010).
[14] Robert Chazan, The Jews of Medieval Western Christendom, 1000-1500 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006).
[15] Heschel, 7.
[16] As cited in Heschel, 71.
[17] Heschel, 7.

control, though access to power was, of course, highly asymmetrical.[18]

The Institute and Its Projects

The popularity of the movement grew throughout the 1930s, as demonstrated by the increasing representation of German Christians in national church leadership elections.[19] The early-1930s saw the height of the *Nazi-Deutsche Christen* cooperation, as Nazi party member Ludwig Müller was elected to the newly created position of *Reich* Bishop in 1933.[20] Though he had no seminary training to speak of, he then became responsible for supporting and presiding over German Christian pastors and scholars.[21] Despite these political advances, there are no accurate records of the numbers of the movement's adherents due to both the frequency of the movement's internal fragmentation and its increasingly awkward relationship with political Nazism from late-1933 onwards.[22] Bergen estimates roughly 600,000 Germans were members by the mid-1930s.[23] So while the German Christian Faith Movement never came close to becoming the factional majority in the Protestant Church,[24] their public influence became disproportionally substantial, due in large part to the establishment of this theological organization, popularly known as the *Entjudungsinstitut* ("the dejudaization institute").[25]

Opened in May 1939 at Wartburg Castle in Thuringia, Germany, the Institute remained the strongest and most influential operation of the movement for the six years of its operation.[26] It was here that Protestant scholars like Gerhard Kittel, Paul Althaus, and Emanuel Hirsch assumed massive projects to buttress National Socialist ideology (including the pseudo-deification of Hitler) with religious rhetoric and to marginalize the Jew from a theological perspective.[27]

These projects included editing the Christian Bible, modifying hymns and prayers, defining the historical Jesus as Aryan, and creating new meaning for Christian sacraments. In all these things, the Institute's publications and statements reflected a determination to 1) oppose traditional church doctrine, 2) promote radical anti-Semitism, and 3) create a "manly" church.[28] They revised the Ten Commandments (e.g. "You shall do no murder...But whosoever tries to ruin him morally, or threatens to assault him, destroys the national fellowship and makes himself deserving of the severest punishment before God and men."); condensed the gospels and epistles into a volume known as *Die Botschaft Gottes* ("The Message of God"); insisted that Jesus was a Jew-fighter who was put to death because of that; and created hymnals that depicted soldiers, flags, and families.[29] Inasmuch as they succeeded in attaining those goals, the Nazi party did not publically oppose them since, as Heschel writes, "the moral and societal location of clergy and theologians len[t] greater weight to the propaganda of the Institute; propaganda coming from the pulpit call[ed] forth far deeper resonance that that spoken by a politician or journalist."[30]

NAZISM'S CONFLICTING RHETORIC REGARDING THE GERMAN CHRISTIAN MOVEMENT

[18] Ibid, 8, emphasis added.
[19] Bergen, 5-7.
[20] Ibid, 15.
[21] Kyle Jantzen, *Faith and Fatherland: Parish Politics in Hitler's Germany* (Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 2008), 4-6.
[22] Bergen, 7.
[23] This number does not include those within the Protestant Church that remained "neutral," siding officially with neither the German Christians, nor the Confessing Church.
[24] Solberg, 23.
[25] Heschel, 13.
[26] Ibid, 1.
[27] Robert P. Ericksen, *Theologians Under Hitler: Gerhard Kittel, Paul Althaus, and Emanuel Hirsch* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1985).
[28] Heschel, 5.
[29] Ibid.
[30] Ibid, 17.

The conflicting attitudes of the Nazi regime towards the German Christian movement cannot be examined in a chronologically neat progression. Rather, the rhetoric varied from speaker to speaker, from year to year, and from audience to audience; more importantly, action taken against the church did not always line up with the publically propagated Nazi rhetoric.

I argue that Hitler's creation of a "positive Christianity," the quiet undermining of all church authority, and the Nazi support of a Germanic paganism all point to a principal reason why the German Christian movement never succeeded in attaining ideological supremacy in Nazi Germany. Simply put, the Nazi vision for Germany never included an organized, supranational religion. If there were to be a god, it would be the Führer himself with the nation as his kingdom. There was absolutely no room for a higher authority who mandated repentance, humility, and unconditional love as the true litmus tests for righteous living.

Hitler's Positive Christianity

With several editions and an approximate total of 10,000 copies printed,[31] the 1933 handbook published by German Christian leadership outlined ten guiding principles, the fifth of which declared, "We stand on the ground of positive Christianity. We confess an affirmative faith in Christ, one suited to a truly German Lutheran spirit and heroic piety."[32] Later on in the same document, in a series of statements regarding the role of the new *Volkskirche* ("People's church"), Thuringian pastor and co-founder of the German Christian movement Julius Leutheuser wrote,

> In a *Vokskirche*, faith in Christ that is not acted on is of no value. The act of believing in Christ is decisively expressed in opposition to all that is evil and in courageous determination to serve and to sacrifice...For this reason the people's church recognizes as positive Christianity: Faith in Christ, Salvation through Christ, Acting out Christ."[33]

Friedrich Wieneke, World War I German soldier, Nazi sympathizer, and post-war cathedral pastor, also mentioned the phrase, insisting that "Positive Christianity is and will ever remain a *biblical Christianity*. 'Positive' means nothing other than 'fundamental.'"[34]

"Affirmative," "heroic," "active," "Biblical," "fundamental": these were all words that German Christians employed in describing "positive Christianity," a phrase probably foreign to most Christians and non-Christians today. That is for good reason, as it was invented by Hitler himself. Interestingly, he did not describe it in quite the same way in a 1920 platform statement:

> We demand the freedom of all religious confessions in the state, insofar as they do not jeopardize the state's existence or conflict with the manners and moral sentiments of the Germanic race. The Party as such upholds the point of view of a positive Christianity without tying itself confessionally to any one confession. It combats the Jewish-materialistic spirit at home and abroad and is convinced that a permanent recovery of our people can only be achieved from within on the basis of the common good before individual good.[35]

Solberg contends that Article 24 revealed Hitler's willingness as early as the 1920s to cooperate with the *Deutsche Christen* movement because he realized his need for its support as he undertook his National Socialism campaign. Nevertheless, not only did this statement suggest that one's identity as a Christian was tethered to one's racial identity as Aryan, but it also implied the party's sole authority to deem whatever Christian traditions or theology unlawful if it conflicted with Nazi social policy.[36] As the years

[31] Solberg, 165.
[32] Ibid, 169.
[33] Ibid, 176.
[34] Ibid, 287.
[35] As cited in Stroud, *Preaching in Hitler's Shadow*, 7, emphasis added.
[36] Stroud, 7.

went on, more and more orthodox theology took a plunge down this slippery slope.

Lest there be any doubt or ambiguity, violations of positive Christianity, including criticism of the Nazi government or its policies to eradicate Jews was condemned as 'negative Christianity.'[37] And negative Christianity meant intimidation, prison time, trials, concentration camps, and death, as several Confessing Church members like Pastor Dietrich Bonhoeffer found out.

Signs of Reluctance and Eventual Disavowal

While the regime appeared to support the German Christian movement, it also sought to quietly suppress any excessive popularity on its part that might convince citizens that one's German Christian identity was more important that loyalty to the Führer. Hitler himself was unsupportive of the German Christians originally calling themselves Protestant National Socialists, because it bore too close a resemblance to the Nazi party's full name, *Nationalsozialistische Deutsche Arbeiterpartei* ("National Socialist German Workers' Party").[38] Later, laws constrained German Christians from even labeling their cause a "movement," restricting the usage of that term to official Nazi establishments.[39]

And as early as 1933 (supposedly the height of Nazi-German Christian cooperation[40]), Hitler saw to the forcible disbanding of church youth groups, requiring children to participate in Hitler Youth and the League of German Girls instead.[41] Heschel takes these examples of Nazi noncompliance to mean that "the promise of full partnership, to which many in the German Christian movement had hoped their active support of Hitler would lead, did not materialize, and church leaders of all stripes found themselves increasingly held at a distance by the party and regime."[42]

Not only did the Nazi regime interfere with the growth of the movement's popularity, but as early as 1933, they had also thrown their weight behind a neo-paganism called *Gottgläubigkeit* ("God Belief").[43] The various strands of this cult had begun to emerge at the turn of the century, and expressed the conviction that if only the German people look to their Nordic-Germanic roots, the nation would experience spiritual renewal.[44] By the early 1940s, Heinrich Himmler not only advocated for *Gottgläubigkeit*, but also publically insisted that "We will have to deal with Christianity in a tougher way than hitherto. We must settle accounts with this Christianity, this greatest of plagues that could have happened to us in our history, which has weakened us in every conflict."[45] It would seem as if Nazi leadership still perceived Christianity, even in the neutered form that *Deutsch Christen* professed, as too dangerous for its own good. A biopolitical, racially rooted cult would be easier to manipulate for Nazi ends.

GOD IN OUR OWN IMAGE, LITERALLY

Throughout history, civil religious rhetoric has been invoked to celebrate and justify the endeavors of many a nation; conversely, since religions are not lived out in cultural vacuums, theological endeavors are capable of projecting political interpretations onto sacred texts in ways that are clearly suspect to those not living in that culture or age. Nazi Germany and the German Christian movement birthed by the Protestant tradition epitomize these respective historical tendencies.

For the National Socialists, Christianity was not so much a dangerous, antagonistic force as much as it was the main artery to many German citizens' loyalty.

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[37] Ibid.
[38] Bergen, 5.
[39] Heschel, 67.
[40] Bergen, 15.
[41] See Appendix: Image 4.
[42] Heschel, 67.
[43] Introductory notes to Heinrich Himmler, "On Christianity and Religion (June 9, 1942)," German History in Documents and Images (GHDI), accessed March 8, 2015, http://germanhistorydocs.ghidc.org/sub_document.cfm?document_id=1573.
[44] Ibid.
[45] Himmler, "On Christianity and Religion (June 9, 1942)."

If the populace could be convinced via state-issued propaganda and their very own German Christian movement that their religion supported Hitler's regime, his anti-Semitic policies, and the elevation of the nation's interests above personal conviction, then Nazi Germany would be unified and Hitler become all the more powerful. Concurrently, Hitler saw the German Christians as expendable; as soon as they fulfilled the role of supporting Nazi ideology with religious rhetoric and further inculcated anti-Semitism into German society, they were ushered out of the limelight so that the worship of the real lord, the Führer, could commence.

On the other side, the German Christians saw the Nazis' rise to power in the early 1930s as an opportunity to demonstrate nationalistic loyalty and ally with a political power that was antagonistic towards Jews. Yet, in vying for some of the political, popular power held by the Nazi regime, but still wanting to retain the religious authority of the Protestant Church, they ended with neither. In the words of Bergen,

> When it came to antidoctrinal faith, German Christians were reaping what they had sown. They had replaced belief with ritual, ethnicity, state sponsorship, and war as the core of their spiritual community. In the process, they perpetuated a church with neither authority nor integrity.[46]

This is the legacy of the compromising church in Nazi Germany. As Image 1 aptly suggests, when we create God in our own image we find ways to crucify Christ anew.[47] Christ did not lose his life at the hands of monstrous, decrepit, ugly, eternal Jews; he gave his life for all of humanity so that he could redeem personal brokenness and overcome systematic injustice in all its forms, be it racism, classism, sexism, etc. Yes, he harrowed Hell, but we err egregiously if we think that Jesus was "a manly, heroic, fighting spirit,...killing one's opponent without emotion but in accord with principles of natural law, in defense of one's own race and at the cost of personal sacrifice."[48]

In the same vein, Jesus' actual words stand in conflict to Reich Bishop Müller's revision of the Sermon on the Mount, which celebrated strength, courage, comradeship, and manly endurance.[49] Blessed indeed are the meek, for the true God is in the business of choosing what is foolish in the world to shame the wise and choosing what is weak in the world to shame the strong.[50] Bonhoeffer underscores this truth in his one of his many subversive, negative-Christianity-esque sermons, "Gideon":

> This is a passionate story...of God's mocking human might... It is no rousing heroic legend—there is nothing of Siegfried in Gideon. Instead it is a rough, tough, not very uplifting story, in which we are all being roundly ridiculed along with him. ...We have Gideon, because his story is a story of God glorified, of the human being humbled. Here is Gideon, one person no different from a thousand others, but out of that thousand, he is the one whom God comes to meet, who is called into God's service, is called to act.[51]

Here and throughout the rest of this message, Bonhoeffer contrasts Germany's heroic Siegfried with Yahweh God's humbled Gideon and exhorts his congregation to be the latter – the unremarkable, the meek, the courageous. This, from a man who exemplified his own exhortation unto death, challenges us to consider the weighty consequences of our citizenship in heaven.[52] Regardless of whether telling the truth, speaking out against injustice, or walking humbly are in vogue and nationalistic enough or not, these are our job descriptions as representatives of One who does not permit himself to be made a means to merely human ends.

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[46] Bergen, 60.
[47] See Appendix: Image 1.
[48] Heschel, 10.
[49] Ibid, 53.
[50] 1 Corinthians 1: 27-28.
[51] Bonhoeffer, as found in Stroud, 55.
[52] Philippians 3:20.

Appendix: Images

Image 1: "Establishing the state church: the cross was not hard enough." A poster sketched in 1933 by John Heartfield.

Click here to see the image.

John Heartfield, "Religionskritik," Kirche Und Staat, Kirche Und Politik Ab 1900 (Antiklerikale Karikaturen Und Satiren XXV), accessed April 24, 2015, http://www.payer.de/religionskritik/karikaturen253.htm.

