Running the Race for an Imperishable Crown: The Desire for Glory as an Essential Component of the Christian Virtue of Magnanimity

Abstract

In this paper, I will first provide (1a) a brief account of Aristotle’s virtue ethics and (1b) a summary of his portrait of the moral virtue of magnanimity (megalopsychia) in particular, emphasizing how essential the desire for glory clearly is to his portrait. I will then (2) outline two common features of contemporary secular critiques of Aristotle’s portrait of the magnanimous man: first, (2a) contemporary secular critiques almost universally mistakenly identify the magnanimous man’s desire for glory as one of his greatest flaws. Many therefore attempt to explain that desire away, removing it from the portrait of a magnanimous man; this calls into question whether the portrait can be salvaged at all. And yet, second, many of these critiques do also (2b) rightly identify two irreconcilable tensions in Aristotle’s account, given the magnanimous man’s desire for glory. I will then argue (3) for what I believe is a correct Christian reimagining of the Aristotelian virtue of magnanimity which affirms the magnanimous person’s desire for glory, and in doing so, actually succeeds in salvaging Aristotle’s portrait. To do so, I will first argue, along with other Christian interpreters, (3a) that Aquinas’s Christian recasting of the Aristotelian virtue of magnanimity readily resolves the two irreconcilable tensions secular commentators often identify in Aristotle’s account, but will then (3b) outline a common contemporary Christian dismissal—the very same dismissal characterizing secular commentators’ perspectives—of the magnanimous person’s desire for glory, which, again, would call into question whether the portrait can be salvaged at all (3c) and reply to that dismissal by citing the authority of Aquinas himself in addition to Christian apologist C.S. Lewis and Thomist philosopher Josef Pieper to affirm the goodness and rightness of a magnanimous Christian’s desire for glory.