Image 2: "The Cross of Christ and the Swastika." The front cover of the journal in which Hahn's article is found.

Click here to see the image.

Gerhard Hahn and Randall Bytwerk, trans., "The Cross of Christ and the Swastika," German Propaganda Archive, accessed March 19, 2015, http://research.calvin.edu/german-propaganda-archive/christuskreuz.htm.

Image 3: "Christ is the mortal enemy of Judaism!" Newspaper.

Click here to see the image.

Alois Payer, ed. "Religionskritik," Kirche Und Staat, Kirche Und Politik Ab 1900 (Antiklerikale Karikaturen Und Satiren XXV), accessed April 24, 2015, http://www.payer.de/religionskritik/karikaturen253.htm.

Image 4: "Image of Protestant Girls' Youth Organization before Its Dissolution." Photograph.

Click here to see the image.

"Image of Protestant Girls' Youth Organization before Its Dissolution (April 1, 1934)," German History in Documents and Images (GHDI), accessed March 9, 2015, http://germanhistorydocs.ghi-dc.org/sub_image.cfm?image_id=2062.

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Systemic Sexual Abuse in Christian Congregations

Ciera Horton

Trigger warning: This is a carefully researched and well written paper on one of the most egregious shortcomings of the church today – its failure to address, and sometime complicity in, physical and emotional violence against women. The author offers a frank analysis of the rise of "rape culture" in which such violence has become the norm, briefly examines the failures of the church to address these issues, and focuses attention on the opportunity for "victim ministry" focused on critical consciousness, ethical education, and social conversion. The paper demonstrates a commitment not just to faith and learning, but to application in the life of local congregations.

Every 107 seconds, another American becomes a victim of sexual assault, with an average of 293,066 victims of rape and assault every year, according to the U.S. Department of Justice's National Crime Victimization Survey. One out of every six American women have been victims of rape or attempted rape. In 2003, nine out of every ten rape victims were women. However daunting, these sociological statistics are not inclusive for they do not take into account the cases that are not reported to the police, either out of shame or compulsive fear, for 32 out of 100 go unaccounted (RAINN).

The book *Transforming A Rape Culture* by Emile Buchwald states that "A rape culture condones physical and emotional terrorism against women as the norm...It is a society where violence is seen as sexy and sexuality as violent" (Buchwald vii). Sexual violence is widespread in our culture and sadly religious communities are not immune to cases of aggression against women. In the Christian church, instances of rape and addiction to pornography often go unseen and necessitate a change in how Christians approach violence against women to effectively strive for healing and social justice for victims.

This paper will seek to answer the questions, "How do social interpretations of gender roles and exposure to explicit material feed into instances of sexual violence against women? What is the nature of rape culture in the environment of the Christian church?" For the sake of this analysis, sexual assault, as defined by the Rape, Abuse & Incest National Network (RAINN), refers to "rape, attempted rape, forcing a victim to perform sexual acts, fondling or unwanted sexual touching." The widespread cultural leaning towards legitimized aggression is centered around a disparity of gender roles, both in secular and Christian circles, and portrayals of women in erotic material, especially that which is abusive in nature.

GENDER INEQUALITY IN SECULAR CULTURE

A University of Florida school administrator was once asked to give a response to the high numbers of gang rape occurring at colleges. His response

about the pressure to commit gang rape was, "The men almost cannot say no, because if they do their masculinity will be in question" (Miedzian 153). Male sexuality is often associated with power, aggression and uncontrollable desire in a way that eroticizes violence. One of the central concepts surrounding the discussion on sexual assault against women is the idea that rape serves as a function of a male dominated society. Conceptualized gender roles often encourage sexual exploitation, especially when it is socially normative to associate masculinity with strength, dominance, belligerence and sexual prowess.

Despite the different waves of feminism, there is still gross inequity regarding gender representation. Such sexual discrimination come from underlying assumptions that shape societal views of gender and value. According to Pamela White, professor of Pastoral Theology and author of *The Cry of Tamar*, there are several stereotypes of women which are relevant to the issue of abuse in that they illuminate the psychological justifications employed by perpetrators. 1) Women are wild and need to be subdued. This stereotype is commonly driven through media portrayals of women in advertisements, such as the nude model Nastassia Kinski draped with a python snake, associating her with danger. There is a common trope of identifying women with animalistic nature, which only compels the desire for men to conquer the untamed side of woman. 2) Women are volatile. One of the most potent ways to legitimize abuse is to invalidate the narrative of the women by branding them as emotionally unstable. This concept of the irrational can be traced to historic roots with the word *hysteria* which was the Greek term for the word womb, *hýsteron*. Plato wrote that hysteria was a condition only for women, in which her womb would disrupt her body and cause emotional havoc. Therefore the warning against hysteria was historically directed at women as an exaggeration of assumed female attributes, such as being too emotive. In response to this proposed relationship between female physiology and emotional conditions, a common cultural reaction was to mutilate their bodies to remove sexual organs. This practice was recorded until 1946 (White 70). This correlation between the sexuality of women and derangement trivializes their real stories of abuse under the pretense that they either exaggerate or emotionalize.

STEREOTYPES OF WOMEN IN CHURCH HISTORY

The issue of gender disparities is not restricted to broader culture and does have a stronghold in church tradition, which is a significant component in assessing the crime of sexual assault in Christian communities. Church history reverberates with gender conventions that have often hindered progression towards social justice. St. Clement of Alexandria, an early church father, said in a statement that illustrates the contemporary view of his day, "Every woman ought to be overcome with shame at the thought that she is a woman" (Gilmore 87). Scripture also easily became an avenue for supporting gender stratification as church leaders dealt with difficult passages such as 1 Timothy 11, which states, "Adam was formed first, then Eve. And Adam was not the one deceived; it was the woman who was deceived and became a sinner" (NIV). Such passages led to a gender divide based on presumed moral and spiritual superiority, lived out through blatant patriarchy. Therefore, the stereotype of the 'perfect' Christian woman became someone who was meek, submissive and who stayed at home rearing children while her husband was her ontological authority. Carol Adams' article "The Church and Sexual Violence" in *Transforming A Rape Culture*, shows that the early history of misogyny continues today in the form of using Scripture to argue "women as sinful, women as the cause of sin, and subjugation to men as the punishment for women's sinful behavior. This positioning of women provides several legitimations for rapist behavior" (69). When men assert moral and social control over women, Scripture can become twisted for support, especially in justifying rape between a married or engaged couple.

This continual theme of viewing women as less worthy is what leads to the condition of objectification and allows men in contemporary Christian culture to view a woman as an "it" to be owned and used for pleasure. Such contrived cultural and church-oriented assumptions serve to shape an individual's understanding of sexual ethics and

the way that gender, and aggression, is normalized. The problem heightens when misconceptions on gender roles lead into legitimizing violence. In the *Issues in Criminology* report "Victimology and Rape", sociological researchers Dr. Kurt Weis and Sandra Borges state, "Rooted in a social structure which is characterized by male domination, the socialization processes of the male and female act to mold women into victims and provide the procedure for legitimizing them in this role" (81). Through the gender gradation, men are conditioned to adopt a social and ethical authority, while "women are brought up to think of themselves as sexual objects, subject to being acted-upon by men" (Weis 84). One of the most tangible ways these inequitable roles exist is through the visual portrayal of female sexuality in pornography. The camouflaged rape culture within the church is strongly driven by exposure to explicit material, which warrants hostility and sexual expression.

EXPOSURE TO PORNOGRAPHY

There is often a misconstrued idea of what pornography really entails. The issue is not with the showing of flesh or the portrayal of erotic scenes. Instead, its very nature is that of exploitation, taking something sacred, the intimacy of faithful sexuality, and giving it a price tag to be consumed. It is this dehumanization that restricts the narrative of the women involved from being human to being objects. Baron and Straus' comprehensive sociological approach to rape culture in America, written in conjuncture with the Family Violence Research Program at the University of New Hampshire, focuses on pornography as an irrefutable component of legitimized aggression in cultural contexts. They write that pornography "reflects and promotes male dominance in society", "sexually objectifies women" and "depicts physical assaults against women that serve as behavioral models" (96). Just as those who hear foul language begin to repeat it, pornography viewers are often unknowingly influenced over time and can easily become imitators of the sexual domination.

While some of the following evidence is reflective of the general populace in American society, the principles hold true about the relationship between graphic portrayals of women and reactions of violence. A public health survey with the U.S. National Library of Medicine found that "...exposure to sexually violent material correlated significantly with the belief that 'rapists are normal'...and a consensus of 'everybody does it' and 'this is the way that men act'..." (Cramer 269). This concept of normalization is what allows perpetrators of sexual violence to justify their actions. In a 1988 study of 220 undergraduate men, 27% of the men said they would use force to gain sexual access to a woman. Furthermore, 81% of these men admitted to using nonviolent pornography, with roughly 40% using violent materials. The study found that the "Likelihood of rape and sexual force were directly associated with the use of sexually violent pornography and an attitude of acceptability regarding interpersonal violence against women" (Cramer 269). Not only does pornography lead to a desensitization, but it can also perpetuate violence, especially if the material being absorbed is aggressive in nature. One of the dangers in this is that a vast majority of explicit material is "rape porn" in which the woman resists and does not consent, but is still shown to experience arousal sex with enjoyment. This media stereotype, furthered by songs such as "Timber", with lines like "Says she won't, but I bet she will", are centered around the correlation between pornography and abuse and the assumption of sexual pleasure for the victim. Therefore, those who partake in viewing violent pornography easily become desensitized and the lines between consensual sex and rape become blurred.

For example, the porn magazine *Penthouse* was caught up in scandal at the end of 1984 when their December issue showed nine different pictures of Asian women tied up with rope. Two of them were shown as dead and the others hung limply from trees. Psychotherapist Melissa Farley led a protest against *Penthouse*, arguing that "these murderous images... exude dominance and subordination" (Farley). Two months later, a young girl was kidnapped, raped and killed in a similar fashion, which lead sociologist Diana Russell, among others to "believe that *Penthouse* magazine owner Bob Guccione is in part responsible for her horrifying death" (Russell 104).

The portrayal of violence as accepted art had a direct correlation to enacted assault, in this case on a minor who lost her life.

While the above example is extreme, the relationship between observing aggression, especially in a legitimate medium, and acting upon sadistic fantasies that belittle women is critical. The widespread moral degeneration also illuminates the fact that this problem does not begin on an individual level—it is systemic and deeply institutional. Most perpetrators began as victims of the high sexualization of a corrupted culture.

But do these findings apply to Christian contexts? Statistics show that the same temptations to view pornographic material exists. A 1996 study found that over 50% of attendees at Promise Keepers, a Christian event for men, admitted to viewing pornography that same week (White 75). Furthermore, a 2014 national study of Christian men aged 18-32 found that 77% acknowledged looking at explicit material at least monthly, 36% daily and 32% recognized it as an addiction (Hesch). Evangelical Christians are not immune to the temptation of viewing erotica. Not only does pornography solidify the implicit gender stereotypes, that women are to be viewed, enjoyed and used, but its existence in the church is significant in the discussion on sexual abuse in Christian communities.

OPPOSING ARGUMENTS

Though this subject is underdeveloped and easily overlooked in the world of higher academia, the discussion is relevant and more common than many might presuppose. There have been few social studies specifically on rape and abuse statistics in Christian communities, but numbers from mainstream research still apply in illustrating cultural normalization and the correlation between erotica and substantiated hostility. The initial "It doesn't exist" counteraction is actually a product of this rape culture in which we are immune to sexualized portrayals of women which inevitably lend towards aggression, as shown through the sociological evidence linking graphic content to actions of violence. Misguided gender roles are still present in contemporary church settings today, especially depending on patriarchal tradition and congregation. Christian men are also not impervious to pornography, much of which is violent in nature.

An important insight is that a Christian community is a subculture—it is not outside of culture. Churches are still influenced by sexualized media, music, gender perceptions, violence and social reactions to victimization. The most dangerous reaction we can have is to ignore the cries of the injured and assert that such crimes are impossible and do not exist in the supposed safe haven of a congregation. In doing so, I believe that we only perpetuate the problem.

CHANGES TO VICTIM MINISTRY

It is clear that the church is not inherently protected from instances of sexual violence. The real question is how Christian communities choose to respond. The first step in reconciling the sweeping problem of systemic abuse and misconceived standards for gender inequalities is formerly acknowledging their existence. Pastor and victim counselor Karen McClintock writes in her manual Preventing Sexual Abuse in Congregations, "Individuals living with the pain of abuse are sitting among us in worship, at Bible studies, and in other activities. The 'shhhh' method has kept these victims and witnesses of their abuse silent...Those who are wounded by abuse are doubly wounded by silence" (3). We are quiet on the topic of abuse from the pulpit and in small groups, living with disillusionment and disbelief that aggression could ever exist in our Evangelical communities.

However, this silencing only leads to victim shaming—instead of viewing an abused woman as the sufferer of a heinous crime, she is now deemed impure. When we silence the cries of the injured, we dehumanize them and hinder the journey towards healing and social justice. A significant part of reforming victim ministry is to distance pastoral counseling from the Blame and Shame method of discussing abuse. What often happens is that the response of outside parties is focused on what the vicim did wrong, insinuating that they are in some way responsible. Such victim blaming is often manifested in questions around topics such as what they were wearing, whether or not they were drunk,

or if they had flirted and encouraged the ensuing attack. One researcher found that people who "do not identify with the victim may receive a sense of security by distancing themselves from victims with their belief that the victim deserved it" (Hayes 207). If our response to violence is to misdirect responsibility, then we fall under the same fallacy as saying that someone deserved to be murdered because they chose to walk down a dark alley—while it may have been prevented, the vicim is never morally responsible and the crime is never justified.

Instead, our approach should be three-fold. I propose that the most effective way for Christian communities to further the discussion on sexual abuse in their congregations is to support *critical consciousness*, *ethical education* and *social conversion*. The first step, *critical consciousness*, means allowing for perception and open exposure to the real state of social surroundings. This includes creating a healthy view on gender roles and the moral equality between men and women. Church leaders should proactively provide venues for developing the conversation on sexual ethics for prevention and psychological healing for both the victims and repentant perpetrators. While accountability is a significant part of working towards justice, guilt is not a healthy mode of experiencing reconciliation for either party. Through the *ethical education*, church leaders and goers should assume a communal duty of conversing on the subject of sexual and relational ethics. While most churches succeed in teaching sexuality as a holy aspect of marriage, few address its misuse other than warning teenagers of its sanctity. We can reclaim the conversation so that the church can be providing the moral education more than secular media. This leads to *social conversion* and congregational transformation. Churches can contribute to the preventive and reactive sides of abuse ministry by eliminating the taboo and modeling transparency through small groups, counseling, personal mentorship, small groups and any other valuable means of establishing dialogue.

CONCLUSION

Sexual violence is deeply ingrained in mainstream culture, and though it may be easy to turn a blind eye to the truth, religious communities are also impacted by aggression against women. In the Christian church, instances of rape and addiction to pornography often go unseen and necessitate a change in how Christians approach violence against women we work towards continued healing and reform for victim ministry. Implicit gender roles, propelled through patriarchy, social inequities and media serve to detract from the narratives of the abused and subconsciously normalize violence. Exposure to sexually explicit material, especially that which is aggressive such as "rape porn", eroticize badgered women and often lead perpetrators to imitate what they have seen. Such addictions to pornography are just as powerful within church circles, illustrating a key component of the systemic abuse of women that still exists in Christianity. If we begin by recognizing the gravity of this issue and make steps to avoid the Blame and Shame approach to victim ministry, we can make great strides in the pursuit of reconciliation and social justice.

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Firearm Suicide: The Unacknowledged Cost of Firearms

Ariana Schmidt

This paper addresses the gun control debate by turning the reader's attention away from mass shootings and to suicide, from public spectacle to private troubles. The author explores the reasons that mass shootings have failed to generate a compromise position between gun-ownership advocates and gun-control advocates, but makes a case that firearm suicide, a far more common problem than mass shootings, has the potential to trigger support from moderates on both sides of the issue. The paper is ambitious, well researched, and well argued.

The December San Bernardino shooting brought the gun control debate once again to the front page. Mass shootings always do. President Obama called for stronger gun control and the NRA led with their mantra "Guns don't kill people, people kill people." Gun control remains one of the most intractable issues in the U.S. partly because the debate is framed in an antagonistic manner, putting gun owners on the defensive (*The Economist* 2015). This antagonistic framing often neglects to mention that the largest percentage of firearm related deaths are suicides (Center for Disease Control 2015b; Center for Disease Control 2015a). The seriousness of firearm suicide in the U.S. calls for cooperative not combative solutions rooted in means removal.

While mass shootings are the most dramatic scenario for use in the gun control debate, they are not the most effective. They are outliers. Florida State University Professor of Criminology Gary Kleck contends that mass-shootings prove ineffective catalysts for policy change because, of all gun deaths, they are the hardest to predict and prevent, making their arguments for stronger gun control irrelevant (Kleck 2009, 1462). Furthermore, they represent a small percentage of total firearm deaths. The Washington Post reports that the four worst mass shootings in the past fifteen years account for 84 deaths, roughly equivalent to the average daily firearm death in the U.S. from 2003 to 2012 (Millman 2015). Of those 84 deaths, on average 57 are firearm suicides, meaning that roughly every hour of every day at least two people in the U.S. commit suicide using a firearm (Center for Disease Control 2015b). According to the Center for Disease Control (CDC), 11,208 firearm homicides occurred in the U.S. in 2013 as opposed to 21,175 firearm suicides (Center for Disease Control 2015b; Center for Disease Control 2015a).

Statistics like these underscore the tragic reality that firearm suicides are not just a backdoor approach to the issue of gun control but rather the most numerically significant issue in this debate. Though they rarely make the news, they do significantly affect communities. For Christians the issue of firearm suicide should be especially compelling. Though

the Bible does not explicitly forbid suicide, the Judaic tradition condemns suicide "performed out of despair" because it "den[ies] God's goodness and purpose" ("Suicide - Oxford Reference" 2015). Self-destruction is not God's plan for His children. The U.S. National Library of Medicine reports that suicide is often a cry for help or an expression of hopelessness not a genuine attempt to end one's life ("Suicide and Suicidal Behavior" 2015). Unfortunately when the attempt is successful, neither help nor hope ever come. Acts 16 recounts how Paul and Silas prevented the Philippian jailer from committing suicide. They then led him and his entire household to the Lord (Crossway 2010). This story illustrates the potentially damning consequences of a rash suicide. Christians, called to share God's love and hope, should seek to prevent any behavior that decreases unbelievers' chances of hearing the Gospel. 85% of the time no one can reach them once the trigger is pulled ("Lethality of Suicide Method" 2015).

Unfortunately, believers and unbelievers are equally prone to commit suicide (Hsu 2015). As 1 Corinthians 12:26 reminds us, the Body of Christ rejoices and suffers as a whole therefore care should be taken to support each member. Knowing the prevalence of suicidal thoughts among their church family, "stronger" believers should be willing to lay aside some privileges or even rights so as not to present a stumbling block in accordance with Paul's instructions in Romans 14 and 15. Arguably, stronger gun control in the U.S. could be one of these cases. Easily accessible firearms present a real danger to those tempted by suicide. Christians should be open to researching and promoting suicide prevention efforts.

Safer gun storage methods and firearm reduction are the most obvious solutions to the alarmingly high firearm suicide rates. One such approach attempted by researchers Carbone, Clemens and Ball in a pediatric clinic in Arizona showed encouraging results. The researchers conducted an experiment where families at the clinic completed a pre-experiment survey which determined gun ownership and gun storage methods. Only families with firearms were included in the study. Half of the families with firearms were randomly assigned as the control group and the other half as the intervention group. The intervention group received a gun safety lecture, a brochure and a free gun lock costing $6.99. A month later both groups were mailed a follow-up questionnaire. To improve response rates, researchers followed up with a phone-call if the mail questionnaire was not returned. 25% of the intervention group improved their gun storage mechanism as opposed to only 4.8% of the control group. An additional 22% of the intervention group removed firearms from their house entirely (Carbone, Clemens, and Ball 2005). Understandably these results may seem underwhelming but at least they represent a decent start. The key strength of this method is its non-antagonistic approach. It does not hold the threat of "the government is coming to take away my guns." It allows NGOs to cheaply educate and spread awareness.

However, there are always skeptics. It is possible that these results would not be duplicable. In addition, the NRA doubts the premise of the intervention claiming that changing access to firearms will not affect suicide rates because the attempter will merely switch their method ("NRA-ILA | Suicide And Firearms" 2015a). This argument lacks evidence. In reality, means substitution is rare. Studies conducted in the UK, Israel and Sri Lanka show little to no means substitution after the preferred suicide method was made less accessible (Miller, Azrael, and Barber 2012, 402).

An understanding of the decision to attempt suicide sheds light on this lack of evidence for means substitution. A 2001 study conducted by Simon et al. found that 24% of those whose suicide attempts were near-fatal reported deciding to commit suicide less than five minutes before their attempt and 85% decided less than a day in advance (Simon OR et al. 2001, 52). Simon et al. observe that those who commit impulsive suicide often report that they did not expect to die but rather it was an act of desperation or a cry for help (Ibid, 55). Unfortunately, if the person chooses a gun, whether or not they thought they would die is rendered obsolete because of the consistent lethality of guns.

Predicting suicide attempts is difficult because the time between the catalyst and the attempt is often alarmingly short. However, the good news is that according to David Hemenway's research, the

Director of the Harvard Injury Control Research Center, only 10-15% of those who attempt suicide actually possess "an unbreakable desire to kill themselves"(Hemenway 2011, 504). Only 10% of suicide survivors will succeed in a subsequent attempt (Hemenway 2011, 504) and 70% will not try again ("Attempters' Longterm Survival" 2015). These statistics show that if the person's initial attempt at suicide can be thwarted or delayed, the likelihood of them succeeding is much reduced.

However, even if the individual, prevented from committing firearm suicide, used a different method, she would have a greater chance of survival. The Harvard School of Public Health reports that while firearms suicides only account for approximately 18% of all suicides attempts both fatal and nonfatal in the U.S., firearm suicides account for over 55% of fatal suicides because firearm suicide attempts are successful 85% of the time ("Lethality of Suicide Method" 2015). In comparison, poisoning/overdose account for 62% of all suicide attempts but only 17% of fatal suicides because suicides attempts by poisoning or overdose are only successful 2% of the time (Ibid). Means matter. Firearm suicide is the most consistently lethal method. Therefore, access to guns also matters. Researchers Betz from the University of Colorado and Barber and Miller from Harvard University found that the presence of a gun in the house increased the likelihood of the individual planning suicide with a gun sevenfold (Betz, Barber, and Miller 2011, 388). This research gives hope that means removal programs could be effective in preventing firearm suicide.

Currently, the accessibility of firearms to children is especially alarming. This October, three-year old Eian was killed by his six-year old brother in a game of cops and robbers with their father's gun. Their father, a former gang member, kept an unlocked, loaded gun above the refrigerator for protection ("Chicago Boy Accidentally Shoots Brother - CNN.com" 2015). While this case was not suicide, it does tragically underscore the state of gun storage safety in the U.S. According to Children's Safety Network, 2.6 million children under the age of 18 or 12% of children nationwide, live in homes where firearms are stored unlocked alongside ammunition ("Firearm Access Is a Risk Factor for Suicide" 2015). 82% of firearm suicides in the seventeen and under demographic are committed with a family member's gun ("Youth Access to Firearms" 2015). People cherish their guns' ability to protect them and yet statistics show that for every time a person uses a gun in self-defense in their home, thirty-seven other people use their household gun to commit suicide (Brent et al. 2013, 334).

Statistics like these demand a response. Firearm reduction is the most obvious solution. Miller, using data from the CDC from 1981 to 2002, tracked a positive correlation between decrease in gun ownership and suicide rates even when controlling for age, unemployment, per capita alcohol consumption, poverty levels and regions of the country. Miller found that a 10% drop in firearm prevalence corresponded with 4.2% drop in firearm suicide specifically and 2.5% of all suicides (Miller et al. 2006, 180). The correlation emerged even stronger among the 0 to 19 demographic. Among this demographic a 10% decrease in firearms resulted in an 8.3% drop in firearm suicide and 4.1% in suicide overall (Miller et al. 2006, 180). Results like these make one hopeful that firearm reduction through education and awareness programs like the Arizona program could make a difference in firearm suicide rates especially among adolescents.

Critics of the Arizona program would undoubtedly object that the solution is too small considering the magnitude of the problem, stating that the issue should be raised at the government level not the local level. However, any dramatic formal firearm reduction plan to prevent firearm suicides is unlikely to succeed thanks to the political weight of the NRA. The NRA lobby successfully stopped legislation requiring universal background checks in 2013 after the Sandy Hook shooting despite the fact that a reported 90% of Americans supported the bill (Donohue 2015). Furthermore, the NRA is unlikely to take action against firearm suicide as their website already admits the connection between owning firearms and committing suicide explaining it as "Gun owners are notably self-reliant and exhibit a willingness to take definitive action…Such action may include ending their own life when the time is deemed appropriate" ("NRA-ILA | Suicide And Firearms" 2015b). Suicide is treated as noble decision

not a tragedy. Considering the lobby's current strength, it is unlikely that Congress could pass any major firearm safety or reduction bill.

The courts are a more likely harbinger of major change but still not a sure bet. The last two Supreme Court cases involving gun control upheld citizens' constitutional right to carry firearms for the purpose of self-defense. *District of Columbia v. Heller* upheld this as a federal right and *McDonald v. Chicago* upheld it as a state right ("District of Columbia v. Heller 554 U.S. 570 (2008)" 2015; "McDonald v. Chicago 561 U.S. ___ (2010)" 2015). However, both cases were decided by a five to four majority with the dissenting opinions defining the right to bear arms as only applying to militias (Ibid). Therefore, if the composition of the court was to change, conceivably these decision could be overturned.

Obama's continued appeals for stronger gun control have proved largely ineffective therefore he is considering writing an executive order compelling gun salespersons who sell a certain number of guns to require their customers to pass background checks. However, the arbitrary assignment of a threshold will make the executive order difficult to justify in courts (Eilperin 2015). Evidently, none of the three government branches are currently able to institute large-scale change. Thus smaller more community based solutions like the Arizona program offer a greater hope for change as a first step. Hopefully small scale success will open the door for larger, cooperative efforts.

Navigating the minefield of the gun control debate is daunting because both sides are deeply entrenched. However, the tragedy and senselessness of firearm suicide can be rallying cry for change on both sides of the debate. Demicco, a gun shop owner in New Hampshire, sold a gun to someone who hours later used it to commit suicide. Afterwards, Demicco said "As a business person, having a customer do it – it's just an ugly, ugly thing. I decided I must become involved [in prevention efforts]." Demicco now works to spread awareness about firearm suicide among his fellow gun shop owners ("Gun Shop Project" 2015). He has not given up his guns but his brush with firearm suicide made him more sensitive to the risks and open to cooperative solutions. The goal is not to take away people's guns or constitutional rights but rather to reduce the accessibility of a highly lethal means of committing suicide so that more people seek help before it is too late.

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Imagery and Anagogy: The Influence of Pseudo-Dionysius on Byzantine and Medieval Image Theory

Christopher Iacovetti

In this well-researched and carefully articulated paper, the author explores and compares Eastern and Western church image theory as it evolves from scripture up through the 12th century. Revealing and clarifying the source material for much of this image theory is a great joy to read, but the author's real strength comes out in a subtle, nuanced, and delicate comparison of how the two traditions dialectically worked towards and against each other, and finally how the two find an ultimate grounding in different takes of the same Dionysian heritage. Beautifully researched, carefully considered, and deeply evocative, it represents a student working at a very substantive level of mature Christian scholarship and clearly enjoying the process of discovery and revelation. Though shorter and less annotated than the other winners in this category, it nevertheless demonstrates a strong capacity for sustained intellectual inquiry in the theological tradition, and is welcome evidence that ancient texts still have much to reveal to postmodern ears. The author is encouraged by this judge to get thee to a graduate school, post-haste.

In his seminal orations in defense of Christian iconography, John of Damascus (d. 749) repeatedly cites the following two passages from the corpus of Pseudo-Dionysius the Areopagite:[1]

> [God's] love for human kind covers intelligible things by that which can be perceived by the senses and things beyond being by the things that are, and provides forms and figures for what is formless and without figure, and makes manifold and gives form to simplicity that is beyond nature and shape in a multitude of separate symbols. (*De divinis nominibus* 1.4)

> We ascend by means of images perceived through the senses to the divine contemplations. (*De ecclesiastica hierarchia* 1.2)

These passages make no direct mention of the practice of icon veneration, but they succinctly

[1] Both these passages are quoted in John of Damascus, *Three Treatises on the Divine Images*, trans. Andrew Louth (Crestwood: St Vladimir's Seminary Press, 2003), 40.

encapsulate the vision of reality to which Byzantine Christians like John subscribed—and from which they argued in defense of icons. This vision was impressed upon the Christian world largely through Pseudo-Dionysius, a fifth- to sixth-century theologian who likely hailed from Syria and who was famously steeped in the Neoplatonic tradition. Throughout the patristic and medieval periods, Dionysius was widely identified with the Dionysius of Acts 17, whom the Apostle Paul personally converted and instructed. This mistaken identification bestowed upon Dionysius' writings to an all but apostolic authority in the middle ages, which further secured the influence of his already potent theology on medieval and Byzantine thought. Thus, unsurprisingly, and in just a handful of centuries, Dionysius' influence came to extend well beyond his native Syria and into the respective worlds of Eastern and Western Christianity.

Dionysius' thought is tremendously complex and rich in scope, but can perhaps be understood as a single, systematic elaboration of the biblical claim that *from and through and to God are all things* (Rom. 11:36). For Dionysius, God exists in absolute, inscrutable, self-sufficient transcendence; and yet, "in the loving care he has for everything," God is "carried outside himself" (*On the Divine Names* 4.13): In a free act of 'erotic' affection, God calls our world into being from nothingness and grants it a share of his own life. Creation is thus, in every moment, a gifted participation in God's reality, and for this reason is a constant reflection of the One in whom it participates. As Eric Perl puts it, the fundamental thesis of Dionysius' thought is that all creation is a *theophany*, a finite manifestation of the infinite God.[2] God issues creation forth from Himself, sustains its being within Himself, and finally—through creaturely symbols and images—calls it eternally back to Himself. This picture of reality has powerful implications for image theory, which were drawn out eventually in both the Eastern and Western Christian traditions.

In this paper, I will very cursorily narrate the parallel developments of Eastern and Western image theory throughout the Middle Ages, taking special notice of the way(s) in which both traditions were influenced and formed by Dionysius' theological vision. In so doing, I hope to demonstrate a general consonance between the mature image theories of East and West; at their best points of historical expression, I will contend, both traditions are grounded alongside one another in the heritage of Dionysian theology.

THE DEVELOPMENT OF IMAGE THEORY IN THE BYZANTINE EAST

For good reason, most analyses of John of Damascus' image theory focus on his christological argument in defense of icons: namely, that because the invisible God has become visibly incarnate, He can now be depicted in iconographic form. Important as this argument is, it is all too often understood in isolation from the rest of John's theological vision.

Following Dionysius, John takes the incarnation to be not *merely* a singular, unprecedented act of God's self-revelation, but also the perfect expression and *fulfillment* of the way God has been revealing Himself to creation all along. This is because, for both Dionysius and John, everything that exists is—in however dim a capacity—an *eikon* of its God and Creator. Thus God has been 'imaging' Himself to humanity, through the created order, from the world's beginning.[3] And so the incarnation is not something alien to God's prior, 'imageless' history with the world; rather, the incarnation confirms the power of *images in principle*—viewed properly—to truly reveal and manifest the invisible God.

Moreover, the incarnation shows humanity the eternal Image of God's own person, the divine Image

[2] See Eric Perl, *Theophany: The Neoplatonic Philosophy of Dionysius the Areopagite* (Albany: State University of New York Press, 2007).
[3] Hebrews 1:1-3 could perhaps be read as an account of the way the incarnation of the Son—who is the only "exact imprint of [God's] nature"—perfectly validates *and* fulfills the various and inexact images of God offered to Israel throughout creation and under the Old Covenant.
[4] John explicitly identifies the Son as the first image in his so-called 'Great Chain of Images.' For a helpful analysis of this 'Chain,' see Andrew Louth, *St. John Damascene*, 216 (cited in full in note 4 below).

toward whom all creaturely images point.[4] On John's account, the incarnation both validates images *and* teaches us to see *through* them, i.e., beyond them to their divine archetype. Thus, in Andrew Louth's words, "the making of icons and their veneration rests for John … on what one might call the *architectonic significance* of image in the created order."[5] As John himself argues (commenting upon a Dionysian text):

> If it belongs to [God's] love for human kind to provide forms and figures for what is formless and without figure, and for what is simple and without shape in accordance with our analogy, how then should not we form images analogous to us of what we see in forms and shapes to arouse our memory and from memory arouse zeal?[6]

John's arguments were vindicated by the second Council of Nicaea in 787, but iconoclasm nonetheless reemerged powerfully in 9th century Byzantium, thus calling for a new wave of Eastern icon defenders. In particular, the 9th century demanded a more precise account of the *relationship* between icon and archetype than that of John. While John had acknowledged that an icon is "not like the prototype in every way,"[7] his language occasionally appeared to suggest that archetypes were present in their icons in an all too *real* or *essential* way. The task of 9th century defenders of icons, then—chief of whom were Theodore the Studite and Nikephoros of Constantinople—was to explain how "the icon, unlike the idol, contains only partial and not full presence"[8] of its archetype.[9]

Theodore and Nikephoros employ an Aristotelian distinction to clarify John's image theory: an icon, they argue, participates not in the essence (οὐσία), but in the formal likeness (ὁμοίωμα), of its archetype.[10] This distinction allows Theodore to maintain that "if one says that the divinity is in the icon, he would not be wrong," and yet also that "the divinity is not present in [the icon] by a union of natures … but by a relative participation."[11] Thus Theodore manages both to retain the participatory dimension of Dionysius' thought and to communicate the *nature* of this participation with more precision than John.

What is most crucial to note here is that, like John, both Theodore and Nikephoros follow Dionysius in affirming that images serve an *anagogical* function: that is, they affirm that, given the fundamentally symbolic character of all creation, it is necessarily *by way of images* that the soul rises to contemplation of God. Thus, their 9th century synthesis of Dionysian anagogy with Aristotelian terminology represents the final and most mature stage of Byzantine image theory. This stage would not be paralleled in the West for several centuries.

THE DEVELOPMENT OF IMAGE THEORY IN THE LATIN WEST

The principles of Western image theory were first laid down by Augustine in the fifth-century, who distinguished between three forms of vision in his *On the Literal Meaning of Genesis*: corporeal vision (which perceives only material objects), spiritual vision (which perceives the intelligible forms of objects without looking physically upon them), and

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[5] Andrew Louth, *St. John Damascene: Tradition and Originality in Byzantine Theology* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2002), 213; emphasis mine. Louth continues a few pages later: "John finds authority for this idea of a world of mutually reflecting reality, in which signs and images trace its interrelationships and are the means by which human kind, which is both spiritual and bodily, moves through material reality to grasp invisible, spiritual reality, in the writings of Dionysios" (217).

[6] John of Damascus, *Three Treatises on the Divine Images*, 40.

[7] Ibid., 25.

[8] Clemena Antonova, *Space, Time, and Presence in the Icon: Seeing the World with the Eyes of God* (Burlington, VT: Ashgate Publishing Company, 2010), 87.

[9] Though I will not be addressing it in this paper, I should acknowledge that the argument has recently been made by Glenn Peers that the "hectorings" of theologians like Theodore and Nikephoros were not representative of the Byzantine world as a whole, which was generally "imbued with a kind of animism." See his edited volume *Byzantine Things in the World* (New Haven: 2013).

[10] See Charles Barber, *Figure and Likeness: On the Limits of Representation in Byzantine Iconoclasm* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2002).

[11] Theodore the Studite, *On the Holy Icons*, trans. Catharine P. Roth (Crestwood, NY: St Vladimir's Seminary Press, 1981), 33.

intellectual vision (which directly perceives eternal and immaterial truths).[12]

For obvious reasons, Augustine considers only intellectual vision capable of perceiving God in any real sense. But he goes farther than this, often asserting not only that corporeal vision is *unable* to see God, but also that it tends, by nature, to problematically *hinder* the intellect's perception of divine truths. Thus, in one influential sermon on the Ascension, Augustine argues that Christ's Ascension was necessary in order that the Apostles might begin to consider His divinity rather than His flesh:

> They were fixated on the man, and unable to think of him as God. The time they would think of him as God would be if the man were removed from their sight; this would cut short the familiarity they had acquired with him in the flesh, and so they would learn at least through his absence in the flesh to think about his divinity. (Sermon 264, trans. Edmund Hill)

The thrust of this passage is clearly aniconic (if not iconoclastic): corporeal sight stands in the way of spiritual vision, and so the the latter should be pursued in the absence of the former.

This Augustinian aniconism was by and large inherited by Gregory the Great, who wrote two deeply influential letters concerning imagery to a bishop named Serenus in the early 7th century. Gregory explicitly denies, in these letters, that sacred images are worthy objects of *adoratio* (whatever precisely it is that he means by this term), but defends their use on pedagogical grounds, as "books for the illiterate." Thus Gregory's understanding of images is generally in keeping with that of Augustine; although Gregory doesn't lay quite as much stress as Augustine on the spiritual ineptitude of corporeal vision, both thinkers clearly believe images to serve little to no *spiritual* purpose, and to accomplish nothing that written texts do not.

This Augustinian-Gregorian tradition was the framework within which Western image theory developed in the Middle Ages. "Because it was limited to sensual apprehension of material forms," notes Kessler, art was understood to be "inherently unsuited to the representation of [intellectual] vision of God."[13] So firmly established was this understanding, in fact, that some prominent medievals, such as Henry of Ghent and Bernard of Clairvaux, verged on rejecting art wholesale, "as a pagan invention that was food only for the eyes."[14] This view was not dominant, however; and for the majority of Christians the reservation displayed by Augustine and Gregory simply indicated that art needed to be carefully designed and approached, so as to avoid idolatrous excesses.

And thus, in the West, writes Kessler, "The issue became how to direct the sentiments aroused by the sensual experience away from the physical object and upward toward the prototype behind it."[15] In the 8th century, for instance, Pope Hadrian objected to the quasi-iconoclasm of Theodulf of Orleans on the grounds that, although art was not "directly implicated in spiritual seeing," it nonetheless "engaged the mind, which, once activated, elevated the spirit."[16] In this and other early intra-Western debates, though, what was clear was that "an anagogical theory of art," in the vein of Dionysius, was not an available option.[17] And this lack of anagogical emphasis, avers Kessler, was "what differentiated Western image theory absolutely from Byzantine notions that the icon was transparent, a window onto the higher reality."[18]

As Andrew Louth notes, "The West only came

[12] For more on Augustine's understanding of the three modes of vision and its influence on the development of Western art in the later Middle Ages, see Cynthia Hahn, "Vision," in *A Companion to Medieval Art: Romanesque and Gothic in Northern Europe*, ed. Conrad Rudolph (Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishing Ltd, 2006).

[13] Herbert Kessler, *Spiritual Seeing: Picturing God's Invisibility in Medieval Art* (Philadelphia, PA: University of Philadelphia Press, 2000), 118.

[14] Herbert L. Kessler, *Seeing Medieval Art* (Orchard Park, NY: Broadview Press, 2004), 167.

[15] Kessler, *Spiritual Seeing*, 120.

[16] Ibid., 124

[17] As Kessler concludes, "If the sacred image in the West was a bridge, then it was a drawbridge drawn up, if a window, then only with a shade pulled down. It marked the existence of the 'world out there,' but it also revealed its own inability to transport the faithful into that world." Ibid., 144.

[18] Ibid., 124.

to learn of the notions of Dionysius when his works were translated into Latin" in the 9th century, and even then the "real influence" of Dionysius did not take root until the 12th century, primarily via the Victorines and their successors.[19] This influence was real and perceptible, though, and yielded some of the West's first explicitly anagogical descriptions of imagery. Hugh of St Victor, for instance, who wrote a 12th century commentary on Dionysius' *Celestial Hierarchy*, "provides a detailed account of the perceptual process by which a person should be led from visible things to invisible things,"[20] arguing that both scripture *and nature* are books written by God's hand. In an almost explicit echo of Dionysius' *De divinis nominibus*, Gertrude of Helfta argues that "as invisible and spiritual things cannot be understood by the human intellect except in visible and corporeal images, it is necessary to clothe them in human and bodily forms."[21] And Gertrude herself derives this Dionysian notion from Richard of St Victor, who on its basis went so far as to alter the traditional Augustinian scheme of vision, identifying *anagogical* instead of intellectual vision as the highest form of human perception.[22]

Jeffrey Hamburger observes that for these Victorines, "the visible world represents no more than the first stage in the mind's ascent to God, but, in a fundamental shift, it now represents an *indispensable stepping-stone* along the way."[23] And it is certainly no coincidence that this "fundamental shift" toward visibility and anagogy was almost exactly concurrent with an increase of monastic, meditational, and otherwise devotional use of images in the period.[24] Clearly, images had at this point become far more than mere "images for the illiterate," and were in fact understood by some Westerners to communicate truths that even language could not adequately express.

CONCLUSION: ABBOT SUGER AND THE COMMON DIONYSIANISM OF EAST AND WEST

To be clear, none of this establishes that East and West were ever in perfect agreement regarding imagery. Nevertheless, it does indicate that both East and West developed and adjusted their image theories throughout the medieval era, and—at least at certain points in their respective histories—gravitated toward increasingly similar theories thanks to the influence of Dionysius' thought. The East scaled back its essentialist tendencies, whereas the West scaled back its aniconic ones; but both traditions moved away from their respective extremities and toward the *via media* of Dionysius' anagogical theology.

In closing, there is perhaps no better visual illustration of the common 'Dionysianism' of East and West than Suger's 12th century addition of stained-glass windows to the Basilica of St Denis. Probably the single "most ambitious attempt ever made in the medieval West to construct an elevated theological program by means of pictures,"[25] Suger's addition of these windows was probably intended as an affirmation (occasioned by certain Western attacks on materiality) that corporeal sense indeed has the power to be "spiritually productive."[26] These windows, like the robust affirmation of materiality from which they followed, could hardly have been more Dionysian in character. The visual play of interwoven light and darkness they created, the anagogical reading of scripture their graphics employed, even the radiant beams of sunlight they produced inside the cathedral: these and other elements are all unmistakably reminiscent of Dionysius' theology, and could simply never have been included in a world bereft of Dionysian influence.[27] St Denis thus deserves commemoration as a potent, enduring symbol of

[19] Andrew Louth, "Apophatic and cataphatic theology," in *The Cambridge Companion to Christian Mysticism*, ed. Amy Hollywood and Patricia Z. Beckman (New York: Cambridge University Press), 143.
[20] Jeffrey Hamburger, "Mysticism and visuality," *Cambridge Companion to Christian Mysticism*, 288.
[21] Ibid., 289.
[22] See Veerle Fraeters, "Visio/vision," *Cambridge Companion to Christian Mysticism*.
[23] Hamburger, "Mysticism and visuality," 288; emphasis mine.
[24] See Fraeters, "Visio/vision," 182; also see Hahn, "Vision," 59.
[25] Kessler, *Spiritual Seeing*, 191.
[26] Ibid., 144. Following Conrad Rudolph, Kessler takes Suger's windows to be, at least in part, a direct reaction to Bernard of Clairvaux.
[27] I should acknowledge here that some art historians, most recently Andreas Speer, have argued that the connection between

Pseudo-Dionysius' theological heritage—a heritage shared by the Eastern and Western churches.

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Dionysius' theology and Suger's 'anagogical' project was in fact either minor or nonexistent, and that Suger's additions to St Denis were primarily (if not exclusively) motivated by non-theological concerns. Such objections seem largely beside the point. For whether Suger was personally familiar with Dionysius' theology or not, and whether he intended his additions to St Denis to be distinctively 'Dionysian' or not, the simple fact remains that his stained-glass windows *could not have emerged* in a world whose vision had not already been profoundly shaped by Dionysius' theology. (Suger's own descriptions of his work themselves attest to this fact, after all.) What meaningful difference does it make whether the influence of Dionysius was transmitted directly or indirectly to Suger? In either case, Dionysius' theology exists at the core of Suger's project.

Liturgy on the Cusp of Secondary Orality: Marshall McLuhan and Messianic Judaism

Paul Vermeesch

This paper starts of lightly and playfully, before suddenly plunging the reader into a never-before-considered What-If scenario regarding the ultimate allegiances of media theorist Marshall McLuhan. Arguing that McLuhan's understanding of human sense-ratios may have qualified him to be a better candidate for Messianic Judaism than Roman Catholicism, precisely to the degree that the former favors primacy of the ear over the eye in a way that is complicated by the latter's use of imagery, the author makes a first-ever claim (for McLuhan scholarship) that the Canadian media theorist may have felt equally at home, and equally a fish out of water, in a Jewish congregation than in a Catholic cathedral. Provocative and resonant in the McLuhan rhetorical tradition off a scholarly "probe," this piece reveals its author to be both remarkably gifted at research, synthesis, and integration, and to be startlingly gifted at deriving new theses worthy of serious consideration. Marshall McLuhan once said that God was a "ceaseless invitation to wonder," and this paper's effect is precisely that: a surprisingly fresh invitation to wonder at a highly plausible "What-If" scenario that never came to pass. With a bibliographic citations page of thirty entries, the paper is sufficiently substantive in its scholarship and the author is encouraged to submit the work for publication in the appropriate journals.

I like to think I'm as much a rebel against the digital age as I am a product of it. I've started carrying around a fountain pen and notebook as a token of my quiet crusade against the culture that dictates kids my age should have their noses buried in the light of retina screens. Perhaps it's the protesting Protestant in me that wants to believe that the digital glow is somehow opposed—fixed in mortal combat—with that real Light outside of space and time that entered our space and time to redeem it. But the work of Marshall McLuhan, the practical mystic and prophet of communication theory, opens up a way to theologically and practically reconcile these apparent contradictions, particularly when his work is cast in the light of Messianic Jewish theology. The marriage of Judaism and Jesus Christ provides the theological outlook necessary for successfully, selflessly, and productively navigating the technologically liturgical environment in which we, modern believers, find ourselves.

This paper presents less of a thesis than it does a set of tools—a lens through which to look at the theology and ideas of Marshall McLuhan. As many questions are asked as are answered, and ideally,

some of these thoughts may open doors to further explorations of McLuhan's faith and the theology of Messianic Judaism.

McLuhan was a convert to Roman Catholicism and remained a devout Catholic through his life, so casting his ideas in the light of Messianic Judaism is meant to be a "tentative probe." McLuhan considered many of his works provocative and often amplified attempts to get at the truth. "For me," he wrote, "any of these little gestures I make are all tentative probes. That's why I feel free to make them sound as outrageous or extreme as possible. Until you make it extreme, the probe is not very efficient" (McLuhan, "Media Research" 62). McLuhan understands one must be prepared to "toss them [the probes] away" if they aren't "getting you into the problem" (McLuhan, "Media Research" 62). If sufficiently substantiated, the work in this paper will hopefully be provocative enough of a "tentative probe" to *get us into the problem*.

But before exploring the grit of technological liturgy and Messianic Jewish theology, some groundwork must be laid. We will briefly touch on two cultural shifts that will set the stage for the work in this paper: the Second Vatican Council shift away from corporate worship within Catholicism, and the obverse shift *toward* corporate worship in the next generation of Christian young adults.

First, the critical shift of Vatican II—the moment when the ethos of the Catholic church changed—should be explored. In 1962, the Catholic Church underwent a subtle liturgical transformation in response—if we take McLuhan seriously—to the emerging electrification of religion. McLuhan was a devout Catholic for the same reason I advocate a form of Messianic Judaism here: Catholicism allowed him to ground his observations about media and technology in a selfless, corporate, and oral religious outlook. But Catholicism underwent a shift in McLuhan's lifetime, 23 years after his conversion. The religion that once placed such an intense emphasis on corporate faith and worship was significantly individualized by the reforms of Vatican II. The council called for a transition from the sacred Latin to the common vernacular because an electronic culture had elevated the *message* of liturgy over the medium of spoken Latin. McLuhan tied the significance of Latin within Catholic liturgy to Yeat's concept of "auditory imagination"—"the feeling for syllable and rhythm, penetrating far below the conscious levels of thought and feeling invigorating every word: sinking to the most primitive and forgotten" (McLuhan, "The Medium and the Light" [ML] 143). He called it the "most ancient and civilized mentality" (ML 143).

We don't see it often, but McLuhan's latent discontent with post-Vatican II Catholicism sometimes breaks the surface in his writings. For him, spoken Latin was the last line of defense against the intrusions of Protestant textuality and print culture. "The reversal by which a Catholic is now supposed to develop a personal position on mysteries and doctrines that are themselves the prime means of corporate participation could only result from the belated extension of literacy to the Catholic world," he wrote in a volume of the collected doctrinal opinions of Catholic thinkers (McLuhan, "Spectrum of Catholic Attitudes" xxix). Rome, he said, had held out against the pressures of an increasingly print-based culture, "until the beginning of this [the 20th] century" (ML 58). What resulted after 1962 was an individualization and fragmentation of liturgical practice in the Catholic Church. And it was the consistency of this liturgy that had drawn McLuhan to the Catholic church in the first place. He said, "I grew up with Protestant liturgy. I only became a Catholic after taking an interest in liturgy" (ML 148). There is no question that McLuhan was a devout worshiper and practitioner of the Catholic liturgy after his conversion, but his devotion was seasoned with critique. If we push on this small rift—the rift between oral and literary forms of worship, we may be able to reveal a beautiful new way of reconciling McLuhan's discontent and exploring a fresh theological approach to our own interactions with media and technology.

A second shift really is the keystone of our investigation of the emerging technological environment, but this shift is not a widespread cultural change. It's much more subtle, but there is a sea change happening in the zeitgeist of the Christian young adults of my generation, perhaps in response to the same electrified individualism that precipitated Vatican II. Dogmatism is falling out of fashion at the same time that religious structure is

making a resurgence. Kids who have grown up in the seeker-sensitive church—in the church that places such an intense emphasis on one's personal belief in Jesus—are craving something more historical and communally shared. My peers are craving a structure and framework that is bigger than themselves. They want a system for their belief system, and they're finding it in liturgy. The language of tradition, repetition, meditation, and sacrament seems to be pushing to the forefront of the public consciousness within evangelical circles. In a recent article on why millennials "long for liturgy," Anglican thinker Yet Lee Nelson writes that, in the midst of our consumer culture, young people "ache for sacramentality" (Olmstead). If value and meaning are functions of scarcity, the infinite accessibility to infinite information has stripped knowledge of its meaning. An emphasis on empathy and valuation has, in a very real sense, been replaced by an emphasis on speed and obtainability. Presbyterian-turned-Eastern Orthodox student Jesse Cone, writes that "We're so thirsty for meaning that goes deeper, that can speak to our entire lives, ... that we're really thirsty to be attached to the earth and to each other and to God. The liturgy is a historical way in which that happens" (Olmstead). Protestant churches aren't blind to this fact, and many services are being infused with liturgical elements drawn from historical Christian traditions in an effort to retain their millennial congregants.

But there's a problem. The odds are, if you're not finding your "sacramental yearning" fulfilled by religious liturgy, you're fulfilling it elsewhere. After all, the ability to pattern and mediate our experience through words, liturgies, and meta-narratives is what sets humans apart in the animal kingdom. So for most individuals of equal or less spiritual inclination, their subconscious craving for liturgy is manifesting itself in a religion of another sort, one with deeper rumblings: the patterned religion of technological consumption. McLuhan wrote that "we must, to use [technology] at all, serve these objects, these extensions of ourselves, as gods or minor religions" (McLuhan, "Understanding Media" 55). These little gods we serve inhabit the pantheon of technological consumerism, the belief system that is quickly becoming the one-world religion. And there's something unique—or rather not unique—about the liturgy of technological consumerism. it uncannily resembles the liturgy of Judaism.

What we now call ancient Judaism was the father religion of "primary" or "tribal" orality. Orality is a term that historians use to classify the first era of communication history. Oral cultures communicated primarily person-to-person and had a strong collective group sense. And their religions were acoustic. Typified by the Shema, the injunction in Deuteronomy 6 to "Hear, oh Israel" (Deuteronomy 6:4, ESV), ancient Judaism was the *wunderkind* of acoustic religion. Catholicism too, had strong grounding within oral tradition prior to the Vatican II reforms. But Protestantism, unlike Judaism and pre-Vatican II Catholicism, was a product of the print era of communication, à la Gutenberg. McLuhan insisted that print was solely responsible for the privatization and individualization of the Christian faith. "A sense of private substantial identity–a self– is to this day utterly unknown to tribal societies," he wrote (ML 80). McLuhan's son Eric gave a soteriological topspin on this idea when he posited that "the private individual with a private self is also charged with private responsibility for his or her own actions and quests for private salvation. The alphabet literally paved the way for these matters. These are New Testament times. The Old Testament, for example, had declared the Jews a chosen people: group salvation" (McLuhan, "Sensus Communis and Synesthesia"). It's this same over-individualized faith that I'm seeing backfire among my peers. We're entering a second orality, and it's pregnant with possibility and risk.

Secondary orality was a term coined by media scholar Walter Ong in his 1982 treatise *Orality and Literacy*. He describes *secondary orality* as "a more deliberate and self-conscious orality, based permanently on the use of writing and print" (Ong 136). This secondary orality isn't going to be a perfect resurrected replica of the "primary" orality that saw the rise of Judaism. It's going to be a cyborg blend of the written, print, and electronic traditions—a blend that may seek to restore the communal value of oral culture. This transition away from the electronic age toward secondary orality is a process that has

certainly begun, but has not yet been fully realized. McLuhan lived through the slip from oral-based to electricity-based liturgy in the Catholic church, but he didn't live to see the fulfillment of the oral revival that he had predicted. Secondary orality will be characterized by increasingly acoustic technology and a return to societies built on meta-narratives of the sort found in the tribal epoch. According to popular theorist Daniel Pink, secondary orality will be an era in which creativity, empathy, pattern recognition, and the ability to make meaning again become marketable skills in the workplace (Pink 43). As the landscape changes rapidly and millennials become more and more disillusioned with the individualization that the electronic age has forced on them, liturgical frameworks will again become desirable as systems of organization, tradition, and meaning. A generation of creative catalysts, storytellers, harmonizers, curators, empathizers, meaning-makers, and big-picture thinkers will begin to flood the marketplace, meeting a demand for synthesis, and not just analysis—beauty, and not just function. Though the move to the conceptual age is an evolution from humanity's tribal roots, it's also a *re*volution back to those same tribal roots. The emerging technological framework of secondary orality finds its historical analog in acoustic religion. Brand mythology finds its historical framework in culturally-valued religious meta-narrative. Corporate iconography finds its historical framework in religious symbology (Schuchardt). And the way we use technology finds its historical framework in religious liturgy. In a word, we're returning to the sort of acoustically meaningful culture that saw the childhood and adolescence of Judaism. If primary orality was the primordial soup that produced Jewish liturgy, secondary orality is producing a technological liturgy that's remarkably similar. The proof is in the patterns.

The verses following the Shema in Deuteronomy 6 have become the foundation for much of Jewish liturgical practice. I appreciate the way that the NIV translates verses 8 and 9: "tie them [the commandments] as symbols on your hands and bind them on your foreheads. Write them on the doorframes of your houses and on your gates." From these verses, Judaism has derived several liturgical practices. The injunction to bind the commandments has been interpreted as the practice of tying *tefillin* during morning prayer. The *tefillin* are small boxes bound with leather to the wrist and head that contain the words of the Shema. They are symbols—physical representations of the non-physical concept of what it means to love God. The injunction to write the commandments on the doorframe has been interpreted this command as the *mezuzah*, a small box affixed to the doorpost of a house, containing the words of Deuteronomy 6. These practices have technological analogs in secondary orality. The *tefillin* is mirrored in the emerging realm of wearable technology, particularly the Apple watch and like products—small boxes bound with leather to the wrist, and eyewear like the failed first iteration of Google Glass. These technologies are used in the the same way that the Jews use *tefillin*—as tools of reminder. And already, the theological implications wax ominous. We recall the prophesy of the second beast in Revelation 13 that "causes all, both small and great, both rich and poor, both free and slave, to be marked on the right hand or the forehead" (Revelation 13:17, ESV). Perhaps the contemporary technology analog for the *mezuzah* is the wifi router, a small box that every technologically "observant" household owns. It is traditional, when entering a Jewish home, to reach up and touch the *mezuzah*. Symbolically, acknowledgement of the box becomes a touchpoint of entrance, a sort of signifier of commonality with the belief of the household. Similarly, household wifi is the touchpoint that one must acknowledge as one walks through the door to the Internet.

The liturgical practice from Numbers 15 to wear "tassels on the corners of your garments" and the practice of wearing the *tallis* during prayer also have technological analogs (Numbers 15:38, ESV). You will often see orthodox Jews, even the very young children, reaching down to touch the *tzitzit* that hang from their shirts. Throughout the day, the presence and feel of the *tzitzit* act as a reminder to keep the commands of God. They are grasped in prayer as a physical touchpoint between the worshiper and the divine. In traditional Judaism, the *tzitzit* are also affixed to a four-cornered prayer shawl called a *tallis* which is worn over the head or around the neck. Though the tradition of the *tallis* doesn't have a

Biblical origin per se, its traditional function during prayer is to acknowledge the headship of God, to block out the distractions of the world, and to aid in achieving "*kavannah*" or perfect concentration in prayer. It is not unlike a pair of headphones, worn over the head or around the neck and used to block out the outside world. The smaller version of the *tallis*, the *tallis catan*, may find an analog in a pair of earbuds. In the same way that the *tzitzit* attach to the *tallis*, so too our smartphones attach to headphones and serve as both signifiers and as conduits. They label the observant and facilitate communication. We reach for the phones at the corners of our garments as touchpoint between ourselves and the global village. The compulsion with which we handle our phones is not unlike the devotion of the orthodox Jew. To them the motion is instinctive, engrained in their psyches. And to us, the smartphone is likewise. It is sheer stimulus—a vibrating drug in our pockets that keeps us high on the methadone of connectedness (Farhad).

In the same vein, the bluetooth headset worn around the ear carries a unique resemblance to Jewish *peyot*, the corners of the beard that Leviticus 19:27 commands not be cut. The most devout will even wrap their *peyot* around their ears when they grow to be too long. Both the bluetooth headset and the *peyot* are distinguishing marks of the "faith" and serve a more symbolic rather than pragmatic purpose.

Traditions of conversion and coming of age express themselves liturgically in secondary orality as well. The Jewish conversion process requires circumcision: quite literally the partial loss of that which is most private. So too, in our "conversion" to the technological religion, we must agree to the fine-print terms and regulations, and offer up the foreskin of our private information. Children now experience technological *bar* or *bat mitzvahs*—rites of passage when they become responsible for the knowledge that is only a Google search away. They become not sons and daughters of the commandment, but sons and daughters of the Internet. Clearing browser history becomes the new "*mikvah*" or ritual baptism of Levitical purity, and these rituals are being offered to increasingly younger and younger children. From an early age, children understand "brand holiness" as well as Jewish children knew not to mix wool and linen. So too, even the dietary laws of Leviticus and Deuteronomy may be mirrored malevolently in the eating disorders pervasive among young women bombarded by mediated representations of the self.

The Levitical sacrificial system outlined in detail in Leviticus and Deuteronomy is not unlike the system of technological obsolescence that characterizes the ever-shifting software and hardware environment. In order to stay connected, old models of software and hardware must be "sacrificed" to newer models and versions. Updates are the price we pay for maintaining closeness with the brand. Each update ideally provides a better experience for the user. In a similar way, the sacrificial system functioned to temporarily "cover" the individual's unholiness so that they could draw nearer to God's holiness. Over and over again, individuals would bring sacrifices to the temple to renew their devotional lives. The same phenomenon resurfaces every time we purchase a newer iPhone or download the latest operating system.

Finally, the physical places that are associated with the technological religion are also somehow vaguely familiar. Consider the flagship Apple store in New York is a glass cube, stalely lit from the center by the light of a floating Apple logo. It uncannily resembles the glass cube of the New Jerusalem which descends out of heaven in Revelation 21—a city illuminated from the center by the light of the glory of God (Robinson 94).

But again, as much as I'd love to believe these two lights—the light of the bitten apple and the light of the glory of God—are fixed in opposition, there's a better way to understand the theological implications of these patterns. McLuhan refused to "theologize on the basis of my understanding of technology" because he "lacked scholastic terminology and concepts" (Stearn 98). I don't pretend to have the grasp of scholastic terminology and concepts that McLuhan lacked, but the time is ripe for the first tentative steps toward a theologizing of media.

It's important to recognize that, though their orality-anchored liturgies are remarkably similar, there are two different gods operating behind the technological religion of consumption and the religion of Judaism. Behind the latter is the one, true, God—the I Am. But behind the former is Mammon, the god of consumption, wealth, and

self-aggrandizement who slowly takes more and more, giving less and less in return. Technological consumption may soothe alienation for a time, but before long, we'll be more alienated than we ever were before, from God and from our fellow man. The Master's words ring in our ears: "no servant can serve two masters, for either he will hate the one and love the other, or he will be devoted to the one and despise the other. You cannot serve God and money" (Matthew 6:24, ESV). Mammon reaches his icy fingers into all realms of the heart that are concerned with status, wealth, privilege, social standing, security, and the self.

But the liturgy itself is not to blame. During his ministry, Jesus didn't abolish the liturgical expressions of Jewish praxis any more than he abolished the Law itself. What he did was rebuke the individuals who were using the Jewish liturgy to serve Mammon's desire for status. It was the corrupt and hypocritical among the Pharisees and Saducees—the "blind guides"—who had most fatally fallen prey to Mammon's clutches. They were the ones who made "their phylacteries broad and their fringes long" (Matthew 25:5, ESV).

Within the technological religion of secondary orality, this twisted, self-serving, liturgical use of technology is, of course, all too rampant. Mammon has been the object of worship for far too many individuals who use their technology in seemingly benign ways, neglecting to see how much of a hold it has on their lives. It's hard to see where this slippery slope begins, but it's not hard to see where it ends. It ends with the destruction of the soul for the sake of the body. It ends with the perfect inversion of the work of Jesus, who sacrificed his body of the sake of the souls of billions. It ends with man attempting to become his own messiah.

I spoke with Jacob Fronczak, a Messianic Jewish writer, theologian, and pastor about the theological stakes of this religion of technological consumption. I asked him, given all of the parallels between Judaism and emerging technology, if there was a messiah figure hiding in our technology like the messiah figure that hides in the pages of the Hebrew scriptures. Without missing a beat, he replied, "biotechnology" (Fronczak). Futurists like Ray Kurzweil of Google have predicted that we're only 50 years away from biotechnology that, when integrated with the human body, will be able to prevent death (Kurzweil 43). Kurzweil calls this coming future the "next step in human evolution" (46), the exact phrase that C.S. Lewis used in his terrifying novel

That Hideous Strength to describe the antagonists' own attempts to create "the man who will not die, the artificial man, free from Nature (174). Far from being another rung in an evolutionary ladder, bio-technical enhancement of the human body smacks too much of man playing God or worse, trying to become his own redemption.

This is the self-serving idolatry of Mammon taken to its logical extreme. When we believe we can turn up our bio-technical noses at the curse of death, it's in that moment that we have truly died. It's in that moment that we have lost our souls. It comes as no surprise that the most debated ethical problem surrounding this "next step in human evolution" is whether or not the soul can be technologically codified. I think the obvious answer coming from a position of faith is a frank 'no.' Defeating death is something only the true Messiah can do. Attempting to become our own messiah will only lead to ruin of the eternal sort. McLuhan was right when he speculated that "this [the electronic age] could be the time for the Antichrist." For, he said, "Lucifer is the greatest electrical engineer" (ML 209).

Because Jesus is the only hope for true salvation and the only person who can properly orient our liturgical focus, we need to be looking for places of intersection between Jewish models of liturgy and the redeeming work of Christ. Messianic Judaism is an umbrella term for a host of religious outlooks. For years, the label has been primarily identified with missionary organizations like "Jews for Jesus" who make it their goal to convert the Jewish people to Christianity. But this effort—this facet of Messianic Judaism—has ignored the unique space the Jewish people own as God's chosen people—joined with specific liturgical practices that were not abolished by Jesus's inbreaking. A burgeoning branch of Messianic Judaism called post-missionary Messianic Judaism, holds that God did not break his covenant with the Jewish people, that, in some mysterious way, the Jews retain their status as God's chosen people and should continue to express that identity liturgically in the

manner prescribed in the Torah.

With respect to our technology, we're living in a Jewish world. And, given the natural danger of liturgy to become a self-aggrandizing force, McLuhan would have been the first to argue for the centrality of Jesus Christ in such a technological society. After all, In Christ alone are the group and the individual truly brought together. In Christ alone are the medium and the message perfectly the same (ML 103). In Christ alone are the oral and the literary united. In Christ alone can Catholicism and Judaism be reconciled. The marriage of Judaism and Jesus Christ is the theological outlook we need to successfully, selflessly, and productively navigate the liturgical domain of secondary orality.

This is why I believe that McLuhan, had he been of a mind, could have participated in a form of Post-Missionary Messianic Judaism. Instead, McLuhan chose the next best option: pre-Vatican II Catholicism: a religion with a deep-seated understanding of the incarnation, death, and resurrection of Jesus Christ, and a grounding in the orality of Latin liturgy. Unfortunately, that grounding in orality didn't last.

Post-Missionary Messianic Judaism is the theological perspective that I believe most closely aligns with McLuhan's respect for acoustic community, the figure of Christ, and the world of secondary orality that he knew was just around the corner. I want to stress the tentative nature of this probe, but I think that theologically casting McLuhan's ideas in this way places the emphasis on the form of religion as opposed to the content of religion. It's a helpful probe to "get us into the problem." Perhaps McLuhan would have disagreed doctrinally with the content— with some of the tenets of Messianic Judaism, but his theories of communication align closely with the religion's form. An exploration of McLuhan's works will benefit from an understanding of this niche theology. Messianic Judaism redeems liturgy, transforming it from something individual and dangerous to something corporate and empathetic. And it has the potential to do the same for technology. It is said that empathy rarely extends beyond our line of sight. But our technological liturgies are vastly extending our line of sight (Silva). It becomes our responsibility to extend that same selflessness even further than we have before, to be the light to the nations in an acoustically meaningful way.

Regardless of how dark the future may get as we forge deeper into the wilderness of secondary orality, the community of believers should not be left without a lamp to light our way. If we take Jesus' simultaneous acceptance and critique of Jewish praxis as our guide, we have a brighter path forward as we seek to bring the light of Jesus to the light of our retina screens. Jesus returned the true God to expressions of worship corrupted by Mammon. Jesus made liturgy a matter of the heart, as it was meant to be. He set an example of humility and privacy within praxis, going "up on the mountain by himself to pray" (Matthew 14:23, ESV). Like the liturgical practices of Judaism, technology is empowering. But it's a power that cannot be used to promote the self at the expense of others' dignity. It's a power that must be used to build up the community—to create meaning in ways that promote human flourishing. It's a power that gives healing, abundance, and teeming. It's a power that excels at empathy, storytelling, and exploration—just the sort of virtues that secondary orality values.

As we await the return of the Messiah, the call is to live incarnationally, using technology to extend empathy beyond our line of sight. When we overlay the Messiah's reconciling acceptance and critique of Jewish liturgy on the complex liturgical environment of secondary orality, believers will be better prepared to recognize dangerous patterns of technological self-aggrandizement. Recognizing these patterns gives us power over them. When we realize, like McLuhan did, that history is repeating itself, that the liturgical practices of primary orality are experiencing a resurgence within technological patterns, and that the Antichrist may indeed be a "great electrical engineer," we will be all the more aware of how easy it is to fall into the self-serving traps of Mammon. Empowered, we are able to better reflect the light of Jesus for the restoration of the world.

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L'Homme chrétien armé: The Christian Armed Man

Abbie Brigham

This first-place winner was a beautiful, scholarly, and richly rewarding investigation into the *L'Homme armé* masses beginning in 1450, the *L'Homme armé* song itself, and by extension a beautiful meditation on the relationship of secular culture to sacred music. Exceedingly well-researched, this paper offered twelve bibliographic sources in the context of 42 footnotes of citation and clarification. This paper was a revelation, a deep meditation, and a profound joy to read. The author carried their reader through the research, the texts, and the impacts in a stunningly clear, comprehensible, and beautiful way, employing a seemingly natural writing style that is among the highest this judge has seen in undergraduate work. The selection of source material, the careful balancing of multiple authors, the synthesis of their arguments into one narrative through-line, and all in as rich and clear a "voice" as seems possible, this paper reveals the author to be not just a master of musical history investigation, but a masterful composer of voices from the past into a profoundly present-focused meditation on what the implications are or could be for contemporary Christian worship. The scholarly research in this paper was wonderful, but the writing itself was exquisite: from the introduction of a theoretical soldier walking out of a bar into a historically accurate encounter with his culture's acoustic mass, the paper both informs, reveals, and delights the reader along the way with a refrain and a melody that make the reader wish the song would go on and on. Despite being the investigation of a medieval music mystery, the paper brilliantly deploys contemporary references to Taylor Swift, Bob Dylan and a Christian worship lyric that compared Jesus to "a sloppy, wet kiss" to create the astonishing double effect of delighting the reader as it informs them. The scriptural pattern of Proverbs suggests that "more knowledge creates more sorrow"; this paper manages to make you wiser while also making you happier, and does so in a manner that seems both deft and effortless. The author is encouraged to keep researching, writing, and publishing whenever and wherever possible, for the finished product is remarkably refreshing, illuminating, and deserving of a wider audience.

The burly, grizzled soldier staggered out of the bar, still singing snatches of the song his drinking buddies bellowed inside as he tipsily turned into the street. "*L'homme, l'homme, l'homme armé, l'homme armé, L'homme armé doibt on doubter...*"[1] He paused in the street, cocking his head sideways as if to hear a distant sound. There it was! The melody he was singing. He stumbled forward towards the direction of the voices, led—so it seemed—by the notion of another drink. But then he reached the source of the sound and stopped, perplexed: the drinking song sounded as if it were being sung by a chorus of angels. And the words, though set to the same melody, were different...they were the words of the Latin mass. The man peered into the window of the cathedral (for it was from its windows he heard the song), and, seeing that the only wine in sight was for the Eucharist, he shrugged his shoulders and kept walking, humming the *l'homme armé* melody. Such was the irony of the *l'homme armé* masses: written beginning around 1450, this mass genre used a popular melody associated with Medieval warfare as the cantus firmus line[2] around which the rest of the Catholic *mass ordinaire* was written. The sacred and secular were interwoven; the secular melody was the foundation of the mass, but the sacred mass was the foundation of that pre-Reformation Christian society. How and why was it that the song of the fearsome, secular armed man become one of the high points of Medieval sacred music—what tie was it which bound together the sacred and the secular? Surprisingly, one need not look far to find the connection; the crusade culture had already knighted the secular soldier for a sacred service, typifying a distinctly Medieval approach to relating the mundane and the holy from which the modern church may still learn.

In the context of late Medieval and early Renaissance society, it is not surprising to find such interconnectedness between the sacred and the secular. The two realms constantly bled into each other: the lives of the people, rich and poor alike, were orchestrated by the high days and holidays of the church calendar; the daily rhythm of their work and rest was dictated by the church. But it was not just their daily lives that were influenced by the church; the church, likewise, was influenced by the mundane things of daily life. Thus it should not be terribly shocking to discover that what was the equivalent of a Medieval pop song was also sung in ornate cathedrals as a mass. During this era in the Western European world, the sacred and secular were closely intertwined; thus it only took a fairly small step—one that really was quite logical—to move from one to the other. In studying the case of the *l'homme armé* mass, we will see that it is indeed a simple connection: the "missing link" between the armed man and the Christian church is essentially an association game centered around the crusade movement.

CONTEXT: THE FIFTEENTH-CENTURY CHURCH AND ITS MUSIC

Music played a vital role in the fifteenth-century Catholic church. Worship was organized around song; masses were sung and Scripture was chanted. Roger Bowers describes the relationship between fifteenth-century churches and musicians (speaking more specifically of English churches) as being more complex than simply that of patrons and their dependents. While he recognizes that the church certainly encouraged music (and was, in a sense, obliged to do so), it was generally laity who would commission works.[3] At the same time, however, the sacred church depended on (often secular) composers: "[i]nsofar as each church was obliged

[1] The entire translation of the song text is as follows:
The man, the man, the armed man
The armed man is to be feared.
Everywhere it has been proclaimed
That everyone should arm himself with an iron coat of mail.
("*L'homme Armé*," *Ptera Tunes*, accessed November 28, 2015, http://www.pteratunes.org.uk/Music/Music/Lyrics/LhommeArmeBasic.html).

[2] The *cantus firmus*, "fixed song," refers to the melody line of a polyphonic piece of music. The *cantus firmus* was also called the tenor line.

[3] Iain Fenlon, ed., *Music in Medieval and Early Modern Europe: Patronage, Sources, and Texts* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981), 2.

to observe the liturgy in the manner which the founders and benefactors specified, it was obliged to cultivate musicians and music."[4] Ironically, despite the importance of musicians and their necessity to the church, their work was not given the honor we would likely expect today:

> Not a single piece of church music by Dufay,[5] for instance, is known to have been copied into any manuscript written later than a dozen years after his death...the church composer wrote music which he himself would've been surprised to hear sung even thirty years later. As a creative artist contributing to the worship of God, his offering was on a level comparable with that of the parish ladies who arrange the flowers on Christmas Eve—a genuine contribution to the overall effect, pretty while it lasts, but not destined for more than immediate use, and therefore of only limited value and esteem.[6]

But even though the mass composer was valued on the same level as the church florist, the sheer necessity of music for worship put the composer in a unique position: rather than creating art for the sole enjoyment of the benefactor, the church composer also wrote to satisfy the Almighty—who, Bowers notes, "was not in a good position to communicate his wishes in any detail."[7] This meant that, compared to other artists of their time, church composers were left with "a quite unusual degree of initiative and artistic freedom."[8]

Given the relative freedom they possessed to be creative, how did the composers choose to write their music? Within their freedom, they were still confined to the structure of the mass. The daily mass, known as the *mass ordinaire*, contained five essential chants: *Kyrie*, *Gloria*, *Credo*, *Sanctus*, and *Agnus Dei*. Musically, there were a variety of ways the composers could arrange them, but they often followed certain formal patterns. By the fifteenth century, one common way of composing mass music was a form that came to be known as the *cantus firmus* mass (also called the tenor mass). This method originated in England but spread to the Continent, where it became the most common form of mass.[9] What distinguished the *cantus firmus* mass from other mass forms was the way in which the same *cantus firmus* line was used throughout each of the mass movements, providing a unifying structure. While the precise reasons for organizing a mass this way are unknown, theorists have speculated that it was to "unify the movements of the mass into an integrated whole"[10] or simply to please the institutions and private patrons who "commissioned settings of the Mass Ordinary for specific occasions or devotional services" by using tunes that had some correlation either to the occasion or to the patron (the *cantus firmus* tune was not necessarily a new melody written by the composer of the mass).[11] These correlating tunes were the backbone of a subcategory of the *cantus firmus* mass: the imitation (or parody) mass.

THE IMITATION MASS FORM

Imitation masses were *cantus firmus* masses whose *cantus firmus* line was based on a pre-existing melody. The melodies which composers chose for the *cantus firmus* line could be sacred or secular depending on what the patron wanted or what best suited the occasion; the tune would often be chosen to refer to the saint to whom the mass was written or to the institution/ individual patron who sponsored the mass.[12] Although composers wrote many masses based on the tunes from secular songs during the early days of the imitation mass, they would

[4] Fenlon, *Music in Medieval and Early Modern Europe*, 3
[5] A famous early Renaissance composer; he also wrote an especially beautiful *l'homme armé* mass.
[6] Fenlon, *Music in Medieval*, 13.
[7] Fenlon, *Music in Medieval*, 15.
[8] Fenlon, *Music in Medieval*, 15.
[9] Peter J. Burkholder, Donald J. Grout, and Claude V. Palisca, *A History of Western Music*, 7th ed (New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 2006), 185.
[10] Burkholder, Grout, and Palisca, *A History of Western Music*, 186.
[11] Burkholder, *A History,* 187.
[12] Burkholder, *A History*, 187.

eventually receive backlash against this practice. When this issue was addressed by church authorities during one of the sessions of the Council of Trent in 1562, the church ruled: "Let them keep away from the churches composition in which there is an intermingling of the lascivious or impure, whether by instrument or voice."[13] And those at the Council had good reason to be concerned about interweaving secular songs into the mass: medieval literature was not lacking in colorful descriptions! Medievals may not have been able to create R-rated films, but that certainly did not stop them from writing equally lascivious poetry which would then be set to music. Although it may have been possible to argue against the church forbidding intermingling instrumental music with the mass as the immoral words would not be directly quoted, the logic behind that ruling is quite clear. The purpose of weaving in the melodies of other songs was to create connections by association. If the hearers of the mass were thinking about the associations of the original song, their minds would become focused on sin rather than on the holy mass.

Despite the eventual censorship of these bawdy songs from the church, it is worthwhile to consider how it was that composers were able to seamlessly weave together sacred masses with secular songs with little church outcry or censorship for many years. Perhaps the allure for these strange bedfellows lay in the way in which sacred and secular were already intermingled or the air of freedom composers of the time had, as referenced earlier by Bowers. Whatever the case, with these masses (while they lasted), the patrons were honored, the church gained her necessary music, and composers received their necessary compensation while still using the opportunity to explore more creative musical options which might not have been quite as sacred as one would expect for sacred music (but, as Bowers might point out, the Almighty never vocally objected to this, although—understandably—his more vocal Bride the Church eventually did).

IMITATION MASS CASE STUDY: THE L'HOMME ARME MASS

The history behind the *l'homme armé* mass stems from the history of the imitation mass form; the *l'homme armé* mass is essentially an imitation mass based on the *l'homme armé* tune. To understand the historical significance of this mass, then, we must first examine the history of the basic tune and the context of the early masses. While historians are unable to discern exactly from whence the melody originated, it is likely that the *l'homme armé* tune has an early connection with the fifteenth-century Burgundian court. More specifically, it was probably linked to the Order of the Golden Fleece,[14] founded in 1430 under Philip the Good of Burgundy (reigned 1419-1467), and the Burgundian call for another crusade in the 1450s,[15] shortly after Mohammed II conquered Constantinople.[16] Although this crusade never happened,[17] the call for a crusade as a sign of piety or as a means of increasing wealth was still strong in the Burgundian court. Philip the Good's interest in the crusade movement is evidenced by the ornate copies of the *Livre d'Eracles* (a history of the first two crusades) he and other nobles in his court owned.[18] However, historian Jessica Dobratz argues that the possession of these books point not to a call for arms so much as for propaganda for a new crusade.[19]

Philip de Commines, who was the godson of Philip the Good[20] and became the chamberlain

[13] Andrew Kirkman, *The Cultural Life of the Early Polyphonic Mass: Medieval Context to Modern Revival* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 141.

[14] As Andrew Kirkman observed, religious orders of knights such as this one with their various ceremonies "are expressive of the close reciprocation - entirely characteristic of medieval power structures - between ecclesiastical and secular power" (Kirkman, *The Cultural Life*, 115).

[15] Burkholder, *A History*, 177, 187.

[16] Jessica M. Dobratz,"Conception and Reception of William of Tyre's 'Livre D'eracles' in 15th-Century Burgundy," "*Als Ich Can*," 1. (2002): 585.

[17] Burkholder, *A History*, 177.

[18] Dobratz,"Conception and Reception of William of Tyre's 'Livre D'eracles' in 15th-Century Burgundy," 583.

[19] Dobratz,"Conception and Reception," 584.

[20] Philippe de Commines and Jean de Troyes, *The Memoirs of Philip De Commines, Lord of Argenton: Containing the Histories of Louis XI, and Charles VIII, Kings of France, and of Charles the Bold, Duke of Burgundy; to Which Is Added, the Scandalous Chronicle, or Secret*

and councillor in the court of Philip the Good's son (Charles the Bold, reigned 1467-1477),[21] wrote an extensive set of memoirs at the request of the Archbishop of Vienne[22] recounting the events from 1464 to 1498, covering primarily Louis XI's reign (1461-1483). Although very little of the *Memoirs* proportionally covers Philip's time as duke (and it was not written to specifically describe that dukedom), it still gives a good picture of French courts during his lifetime. As much as the kings claimed piety—and may indeed have been pious men—these accounts show the immense amount of military activity that consumed court life...not necessarily the *chrétien* (Christian) character of *l'homme armé*. Yet, in the dedication of his book written to the archbishop, Commines candidly confesses what he thought of the king: "In him, and in all the rest of the princes which I have either served or known, I perceived ever a mixture of good and bad; for they are but men like us, and perfection belongs only to God Himself."[23] As Commines was also acquainted with Philip the Good of Burgundy (the one who had originally called for the crusade), we can assume that, in Commines's estimation at least, he had both good and bad mixed in him; his desire for another crusade was likely motivated by what would be considered both good (Christian piety) and bad (material gain).

Returning now to the relationship between the *l'homme armé* mass and the call for a crusade, let us now examine the evidence that points to the connection. Numerical patterns within the *l'homme armé* melody seem to relate it to the historical context of the Order of the Golden Fleece,[24] such as the fact that the melody is in units of thirty one and the Order had thirty-one knights. There is other historical evidence that points to its connection with the call for a crusade and possibly even the mustering of French troops.[25] William Prizer, one of the musicologists who first suggested this theory relating the *l'homme armé* mass to the crusades, draws attention to the connection between writing a mass for the patron saint of the Order and using this tune: "the tune would have been an apt one to use as the *cantus firmus* of a Mass of St. Andrew, the patron saint of the Order, chosen partly because of his associations with the area of the Black Sea around Nicopolis, territory the Order aimed to win back from the infidel Turks."[26] Writing a mass for the patron saint—a common practice—would have logically then related to the crusades, and using a tune entitled "The Armed Man" would have been entirely reasonable. Thus, as historians and musicologists piece together the story of the armed man and his song, it is quite possible that the *l'homme armé* mass may have originated as an occasional mass composed around the time of the call for a new crusade; the composers of the *l'homme armé* masses used the imitation form with a tune that already typified the crusade movement.

Although this hypothesis is accepted among many musicologists, others argue for a slightly different link between the tune and the mass. Alejandro Planchart's paper on the history of the *l'homme armé* mass is the story of one red herring after another as musicologists attempted to discover the origins of the piece; ultimately, he concludes that it could not have been a preexisting folk song worked into the mass but was more likely a composed work (art song) directly written for the Order of the Golden Fleece to mock the Turks, and it was only later used as a cantus firmus for a mass for the Order.[27] This means that the tune was never without some sacred connotation, although the sacred meaning would certainly have been less direct before it was worked into the mass. A correlating theory to

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History of Louis XI., by Jean De Troyes, ed. Andrew R. Scoble (London: Henry G. Bohn, York Street, Covent Garden, 1855), xii.

[21] Commines and Troyes, *The Memoirs of Philip De Commines*, xiii.

[22] Commines, *The Memoirs*, xlv.

[23] Commines, *The Memoirs*, xlvi.

[24] Relating music patterns to numerical patterns to represent a deeper hidden meaning was a popular compositional technique of the time.

[25] David Fallows, "L'homme armé," *Grove Music Online*, ed. Deane L. Root (Oxford Music Online), http://www.oxfordmusiconline.com/subscriber/article/grove/music/16553?q=L%27homm+arme&search=quick&pos=1&_start=1#firsthit (accessed 16 October 2015).

[26] Richard Taruskin, "Antoine Busnoys and the '*L'Homme armé*' Tradition," (*Journal of the American Musicological Society* 39, no. 2 (1986)): 272.

[27] Alejandro Planchart, "The Origins and Early History of *L'homme armé,*" The Journal of Musicology 20, no. 3 (2003): 312.

this conclusion is the belief that the "armed man" of the song is Christ Himself.[28] Although the theory that the song was written along with the call for a crusade contradicts the beliefs of other musicologists who posit that the tune was written separately and later incorporated into the mass, both theories posit that the link between the sacred and secular, the holy mass and the pop song, was the crusades: the holy war to free Jerusalem fought by fearsome (and often quite secular) knights. Thus the *l'homme armé* mass was simply one small example of the already blurred lines between sacred and secular during the time of the medieval Holy Wars.

Turning now from the history of the tune itself to the history of the early *l'homme armé* masses, it is generally thought that Antoine Busnoys, who worked solely in Franco-Flemish circles as a member of the so-called Burgundian school,[29] was the first to write a *l'homme armé* mass.[30] This would start a trend that would continue for roughly 250 years.[31] While we do not have concrete evidence that Busnoys was the very first to do so, renowned musicologist Oliver Strunk claims that the fact that his is among the earlier ones (written in the late 1470s or early 1480s) and that other composers, such as Jacob Obrecht, wrote masses that are well-described as "colossal 'parod[ies]'" of Busnoys gives credence to this thought.[32] In analyzing various early *l'homme armé* masses, musicologist Richard Taruskin concluded that there is "no compelling reason to assume that any *L'Homme armé* Mass is earlier than Busnoys's and some good reasons to agree with Strunk's rather tentative suggestion that his was, indeed, the first."[33] This makes Busnoys's contribution to the *l'homme armé* tradition quite valuable, both because he was the progenitor of the tradition and because of the number of composers and music theorists, likely including Dufay himself, who quoted[34] Busnoys's mass.[35]

In analyzing the musical structure of various *l'homme armé* masses, it is apparent that, while they are based off of the same melody, none of the *l'homme armé* masses use exactly the same form of the melody. Although many manuscripts of *l'homme armé* masses exist, there is only one documented version of the original melody in its entirety (see Appendix A). This manuscript was discovered in 1925,[36] making the tantalizing mystery behind the *l'homme armé* mass a fairly recent one for musicologists to solve.[37] In unwinding the story behind the basic structure and origins of the tune itself, musicologist David Fallows concludes that "it is reasonable to assume that it [the *l'homme armé* tune] had an unwritten origin and was monophonic."[38] Fallows continues to describe why composers found this melody particularly appealing for the tenor line of a mass cycle other than the likely connection to the crusades (this is assuming that the original song was not written specifically for the

[28] Kirkman, *The Cultural Life*, 98.
[29] Taruskin, "Antoine Busnoys," 266.
[30] This has been the more traditional thought, but Alejandro Planchart challenges this thought and provides evidence in favor of Dufay and Ockeghem as being the first two composers of *l'homme armé* masses in his article "The Origins and Early History of *L'homme armé*."
[31] Interest in the *l'homme armé* tune has revived in recent years, and composers have once again been using this tune in their modern compositions. To my knowledge, the most recent major work based off of *l'homme armé* is in South African composer David Earl's 2013 clarinet concerto.
[32] Oliver W. Strunk, *Essays on Music in the Western World* (New York: W.W. Norton, 1974), 68.
[33] Taruskin, "Antoine Busnoys," 260.
[34] In the era these works were composed, quoting another composer—which basically meant lifting their music and placing it one's own music—was viewed as a compliment to the composer. This is quite different from the modern view; in 2003, Bob Dylan was accused of plagiarism, which he, in turn, argued was part of the quotation/appropriation tradition (Chris Francescani, "Bob Dylan says plagiarism charges made by 'wussies and pussies,'" Reuters, 13 Sept. 2012, accessed 19 Oct. 2015, http://uk.reuters.com/article/2012/09/13/music-bobdylan-plagiarism-idUKL1E8KCKTK20120913).
[35] Taruskin, "Antoine Busnoys," 263-265.
[36] Planchart, "The Origins and Early History," 307.
[37] The mystery has been so tantalizing to musicologists that rather sharp disagreements seem to have arisen from it; the books and papers I read on the *l'homme armé* tradition contain sections where the musicologists will go point-by-point on why the others are wrong. In writing this paper, I attempted to highlight the most important and least disputed conclusions.
[38] Fallows, "L'homme armé" *Grove Music Online*, ed. Deane L. Root.

Order):

> its tripartite division makes it singularly well suited for use as the *cantus firmus* in a mass cycle. Other useful features include: the move into a higher register for the middle section coupled with the high A giving a sense of a different tonal centre; the leaps of a 4th and a 5th combined with falling lines at the ends of sections; and the motivic economy of the melody.[39]

Although the precise origins of *l'homme armé* will likely remain a mystery which can never be fully solved, it is clear that the imagery between the song and the crusades resemble each other, and that, musically speaking, the melody contained many qualities which made it ideal for early Renaissance masses.

CONCLUSIONS

Society in fifteenth-century Europe was characterized by the seamless interweaving of sacred and secular. The questions we must ask of this era are not, then, about what evidence there is of the blending between the two; rather, we must ask what were the common threads that allowed for such a blended culture. In the case of the *l'homme armé* mass, the connection lies not in some profound relationship between the church musician and secular culture but by simple reasoning from association: either the tune *l'homme armé* was originally secular and had no immediate connection to Christ but came to mind when the first composer of the *l'homme armé* masses was asked to write a mass either specifically for the Order of the Golden Fleece (or in honor of St. Andrew, who was the patron saint of the Order), or it was directly written for the crusaders with Christ being represented as the "Armed Man." If the first option is true, because it was already common practice to use pre-existing tunes that related to the patron or saint as the tenor line of the mass, it was logical to choose a tune about an armed man that was to be feared—after all, that was the goal of the crusaders! Besides this connection, the musical qualities of the melody made it an exceptional choice for a tenor line, prompting other composers who were not associated with the Order to also write masses based off of this tune after the Order composers had begun the trend.

The original quotation of the tune was most likely not simply due to the musical qualities of the melody. Placed in historical context, there was a definite reason for using the *l'homme armé* tune. It was not as if the original mass composer had a song in his head and decided to use it for the mass—or as if a modern church musician was listening to Taylor Swift's "Shake It Off" and inserted it into the worship service solely because it was a catchy tune.[40] It was his way of portraying the crusade movement to the culture in which he lived. Yet, at the same time, the *l'homme armé* mass did bear some resemblance to the modern church musicians who quote—or at least model their worship music after—pop artists. The composers of the *l'homme armé* masses wrote for the people; the tune was chosen to cater to a popular audience (the patrons who sponsored them). The modern church musician also writes for the people, only, rather than writing to one specific sponsor, today's musician writes for the aggregate sponsor of the modern church. Consequently, church musicians, regardless of the age in which they compose, face the challenge of writing and performing for both the secular patrons who pay them as well as the sacred Patron to whom the music is directed.

The fifteenth-century church, already in the midst of a culture that blended the sacred and secular, balanced the challenge of the double patron by composing music such as the *l'homme armé* mass, using sacred words with secular melodies. Today's musicians are faced with the added challenge of living in a culture hostile to the concept of sacredness; when the Council of Trent addressed the issue of secularizing worship by blending music, it spoke to a culture in which the sacred was recognized—blended with the secular perhaps, but still accompanied by a concept of holiness that modern culture often fails to recognize. Some have tried to reclaim the sacred

[39] Fallows, "L'homme armé."

[40] On the other hand, if Planchart's theory is correct and even the *l'homme armé* song was written directly for the Order of the Golden Fleece, the composer of *l'homme armé* may deserve the credit for being one of the founders of the Christian crossover song genre.

by holding Taizé services or creating other distinct avenues of worship intended to focus the worshiper's mind on things away from this world. But what about the average American church service—is there even room for the Holy Uncommon? Or has it already become wholly common? We live in the midst of an audio-visual culture, a people group that lives for sensory experience. How to communicate the otherness of the spiritual—a realm beyond the experience of the human senses—is the challenge of the Christian musician seeking the sacred.
One approach to this conundrum is to attempt to create an environment of such heightened sensory experience that the worshippers are overwhelmed by the feeling of an outside Presence and enter into a state of emotional otherness. This group of Christians often incorporates elements of culture which would likely have been outlawed by the Council of Trent as "lascivious or impure" simply because of their close ties with secular culture; this could include everything from using pop melodies to rock instrumentation to lyrics portraying Christ in a way that is more culturally savvy than biblically descriptive.[41] Yet sincere Christians adamantly cling to these songs as a means of drawing near to the Lord in worship. Other Christian musicians take a different approach, instead trying to create an awareness of the set-apart sacred by worshipping with an attitude of "reverence and godly fear" separating it from culture, as described in Hebrews 12:28 (NKJV), focusing not on the sense experience but instead attempting to shape the thoughts of the worshippers. Christians of this conviction often focus on creating an otherness in worship by treating it as a solemn occasion in which the Church triumphant, spanning the ages, worships the Lord, often using the same words and melodies as Christians of past centuries. Ironically, though, it is *this* group of Christians—not the first—who would be more likely to look to the tradition of the ancient mass as a way of finding the sacred... including the *l'homme armé* mass. Granted, the secular cultural context of the mass is more or less lost in today's world, yet it still remains a foundational element of the piece.

Is there any clear answer to the question of worship—can one simply draw a line that certain things are not appropriate for worship under any circumstance, or is the question a question relative to the individual believer? However the question is answered, it is one that ought to be addressed and wrestled with in all its complexity, past and present. It remains to be seen how the balance in modern Christianity (broadly speaking) will be found...and how later generations will analyze and question the methods used to obtain it.

Appendix B: *L'homme armé* tune in modern notation:[42]

Click here to see the image.

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[41] An example that comes to mind of this type of worship song would be "How He Loves," in which Christ is described by the lyrics "Heaven meets earth like a sloppy wet kiss."
[42] Fallows, "L'homme armé."

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